# Marine Corps Gazette

DECEMBER 1961

FIFTY CENTS

**IN PRODUCTION AND NOW FLYING.** Specifically designed to fill the need for an all-service heavy transport helicopter, HC-1Bs are now in large-scale production. With less than five hours logged following initial forward flight, the first HC-1B flew 150 miles an hour—at a gross weight higher than normal maximum. Since then it has flown at 150 mph for long periods, under various operating conditions. Pilots' test reports consistently read "No major problems." The new helicopter, in addition to aircraft carrier compatibility, embodies the features required by both the U. S. Army and U. S. Marine Corps—large cargo compartment, rear loading ramp, freedom from balance problems and inherent flotation capability.




BOEING VERTOL HC-1B CHINOOK AT 1,500 FEET DURING FLIGHT TEST.

VERTOL DIVISION
MORTON PENNSYLVANIA
BOEING

# Marine Corps 1961

*The Marine Corps Association Newsletter*

*An unofficial digest of news of interest to our members*

Vol. 45, Number 12 | Marine Corps Gazette | December, 1961

## "Grim Determination, But No Hate"—CMC

Staff officers who accompanied CMC Gen D. M. Shoup on his three-week inspection trip through the Pacific haven't quite caught their breath yet. It was a working trip, and they can testify to that. The Commandant went to see and speak with thousands of his Marines as priority one. He did. (See cut.)

**CMC in Hawaii**

Everywhere he went, reporters sought appointments. They got them, but at such times as during Sunday morning breakfast. But the story was worth it. Some "Shoupisms":

*Combat readiness*—"Marine combat units . . . are ready. There's grim determination to be ready out there."

*The M-14 rifle*—Not all Marines have it, but (not) "a single enemy will remain unshot for this reason."

*Why Marines Fight*—"We don't indoctrinate hate against anyone. We're professionals. We fight any enemy the President designates. We try to make good citizens."

*4th Marine Division*—"In case of mobilization, it will be my plan to use the 1st Marine Brigade Hq as a nucleus for a 4th Marine Division . . . not necessarily based in Hawaii."

CMC brought back to Washington military decorations from The Republics of Korea, China, and the Philippines; some more saki bottles for his collection; and a list of questions and comments for his staff about field conditions—still priority one.

### COMMANDANT'S CHRISTMAS MESSAGE—1961

To all Marines, and to their families, I extend my warmest personal greetings and my very best wishes for a Merry Christmas.

In the spirit of the season, we turn our thoughts to the Star of Bethlehem, to the three wise men of the Orient who traveled far bearing gifts, and to the Child in a manger. As we recall the story of the birth of Christ, we are inspired again by its promise of peace and brotherhood.

It is a promise, we know, that can be fulfilled only when the dignity of the individual and the freedom of the mind and spirit are recognized throughout the world. These are the ideals of America and the free world. They are ideals which Marines stand ready to defend against any forces of tyranny and aggression.

On this Christmas of 1961, may we recall the age-old words "on earth, peace, good will toward men" with renewed meaning and rededicate ourselves to the service of right and freedom.

May the spirit of Christmas be with Marines and all who are dear to them not only at this season but throughout the coming year.

GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP

### Target: Shooting For All Marines

Are team shots necessary? You bet, says CMC—if you've got enough teams.

To get enough teams, Marksmanship Br, G-3 has breathed life into the old (1955) RTE program which okayed match-conditioned weapons for commanders who "have shown a positive interest in competitive shooting."

For the new breed, RTE means Rifle Team Equipment, rifles and pistols honed to match caliber by skilled armorers. At last count, 139 commands had it. New MCO 3591.13 tells them how to use it:

- Set up intra-command marksmanship program to sharpen shooting eyes of all Marines.
- Encourage inter-command competition.
- Adhere to formal training schedule.
- Encourage new, untrained shooters to get with the program.
- Train shooters for annual Competition-in-Arms program.

To help with the program, individual command rifle and pistol teams are authorized; formal, full time teams for major commands. Other commands may form part-time teams for same purpose.

### Decorations & Awards

Newest decoration for Marines: Sec Nav Commendation Achievement Award. Who's eligible?

- Junior officers who have made an outstanding contribution to service and country in operations, administration or management.
- Enlisted Marines who have rendered superior leadership achievement.

Object of award: More tangible recognition than an "outstanding" fitness report.

The ribbon, first new decoration for Marines since Navy Commendation Ribbon was approved in 1944, is green with two orange stripes. None have been awarded yet but at least four recommendations (for Marines) have been channeled to SecNav Connally who will present the first one.

# Air-Ground Reserves Face Bigger Test in '62

An array of comments on final phase of RESMOBEX (Reserve Mobilization Exercise) held this summer at CamPen and CamLej may hold the key to a successful 1962 East/West Coast Reserve Air-Ground Exercise.

Reservists at CamLej spent three days in combat exercises, were evaluated by their opposite numbers in 2dMarDiv. Some comments were harsh: "Knows little or nothing about nothing." Mostly though, regulars had warm praise for reserves: "Glad to have 'em aboard."

A few reported weaknesses in Reserve training:

- Junior NCOs lacked aggressive leadership.
- Some lack of knowhow in basic subjects, i.e., hand and arm signals, cover and concealment, small unit tactics.
- Physically unprepared for sustained offensive operations.

Purpose of RESMOBEX was to find out how well organized Reserve units will mesh with FMF. Final answer is yet to come. Two big exercises next year may help decide.

CMC has provided reserve COs with a general concept of operations but stresses that it's for guidance only. Staffs will develop their own strategy. Guidance for actions on both coasts is the same:

- Operations will consist of aggressor-opposed, umpire-controlled field exercises, both air and ground units, task organized as MEB. Assigned missions will include seizing and consolidating battalion size objectives defended by Aggressor forces. Supporting arms, CAS, and helicopter support is a must.
- Minimum four-day problem beginning with training on squad/fire team level, progressing in stages through brigade.
- Hold a CPX on first day of exercise, bring in troops on evening of second. Position will be defensive. To meet the Aggressors, unit commanders are to rely on all aspects of a defensive situation, blocking and counter-attacking. On third day begin normal offensive operations.
- I&I will umpire their own units, minimize interference with reserve COs.

CMC has stressed these objectives:

► Training of the individual Marine to make him "the most efficient fighting machine in the world." Keep him informed.

► Give small unit leaders, officers and enlisted, their heads.

► Officers and NCOs should acquire an appreciation of how weather, terrain, logistics, the enemy, can influence combat operations.

East Coast exercise is slated for 16-27 July at CamLej, West Coast for 20-31 Aug at 29 Palms. Troop list:

| East Coast | | West Coast | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1stAntiTkCo | 1st105mmHowBtry | 1stTrkCo | 7thAntiTkCo |
| 5thInfBn | 2d105mmHowBtry | 7thInfBn | 14thRifCo |
| 2dReconBn | 3d105mmHowBtry | 35thRifCo | 9thTrkCo |
| 50thRifCo | 51stRifCo | 9thTrkCo | 9thInfBn |
| 84thRifCo | 11thInfBn | 10thInfBn | 3dReconCo |
| 74thRifCo | 88thRifCo | 25thRifCo | 3d105mmHowBtry |
| 7thEngCo | 4th105mmHowBn | 5th105mmHowBtry | |
| 5thTrkCo | 1stCommCo | CommCo, 2dCommSptBn | |
| *48thRifCo | *61stRifCo | *15thInfBn | *15thRifCo |
| *99thRifCo | | *67thRifCo | *82dRifCo |

*Aggressors

Air elements have not ben announced but will consist of 1 MASS, 2 VMF(AW), 1 HMR, 1 Det, VMO, from 2d and 3d MAWs, (for respective coast). MARTC will furnish 1 MACS, 2 VMA for each coast.

### Marines at Work

And how did you spend the 186th Anniversary? Here's where some Marines were spending 10 Nov:

- **Col E. J. Doyle's** 14th MEU—afloat off Vieques. (They make their Onslow Beach landing 5 Dec, after long maneuvers.)
- The "Med battalion" (**LtCol Sam Davis'** 3/2)—Barcelona, Spain.
- BLTs 1/3, 2/9, 3dTkBn and 3dAT Bn—slopes of Mt. Fujiyama, Japan. (1/3 returned to Okinawa 10 days later, 1/9 is to return before Christmas, tankers and antitankers stay 'til end of Jan for firing, CW training.)
- Part of 3dReconBn—Thailand. (They arrived 10 Nov for combined Reconex with Thai Marines.)
- Rehabilitated Aggressors 2/7 (**LtCol F. R. Young**)—Honolulu. (SILVER SWORD chores completed with an "excellent" mark from brigade CG, **MajGen R. G. Weede,** 2/7 continued transplacing, became 2/3.)

But cake takers for an exotic cake cutting scene were Marines of **LtCol J. D. Boldman's** SOLANT AMITY III detachment. The task force anchored at 0° latitude, 0° longitude for the occasion. (It's in Gulf of Guinea—next call, Freetown, Sierra Leone.)

That set the tropic scene. Meanwhile, 3/1 was planning for the snow, at Bridgeport CWTC, in 1st SNOWFEX of year (13Nov-3Dec).

1stMarBrig, SILVER SWORD veterans, are still talking about: Maui terrain, the real gully-washing Kona storm (allegedly scheduled by exercise control), the LCpl photographer whose flashbulb sniped **LtGen Alan Shapley,** CG FMFPAC, and the great work done by MAG-13 base troopers in refurbishing unused Dillingham Field.

7th Fleet's Instant Marines (BLT 3/3 and HMR-262) are working out in the Zambales training area (north of Subic in the Philippines.) BLT 1/9 arrives in early December, flexes muscles in training for about a week, then relieves 3/3.

**LtCol Fred Watts'** VMF-323, now aboard *USS Lexington* in WesPac, shook down for its afloat tour with 84 sorties, 133 hours, 72 landings as part of naval forces in Operation COVERED WAGON.

1stMarDiv work attracts presidents. Watching vertical assault on Combat Town: Finnish President Urho Kekkonen. Helo service by MAG-36.

Almost observed: BLT 1/5, in a routine landing 18 Nov over CamPen's White Beach, one of the first of the Corps' 187th year of operations.

Last of three NGF spotter training exercises by 11th Marines is slated for San Clemente Island this month. Coordinator: **LtCol Coburn Marston.**

# Watch Your Credit Line!

Just how bad is a (valid) letter of indebtedness in your record? Obviously it doesn't help promotion. But it's a *pattern* of such letters that hurts. Besides selections for promotions, each enlisted selection board also screens the "cases" to note substandard performance.

Financial irresponsibility is the major bad trait found (at least it's the first sign of trouble to get in the record in many cases.) Others: drinking, bad fitness reports, personal behavior, disciplinary status or repeated minor infractions, and unsatisfactory performance of duty.

If the board finds a bad pattern, it may recommend any of the following:

- A letter of warning.
- Probation (requiring HQMC authority to reenlist).
- A board to determine competency (Para 6302, MarCorPersMan).
- Probation until eligible for FMCR.
- Immediate transfer to FMCR, or retirement.
- Immediate administrative separation.

"Probation" implies future good behavior, naturally. Terms may require a special fitness report in six months (such as a sworn financial statement for debtors) plus the CO's recommendation as to whether the Marine should be retained.

Also note that in applying for enlistment past 20 years, your record is screened for the same patterns of substandard behavior. This makes one important point very clear: that letter of indebtedness stays in your record —forever. (Also see page 55.)

# DoD Decisions

According to *Air Force,* original USAF recommendation for the combined TAC-STRAC command (STRIKE) was that Fleet Marine Forces be included. Other press reports state that there were also proposals to earmark Navy amphibious forces. Neither was adopted.

SecDef McNamara's reaction? In his press conference announcing the merger, he said an aim was to get the sort of integrated effort the Marine Corps already has.

Affecting this year's procurement "buy" is a decision not to spend for two long-lead-time ordnance items: tanks and the 175mm gun. Marine Corps will use this money for modernizing existing tanks and more tank ammo.

About $20 million will go to replace engine, power train, and improve fire control of M48 tanks. Another $10 million goes to buy 120mm ammo for the M103 tank. Both tanks will be around well into the sixties.

Personnel requirements for the new integrated Defense Supply Agency (DSA) and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) are beginning to filter down. It appears both may require more Marine billets than originally predicted.

# Focus on PHIBRON

The Navy is reemphasizing amphibious warfare for "the long twilight struggle." Two straws in the wind:

- The word's been passed that amphibious billets—especially as PHIBRON commanders—will help careers.
- Commander Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet (COMPHIBLANT) is pushing the Navy side of amphibious research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E).

Amphibious Warfare Evaluation Board (AWEB) has been activated with COMPHIBTRALANT (RAdm J. S. McCain, Jr.) as chairman. CNO has approved an Amphibious Development Requirements Unit under COMPHIBTRALANT to serve as the permanent staff for AWEB. It's not fully manned yet, but has been busy getting briefings from BuShips, ONR, MCLFDC.

Members of the board come from major LANTFLT amphibious commands. Object: to provide an activity to screen ideas or gadgets. Already 100 ideas are in the works, running from control of boat waves to changes in LST pumping systems.

The new set-up replaces the Naval Amphibious Test and Evaluating Unit (NAT&EU) which was shut down in 1959 for lack of money and people.

### Well-Shod Marines

A new, improved dry/cold boot is on order; delivery date: May '62. Boot is white rubber, insulated well enough to do job of current felt cold weather boot which in bitter cold needs reinforcing mukluks. Old boot, mukluk and white socks go completely out when new boot comes in. Wear black, cushion sole socks with new boot.

Coming on: a new, standard combat boot. It will do job of three types of boots now in use. Complete details of new combat boot have been withheld pending final approval by DoD.

### Medical Fronts

Naval Reserve has begun recruiting Surgical Teams, three doctors, 13 HM, for FMF billets in time of war. Goal is 24 teams . . . IG was pleased to find that 2dMAW Marines showed a big improvement in First Aid knowhow over past inspections . . . 1963 model field ambulances will probably be equipped with two-way radio . . . 2dMAW medics popped IG's eyes with hot running water in wards and operating room of 20-bed hospital set up on Bogue Field. How hot water in the field? Piped in from field shower unit that carries portable hot water heater. Pipe was cumshawed.

### VTOL Launched

These three aerospace firms will have a hand in developing proposed four-service VTOL (Vertical Take-Off and Landing) transport aircraft: Ling-Temco-Vought, Ryan and Hiller.

VTOL program has been announced as a $70 million project, could grow to more if research covers concepts other than lifting men and gear. Services have kicked in more than $20 million from FY '61 and '62 budgets, will share rest of costs over four-year period.

### Christmas Leave

Marines in recruit training will stay on the job during holidays. For other Marines in CONUS two 10-day leave periods have been announced:

17-18 Dec to 27-28 Dec

28-29 Dec to 7-8 Jan

**Troop Tests, Phase II**

# Service & Support: No Best Answer Yet

After a year of Troop Tests and studies to determine optimum combat support/combat service organization and equipment for the mid-range period (1962-68), HQMC now has a 7 lb, 14 oz bundle on its doorstep. Its parentage is uncertain; its chances for adoption are dubious.

Test directives had FMFLANT test two "functional" type organizations; FMFPAC, two "commodity" type. After tests in GREENLIGHT III, CG, 1st MarDiv recommended forgetting the whole commodity idea. CG FMFPAC and CMCLFDA concurred. CG 2dMarDiv and CG FMLANT didn't like either functional setup, combined them. MCLFDC thus had only one proposal to evaluate—and modified that.

Result: a T/O that will tell planners about how many and what kinds of support and service machines and Marines they'll need in a few years, but which Quantico would like to restudy and rework.

Here are the highlights:

► At Force level, Force Service Regiment would have an H&S Bn, a Supply Bn, and a Maintenance Bn. The Engineer Bn would include a Bridge Co. The MT Bn would have one Truck Co, One Amphibious Truck (AmTrk) Co, and a Transport Co (See Force MT, GAZETTE: Oct '61).


HQ, SERVICE COMMAND FLEET MARINE FORCE
ENG BN FMF 54 Off 1252 Enl
MT BN FMF 27 Off 542 Enl
HQ CO 17 Off 167 Enl
SVC CO 7 Off 293 Enl
ENG CO 6 Off 158 Enl
BRIDGE CO 6 Off 160 Enl
H&S CO 9 Off 116 Enl
TRUCK CO 6 Off 142 Enl
AMTRK CO 6 Off 142 Enl
TRANSP CO 6 Off 142 Enl
FORCE SERVICE REGIMENT 179 Off 4122 Enl
H&S BN 71 Off 1427 Enl
SUP BN 60 Off 1666 Enl
H&S CO 40 Off 338 Enl
SVC CO 9 Off 302 Enl
TRUCK CO 6 Off 259 Enl
COMM CO 10 Off 276 Enl
LONGSHOREMAN CO 6 Off 252 Enl
H&S CO 14 Off 126 Enl
SUP CO 10 Off 409 Enl
RATION CO 7 Off 229 Enl
AMMO CO 17 Off 407 Enl
BULK FUEL CO 12 Off 495 Enl
MAINT BN 46 Off 1029 Enl
ELEC MAINT CO 8 Off 145 Enl
H&S CO 12 Off 93 Enl
ENG MAINT CO 5 Off 167 Enl
MT MAINT CO 4 Off 245 Enl
GEN SUP MAINT CO 4 Off 92 Enl
ORD MAINT CO 15 Off 287 Enl

► At division level, support and service units would be grouped in a bobtailed version of the Force Service Regiment, called "Service Regiment." Svc Regt would include a new Shore Party Bn. It would have an organic capability for supply of Cl I (rations & water), Cl III (fuel) and Cl V (ammo). Communicators would be grouped for training in a division Communications Bn. There'd be no big reduction of division Headquarters Bn,

(See **Troop Test**, next page)

## News Roundup

**Thanks and Five:** To **LtCol M. B. Roush** ExO, MAG-32, who told us VMA-324 belongs to MAG-32, and that new CO of new MAG-31 is **LtCol H. L. Walter,** not **Col W. M. Lundin** who remains CO of MAG-32. While on the subject, first CO of old MAG-31 was **MajGen R. K. Rottet** who at the time was a young (31) major . . . **Christmas Shoppers:** CherPt MX is offering layaway service, one third down, balance in two equal payments by 20 Dec. . . . **Keeping Fit:** 1stMar Div is staying in shape (among other ways) by regular use of weight-training gyms. Ten gyms are planned. First to open for business (at Camp Las Pulgas) is run by **Capt G. E. Ottot,** author of "Are You a 297-lb Weakling?" (GAZETTE: Oct '60.

**New Year, New Rifle:** Recruits at MCRD, San Diego will shoulder M14 rifle early in '62. A Cleveland firm—Thompson, Ramo & Wooldridge—has been signed up to speed delivery. Eight million dollar contract will buy 100,000 rifles. . .

**Headline of Year:** WM AIR-DELIVERED TO MARINES AT SEA (MCAS, Kaneohe *Windward Marine*). Story line dealt with newspapers of the same name . . . **China Clipper:** 1stMAW's VMR-253 has resumed navigational training flights to Hong Kong. Flights leave Iwakuni every three days . . . **It's a Great Life:** Look for **LtCol M. J. Sexton's** 3/3 in an early issue of *Life* Magazine.

**Growing Up:** Potomac-based 2/22 is in BLT class since adding 2d105mm HowBtry, 2dPionPlt, 2dTkPlt and 2d AmTracPlt. FMFLant units will remain at CamLej, join **LtCol W. A. Leitner's** Bn if and when there's a deployment . . . LPH-7, abuilding at Philly Navy Yard, has a name. It's *USS Guadalcanal* . . . **Reserve Selection Boards:** Zone of consideration as used for Regulars now applies to Reserve majors. Promotion zone includes **Maj M. J. Impellitteri;** ZoC extends to and includes **Maj Owens.** Board sits 8Jan62.

**4thMarDiv Reunion:** In Pittsburgh, Pa., 28-30 Jun, '62; 15th get-together for veterans of Roi-Namur, Saipan, Tinian and Iwo Jima.

**Home Study:** New MCI course now available covers most of what a Marine needs to know about M60 MG. Ask for Course 03.20. Also, MCI rules on group study have been made more attractive . . . **The Long Search:** Planners are looking up to find power for high speed amphibians. A marine (lower case) version of the Lycoming T55 aircraft engine has been picked for Borg-Warner's LVW (Landing Vehicle, Wheeled) being developed for USMC. The gas turbine engine will also power engineering model LVH (Landing Vehicle, Hydrofoil).




## Troop Test, Contd

which would keep special staff sections (to be removed under commodity plan) and its MP Co.

► At infantry regimental level, the idea of an organic service unit was discarded.

The report also noted that the current organization has never been troop tested full scale in maneuvers, but that its troubles come more from lack of people and skills, than from organization.

Quantico wants to complete Phase III tests, particularly on logistics support of the wing, and get FMF comments on its Phase II study before firming up T/O. Included in the report are three other possible division organizations, a list of unresolved questions, a revision of basic logistics principles, and a set of searching criteria setting a new approach to how to build logistics T/O. In short, Quantico wants a complete overhaul of logistics doctrine first, then an organization to support it.

Actually, there's almost no disagreement on what units a Marine division or MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) needs. The problem is command and control. Requirements to group specialists in garrison lead to problems in task organizing for combat. The whole subject can stand much good, hard, professional thought.

Accordingly, in coming months the GAZETTE plans to delve deeper into this 7 lb, 14 oz study (3¾" thick) and report on basic problems in more detail. Comment and discussion by informed members will be particularly welcomed for submission to MESSAGE CENTER or OBSERVATION POST.

**Summary:** The past year's Troop Tests point up some professional problems, but reaffirm confidence that combat service and support organization for combat is basically sound. HQMC now has a set of improved T/O for study. These recognize the fact that a heavier division as proposed (added tanks, LVT, trucks, 155mm howitzers) requires more supplies and maintenance. But planners aren't satisfied, think they can do still better. Also, they want to be sure that they can logistically support the Marine Air Wing's new expeditionary capability, using SATS.

## Technological Obsolescence

Marines aren't being thrown out of work by automation, but new weapons are wiping out some MOS's in the MCR. Examples: Antiaircraft artillery, some aviation skills.

Then officers end up with a 9901 (basic) MOS. DivRes has just announced a continuing program, with personalized screening and assistance, to help such reserves retrain. Once accepted for retraining, you go through four steps:

1 Appropriate correspondence course.
2 Active duty for school training.
3 Active duty for OJT (two weeks) with the FMF the next year.
4 Follow-up refresher active duty OJT later.

See MCO 1571R.48 and *The Reserve Marine* for details on how to apply. Basically, DivRes asks a lot of data from which they can suggest an appropriate MOS you might want to seek. Where possible, civilian occupation will be considered.

## Option Play

If you turned down Contingency Option Act (USCOA) benefits when you completed 18 years service, you have another chance. It's the new Retired Servicemen's Family Protection Act. You can apply now if you don't plan to retire or transfer to FMCR for three years.

How does it work? Like insurance, to protect your family if you die after you retire. The government will deduct a small premium from your retired (or retainer) pay. In return, if you die, your family will get a specified portion of your pay.

Also note that if you wish a change, it can now take effect in three years instead of five. And the "death bed election" is out, which may reduce costs. If a serviceman now retires for disability, then dies, his widow can draw $112 a month and 12% of his active duty base pay under another program—the Survivor Benefits Act. She will not be eligible under the Family Protection Act.

Further information: See "Option Act: Elect or Decline" Jan '60 GAZETTE.

## Photo Play

You could win $50 for a naval (includes Marines) theme black and white photo taken during 1961. The U.S. Naval Institute offers ten prizes for its new annual review.

Send photo and negative to: Photo Editor, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. Deadline: 1630 15 Jan '62.

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# Marine Corps Gazette

**Professional Magazine for United States Marines**

*Published by the Marine Corps Association in order to provide a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps.*

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Has all the characteristics of ruggedness, versatility and dependability that are built into all 'Jeep' vehicles. It has litter capacity for three stretcher passengers or two stretchers and side seating capacity for four passengers. By easily removing the ambulance characteristics, it can be converted into a flexible ½ ton, 4-wheel drive cross-country vehicle.

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Carries 1,000 pounds . . . which is more than its own weight. Serves as a weapons carrier, chow wagon and litter carrier. Can be controlled from walking, riding or crawling positions and can be operated at speeds varying from 1 to 25 MPH. Equipped with 4-wheel drive and selective 4-wheel steering.

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For men on the move! This rugged carrier travels off the road, through dense foliage and deep mud to remote places that ordinary trucks cannot reach. Forward Control Cab with large wrap-around windshield gives the driver full command of the toughest situations. Curb weight—3,490 lbs. Payload Capacity—3,510 lbs. Wheelbase—only 103⅝ inches.

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# MESSAGE CENTER

**For letters of professional interest. Length: up to 250 words (one typed page). Rates: up to $25.**

## Burning Brightly

► The excellent article by Capt Robert B. Asprey entitled "The Eternal Spirit" (GAZETTE: Nov '61) is in error in two respects in so far as it concerns me. First, I did not serve in France in 1917 and 1918. Second, remarks attributed to me setting forth manner in which we intended to make the breakout from Chosin Reservoir are generally attributed to Col (now BGen) R. L. Murray, CO, 5th Marines.

Gen Oliver P. Smith

25711 Deerfield Dr
Los Altos Hills, Calif.

**Ed: Gen Smith's letter was not submitted for publication, but we wish to apologize for any embarrassment caused to him. Neither author nor editors have a good explanation as to how the error came about. We do respectfully adhere to the view that while history did not place Gen Smith in France, it did hand to him in Korea, the torch of "The Eternal Spirit." And 11 years ago this month, on the road to Hungnam, history records that it burned brightly, indeed.**

## Maybe For Seahorses

► Re your "Marines Afloat" (Sep '61). For shame, your choice for the lead picture is horrible. Note "saddles" in the covers; duty belts a la wild west; men looking at the deck; rifles out of line, etc.

If you feel the need for pictures at some future date for a sea-going article, ask the Marine Detachment *USS Newport News* (CA-148).

1stSgt B. M. Rosoff

MD, USS Newport News
FPO, New York, N.Y.

► This week one of the more outstanding Marine Option Students here (Idaho U) brought in Sept GAZETTE opened to page 27. On this page is a picture of a Marine Detachment. Take a good look at our sea-going Marines. Guidon bearer is holding staff wrong. Rifles are not aligned. Third man in rank is smiling; 8th, 9th and 11th men are looking at deck. These are only some of the errors that could be pointed out.

Our students have asked if this is the same military bearing and smartness we demand of them. The answer is NO. The question WHY, we pass on to you.

Maj Anthony Novak
GySgt B. B. Chapman

NROTC Unit
Univ of Idaho
Moscow, Idaho

**Ed: Why? Here's why. We had only two pictures. We wanted to use this one ⟶ but our photo editor pointed out that 8th and 9th Marines aren't wearing belts. How does he know? He's the one in the pith helmet. How about some of you MDs sending us your picture? Ten dollars for most photogenic.**

## Lesson for Today

► While I was a tactics instructor at the Basic School in 1958, I composed the following as an aid to student officers in remembering the Principles of War:

*Principles of War*

*I shall Maneuver my forces through Offensive action to seize the Objective, providing the Security consistent with Economy of Force.*

*I shall Mass my forces through Unity of Command—Simplicity helps me to gain Surprise.*

I find it still extremely useful and valid in 1961 and propose that it be published in GAZETTE to help others to remember the nine Principles of War. After all, all warfare—from army level to squad level—evolves from these nine principles.

Maj J. R. Fisher

2316 N. Kensington St.
Arlington 5, Va.

## The Defense Rests

► Capt Paul E. Wilson contested my use of the term "armed rabble" in reference to the Chinese Communist soldier in the Korean War (MESSAGE CENTER: Nov '61).

A first-class army, by Western standards, would not have suffered the 880,000 estimated battle casualties and an equal number of non-battle casualties, under the same conditions.

Admission of these facts has come from the Chinese Communists themselves, both in words and the subsequent re-evaluation of their entire military establishment. It is doubtful that they will field "armed rabble" again. They have excellent raw material and they know what to do with it.

Capt C. J. Smith

8thEngrBn
CamLej, N. C.

## Touche Lautrec

► I feel sure that I have been preceded in this mission by at least 20 other guys, but thought it worth while, to stop poor Lloyd George from thrashing in his grave, to call the error in the October GAZETTE to your attention. Your caption writer has intermixed the identity of Lloyd George and his Munitions Minister. I feel sure that there were times when the Master wished that he were some other, including his Munitions Minister, who appears to be trying to look more like Toulouse-Lautrec than an English governmental official, but I think we should pay correct attention to whomever it is that Haig and Joffre are trying to convince or harangue.

LtCol J. P. Wilbern

2500 Spencer Rd
McLean, Va.

## Disillusioned

► After spending two years as a commissioned officer in the United States Marine Corps I thought I had experienced a complete breakdown of my preconceived notions of the so-called "officers corps" but recently my myth received its last crushing blow.

After filling out my customs declaration slip prior to re-entry into CONUS I found that my signature was not sufficient, that another officer must validate my declaration in the role of "certifying officer."

How long must the officer corps stand for such abuse before remedial steps are taken? At one time an officer's word or signature



was his bond. The day of the officer gentleman has gone, never to return!

This is another reason to substantiate Col Metzger's article in July GAZETTE on why young officers are leaving the Corps.

1stLt Dana E. Caro

2ndMarDiv
CamLej, N. C.

## Hairy Fisted

► I have just finished reading "Wanted: Hairy Fisted Marines," November GAZETTE. I would like to relate how I came to join the Marine Corps.

When I enrolled as a freshman at the University of Akron I signed up for Army ROTC. I wanted a military career, and figured this was a good way to get a commission. I was disappointed. . . .

In the spring when the OSO was on campus I talked with him and got some recruiting pamphlets like: "A Leader Among Men," For Leaders Only," "The Making of a Marine," etc. These were full of pictures of Marines in training, usually in utilities, with their M1 near. Headings read: "Ready on the firing line," "On the march," etc., passages such as "The training is not easy."

I joined and went to PLC camp, and when I came back I was proud to call myself a Marine—here was a tradition and a type of life one could be proud of. I hope the Marine Corps image will remain "an organization of toughly and highly trained fighting men."

Chris Madsen, PLC

408 E. Buchtel Ave.
Akron, Ohio

## Older Brother

► May I congratulate Carl H. Strandberg on his article "Royal Marines, U.K." written to start a series of articles on Marine Corps of the free world. Also to thank him and all US Marines for the birthday greetings on October 28, which marked the 298th Anniversary of the formation of the Royal Marines.

It was more than appropriate that the October issue should carry Captain A. Croft's prize winning article "Commando Course, R.M." This article certainly recaptured the feeling of plodding across Dartmoor, as far as I was concerned.

LtCol P. G. Davis, DSC
Royal Marines

MCEC, MCS Quantico

## Answering Service

► In answer to Lt Hawkey's question on the M-1:

A hint to the answer is found in the M14 Rifle manual under "Ejecting."

Notice the brass marks on the hump of the operating rod after firing. After a single round is fired, the operating rod remains to the rear and the empty case ejects to the right rear.

However, when more than one round is fired, the operating rod, instead of remaining to the rear, moves forward rapidly as the next round is chambered. When it goes forward, the hump of the rod strikes the empty case and knocks it forward and to the right.

Capt R. H. Ridgely

*USS Lake Champlain*
FPO, New York

Ed.: Lt Hawkey's question (*Message Center:* Oct '61): "What causes M1 to eject shell to rear when firing a single load?"

## QUESTION OF THE MONTH

We asked: "What can we do to make a better fighting man out of today's PFC Marine?" and got a deluge of answers. We think you'll agree that 18-year-old R. S. Kelly deserves $25.00 first prize.

New Question: Why can't we adopt a standard fatigue and class A khaki uniform for the four services? Deadline 1 Feb. 62. Submitted by 1stLt D. J. Widder, Co. A, 2d Airborne Battle Group, APO 50, San Francisco.

*The following answer to your "Question of the Month" was not written by a Marine, but rather by the son of a Marine (Maj H. R. Kelly) and the grandson of another Marine (BGen S. E. Ridderhof, Ret.) both of whom started their careers in the Marine Corps as privates. Therefore, as the daughter of one Marine, the wife of another, and the mother of a young hopeful, I could do no more than type his response as he requested, and here it is, unedited.*

► In response to the question, "What can we do to make a better fighting man out of today's Pfc Marine?", I believe this is the answer: "Keep his morale up, and keep him up-to-date." There are many things working down from that, and describing it,

- *Don't make him feel so incompetent or inferior*

Signs like, "Off limits for Enlisted Men, Officers only" and Officers only Eligible" could make him feel that the Corps feels he isn't mature enough, or that the officers are snobs, which they aren't.

- *Instill the will to fight and tradition*

Make him feel like "I'm the best guy, in the best company, in the best regiment, an' I'm a-gonna get out there and do-or-die for good ol' Company C." Make him feel that he has to uphold a tradition in his unit.

- *Make him feel a part of the Corps*

Let him know that the Corps depends on PFC's. If we didn't have any PFC's, the basic combat infantryman, we'd have a Marine Corps with Officers, NCO's, and Fire Team leaders without fireteams. The core of the Marine's fighting strength is its PFC's.

One little extra, keep him informed on new weapons, and trained with them.

Remember, a spirited and well trained Marine is the best fighting man in the world.

R. S. Kelly

101 LeBlanc St.
Fort Bragg, N. C.

► Teach him the one thing that today's youth and the youth of every age search for—Loyalty—and a sense of belonging. The seed is planted and germinates in bootcamp but it has to be nourished until it becomes more mature and hardy after the young Marine reaches the operating forces.

Capt P. J. Shank, Jr.

MTU, MCRD
San Diego, Calif.

► Cut away all the dead wood and make him not a jack of all trades but a master of his own job. More time on patrol and less time in the classroom hearing lists and figures which mean nothing on the battlefield.

1stLt E. E. Dixon

H&S, 1/4, 1st Mar Brig
FPO, San Francisco

► Today's Marine is supplied with posters, pamphlets, movies, and special courses on how to act in a POW stockade or under what conditions surrender would be permissible. Perhaps we could give him less of this, and just a little more about those Marines before him who fought at such places as Chosin, Samar, and Guadalcanal, and never stopped to consider if they had the "means" left to defend themselves or if they should surrender.

He is supplied with an array of Abercrombie and Fitch type camping equipment such as never seen before: Air mattresses, CP tents, generators, lantern sets, gasoline stoves. The battalion CP looks like a branch of Ringling Bros. Wouldn't it be to our advantage to put some of these items in storage, and practice operating ala Castro, Mao, Giap, and Ho Chi Minh?

He doesn't have far to go to see overweight officers and staff NCO's. The situation's so bad we have a special order (MCO 6100.3B). Wouldn't it be better if we stopped the enforced dieting and exercise and just removed the examples completely?

No, there's little *more* today's Marine needs, but a lot he could do without.

1stLt Leon Cohan

984 Murray Drive
Honolulu, Hawaii

► I believe as a corporal, I have closer contact with this problem, as I am one of the persons at whom our training procedures are aimed. I have found out in the short time I have been in the Marine Corps, that by handing out more responsibilities to men that they will react accordingly. Instill pride in unit, organization and Corps in a man and he will go all out for it. It boils down to just one thing: LEADERSHIP. Before you can make the PFC a better fighting man, you have got to make your Junior NCO's more conscientious in their own individual jobs.

Cpl R. W. McLeod

HqCo 9th Marines
FPO, San Francisco

► Today's Pfc. Marine *is* the best fighting man in the world—but, he will be better if we "sell" him the Marine Corps twenty-four hours a day. Here's how:

- Devote one hour per week of training time to some type of "motivation film."
- Have selected senior NCOs prepare a lecture and discussion on Career Appraisal.
- Initiate—*every day*—a method of reminding "all hands" that they are *MARINES* first and technicians, truck drivers and teachers second.

GySgt L. N. Damewood, Jr.

CommElect Bn, MCRD
San Diego, Calif.

**From the Director**

BGen W. T. Fairbourn

# MARINE CORPS RESERVE

When playing "the other fellow's game" in his home park, a little reconnaissance can go a long way. That's what this Reserve outfit did, and carried home the marbles.

A COACH WHO KNOWS HE HAS A WINNER SELDOM PUTS himself out on a limb to select one or two players as standing head and shoulders above the others. If there's any opinion to be given on ability, he leaves it to the experts. The same maxim can apply when the subject is training.

There is no doubt that when it comes to experts in parachute training, the US Army Airborne school, at Ft. Benning, Ga., has its share. Thus, when the instructors there named a Marine reservist as honor man, and added praise for the entire Reserve contingent in training, we accepted the kudos as unqualified opinions of men who know their trade inside and out.

When the Marine Corps decided to assign members of the 1st Air Delivery Company, Marine Corps Reserve, San Jose, Calif., to the airborne course, we knew we had to send out best-qualified reservists from that particular unit. Apparently we did.

The 29 reservists who made the trip to Benning were as confident a group as you could imagine. A great deal of their confidence was due to "pre-training" conducted at the home armory in San Jose. Much of the knowhow the Californians took with them to Benning was passed on by members of 1stForRecon, up from Camp Pendleton to tell the reservists what to expect. Their advice was well taken.

A great deal of this local training took the form of physical readiness. The recon Marines, graduates of airborne training, put emphasis on individual endurance. When the troops got to Benning, they discovered just how important this factor was to be. They barely had time to empty their seabags before their Army instructors had them running through a series of physical tests that probably would have left half of them along the wayside if they hadn't been ready for it.

The three-week basic airborne course was more than a test of physical skill, however. As the first members of an Organized Marine Corps Reserve Unit ever assigned to such training, the San Jose reservists were the hub around which future parachute training would revolve. The results from Benning proved beyond doubt that the Marine Corps Reserve has the people who are capable of absorbing this instruction.

Actually, such training is in no measure a marked deviation from the regular chain of events. It may have taken our reservists a little longer to reach this stage, but when they finally got there, they took to the training like amtracs to water. For the San Jose company, Benning was only a stop along the way. Next year they are scheduled to attend the Army's airborne quartermaster school at Ft. Lee, Va.

Training of reservists at other-service schools has been a standing policy for many years. Many of our so-called formal courses, i.e., legal, strategy, intelligence, are conducted at Army or Navy bases. In addition, we have numerous billets for MOS refresher training at such spots as Ft. Knox, Ft. Eustis, NAB (Navy Amphibious Base), Little Creek, and NPP (Navy Powder Plant), Indianhead, Md. The Marine Corps, in turn, offers various courses to reservists from other services. Thus the cycle is complete.

Only by providing the best possible training at the most logical place can we be assured that our reservists are thoroughly prepared for mobilization. USMC

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# New Transportable Radar Directs Precision Air Support

Front-line ground forces can now obtain all-weather, close air support, —when and where needed—with the new lightweight AN/TPQ-10. This is the first helicopter-transportable, high-accuracy control radar for precision air support. Developed for the U. S. Marine Corps by General Electric's Heavy Military Electronics Department, the versatile new system can also provide aircraft control for emergency supply airdrops, paratroop placements and aerial mapping. 176-07

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# PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK



**This department aims to present briefly ideas of wide or lasting use. We want: professional tips, quotes, reprints, digests of articles from professional journals, translations—all of interest to Marines. We'll pay for your help in finding old, new or original material of professional value.**

## Booby Prize

**By Maj C. O. Cummins, USAF**
**Reprinted from the June '61 issue of "Aerospace Safety"**

Our telling anyone how to conduct a ground safety program would constitute a classic case of the blind leading the blind. We are doing a few things here at Vandenberg, though, which might interest safety people and supervisors. The ideas are not particularly new or spectacular, but they have gained some local publicity and for that reason it might be a good idea to describe them.

Back in September, the month that our rates went off the top of the chart, the boss said something about shaping up or shipping out. He had some other thoughts on the subject of safety which he didn't hesitate to express.

One of the ideas he put forth was what the newspapers have since termed "Booby Prizes." These prizes are directed to the major areas of concern in the accident prevention program—private motor vehicles, government motor vehicles, and on-duty injuries. We kicked it around here in the office and finally decided on the forms of the three awards.

The first award is given to the commander in whose unit a private motor accident occurs. For this one we went to a junkyard in town and got an old, beat-up hubcap. We cleaned it up and mounted it on a nice board with the lettering, "We had the last private motor vehicle accident." The piece will fit on a commander's desk, but it's no thing of beauty and it will crowd the desk a little.

The second award is an eighteen-inch section of chrome bumper with a blue handbrake handle bolted to it, marked "We had the last government vehicle accident."

The *pièce de résistance,* however, is the award for "We had the last on-duty injury." This little gem is the biggest hypodermic syringe I could get from the hospital. We mounted this on a board and finished it off with the biggest and longest needle available, bent into a very striking upward curve.

These awards are moved from unit to unit as accidents occur and we believe that their value lies in directing the attention of the commanders to their responsibilities toward accident prevention. The awards, by the way, were dubbed by the Safety NCOinC as "The Order of the Bent Hub-Cap," "The Order of the Broken Brake and Bumper," and "The Order of the Bent Needle."

There is no doubt that they do the job for which they were designed. Last week the First Sergeant of the outfit with the GMV award called to ask if we had forgotten that his squadron still has the award. We assured him that we keep close track of it.

As long as we are writing this we might as well tell you what we did last Thanksgiving week-end. On the day before Thanksgiving, at 1330 hours, just off the edge of the parade ground we hoisted a car some thirty feet in the air and dropped it nose first. This was preceded by appropriate publicity and we had a small crowd out to watch the exercise. This stunt was done to demonstrate what a sudden stop will do to a car traveling thirty miles per hour. It's an eye-opener. This was at no cost to the government either, incidentally, because a junk-yard downtown donated the car and a local contractor working on-base donated the use of the crane and crew.

For Christmas and New Year's, Lieutenant Robert J. Eisenrich, the Ground Safety Officer, organized a "Holiday Roll Call." Briefly, we had the unit Safety Officer give each airmen a card from the National Safety Council which read "Open Before Christmas." It contained many helpful hints on driving. We had each airman write his serial number on a slip of paper. As this is written, the serial numbers, four of them, are being published in the Daily Bulletin. An airman whose number is published will call this office. If he still has the card in his possession and if he has had neither a traffic accident nor a citation during the holiday period he wil be given a $25.00 US Savings Bond. We have four bonds for this purpose.

Did it help? Who knows? But the only accident we had over the holidays was a motor scooter on-base the day after New Year's. We had one near-miss, too, which we caused ourselves. For New Year's we flew a big 10-foot diameter weather-type balloon from the roof of the Base Safety Officer. On it we lettered "Happy New Year—Drive With Care—1961." This was all well and good until we heard that one of the chiefs almost had an accident trying to read what it said on the balloon. But then, as they say, "you can't win 'em all."

In reviewing what we have described above we feel we should point out that what we are doing here is a direct result of command emphasis. When the commander, any commander, takes an interest in preventing accidents, lots of other people become very interested in the same thing. This helps. In fact, as most of us know, effective accident prevention is virtually impossible without command support.

Director of Safety
Vandenburg AFB, Calif.

# Corps Calendar — December

| SUNDAY | MONDAY | TUESDAY | WEDNESDAY | THURSDAY | FRIDAY | SATURDAY |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | **1** Marines began occupation duties in the Rhineland, lasting 8 months. 1918 | **2** 5th Marines sailed to Nicaragua to protect American lives and property during a revolt. 1909 |
| **3** President Teddy Roosevelt praised Marines for "indispensible services rendered" in Cuba. 1906 | **4** Marine Corps returned to voluntary enlistments instead of draft. 1918 | **5** A Marine aviator, Capt A. N. Parker, became first pilot to fly over Antarctica. 1929 | **6** Gen O. P. Smith's 1st Mar Div began breakout from Chosin Reservoir. 1950 | **7** Marines began heroic 16-day stand at Wake Island. 1941 | **8** FMF established by Navy Dept General Order 241. 1933 | **9** Command of troops on Guadal canal passed from Gen Vandegrift to MajGen Patch, USA. 1942 |
| **10** LtCol W. K. McNulty and 150 Marines fought to defend Guam against overwhelming odds. 1941 | **11** Lt Gillespie and his Marines rescued Army Gen Kearney after crushing defeat at San Pasqual. 1846 | **12** Marines used 5" guns to beat off submarine attacks against Johnston Island. 1941 | **13** 4th Marines used .30 cal MGs to repel strafing attack on Naval Station, Olongapo, P.I. 1941 | **14** VMF-211 left with only one plane that could fly after 30-plane bomb attacks on Wake Island. 1941 | **15** Marine planes covered Army's beachhead on Mindoro, Philippine Islands. 1944 | **16** "Great White Fleet" started from Hampton Roads to sail around the world with 1,000 Marines aboard. 1907 |
| **17** Marines on USS Brandywine landed in Lima, Peru to protect American Consulate during uprising. 1835 | **18** 21st Marines captured Helizapoppin Ridge during Bougainville Campaign. 1943 | **19** 1st MarDiv reached Hungnam, Korea, after 13-day march through 8 Chinese divisions. 1950 | **20** Marines again dispatched to Nicaragua to put down a revolt. 1909 | **21** Marines took part in capturing Carmen, Mexico, and kept a garrison there until end of war. 1846 | **22** VMF-121's Maj Don Yost and VMO-251's Lt Ken Kirk accounted for 7 Zeroes during air attack on Munda. 1942 | **23** First enemy warship sunk by Marine aviators in WWII—off Wake Island. 1941 |
| **24** Marines crossed the Delaware and came to the aid of Washington in New Jersey. 1776 | **25** VMF(N)-541 supported Army landing operations on Palompon, Leyte. 1944 Merry Christmas 1961 | **26** Marines formed major infantry defense on Corregidor. 1941 | **27** For the second time in Marine history CMC left Washington to take command of field forces— in Panama. 1903 | **28** Marines participated in the first flag-raising ceremony on Midway Island. 1867 | **29** A force of Mexicans captured Lt Bartlett, USN, and held him prisoner. Capt Marston, USMC rescued him. 1846 | **30** Born to Mr & Mrs J. L. Shoup, Battle Ground, Ind., a son, David Monroe. 1904 |
| **31** The Marine Corps reached strength of 75,101, highest in history. 1918 | | | | | | |

*Season's Greetings*

## Tricks of the Trade

### Web Belt

. . . Another way to stop web belts from unraveling is to use model airplane cement. Simply work cement into belt end with fingers until dry.

SSgt C. D. Pasquale
American Embassy, Accra, Ghana
% State Dept, Washington 25, D.C.

### Waistplate

. . . To get the desired shine on waistplate, try Joy detergent and a wire brush. (Metal polish and jeweler's rouge don't do the trick.)

MSgt J. A. Gentry
RSS Post Office Bldg.
R., #52, Peoria, Ill.

### Shoes, Boots

. . . To fill cracks in shoes or boots, mix lighter fluid with polish. Result: A paste that fills all cracks. Next step: a good shine.

D. A. Young
MB, U. S. Naval Ammunition
Depot, Earle Red Bank, N. J.

### Trousers

. . . Eliminate saggy trousers and tell tale crease by hanging them by the cuff from hanger with ordinary clothespins.

SSgt R. J. Devon
609 Cottonwood Dr.
Nashville, Tenn.


**The First National Bank**
**OF QUANTICO, Va.**

*Season's Greetings*

Insure a Merry Christmas next year by opening your Christmas Club TODAY

***Savings • Checking Accounts • Loans • Christmas Clubs***
***New Auto Financing at a Low 3½%***

# PROFESSIONAL SCRAPBOOK

## Memo Publishing—Then and Now

By Theodore K. Thomas

Attention Division Adjutants and Sergeants-Major! How efficient are your clerk-typists? What is your average "lead-time" from handwritten rough memorandum to final posting on unit bulletin boards?

You may find interesting and informative the following account of "Valley Forge" paperwork production, *circa* 1778!

General George Washington gave the Prussian volunteer, Baron Frederick Steuben, the job of whipping the Continental Army's "Rag-tag and Bob-tail" into military shape. The impatient and energetic Steuben had precious little time to accomplish what he knew must be done in the way of drill instruction.

He had to publish a drill-manual, so that his drillmasters could learn and apply the drill in a consistent and concerted manner, and with a minimum of wasted time and effort.

The Baron decided to "write the book" as he went along. His English was sketchy, so he wrote each chapter in French. His aide, Duponceau, translated it into English. Others of his staff took turns at editing it into military form.

Publishing and distribution of the chapters was a tedious job. There were no typists pools or mimeograph centers at Valley Forge!

J. Mc. Palmer, a biographer of Steuben, describes the method of distribution:

"This task . . . was assigned to the new Brigade inspectors, one from each of the fourteen infantry brigades. Each brigade inspector made a copy of the first chapter of the drill regulations for his own use and then had it copied in the 'Orderly Book' of his brigade and in that of each regiment. From the regimental orderly book copies were made for each company and from the company copy, each officer and drillmaster made his own individual copy. . . . If the Baron finished one of his chapters, say, *on Monday night,* even with the utmost diligence on the part of the brigade inspectors, it would not be in the hands of all the drillmasters *before Wednesday* . . ." (the italics are mine).

Distribution of some Division memoranda might be hard put to beat Steuben's longhand system. even in this age of the electric typewriter and high-speed Ditto machine!

1854 Andrew St. SE
Grand Rapids 8, Mich.

*A Better Way*

## To Shine Shoes—Visors

By L/Cpl C. L. Harkness

SOAK A PIECE OF TRACING CLOTH, THE kind engineers use for blue prints, in hot water, until all wax is removed. This will take time, approximately an hour or so.

With the wax removed, the cloth is ready for use. Next, shake cloth free of all excess water, and proceed to "spit-shine." To serve its purpose well, and give a better shine, the cloth must be washed immediately after use. Frequently it has to be washed several times while working on a pair of shoes or visor. If the cloth is well taken care of, it will not leave a scratch.

By using the tracing cloth, a pair of shoes can be spit shined in ten minutes.

USMC

Virginia Military Institute
Lexington Va


IT ISN'T IN THE BOOK, BUT...
Sherman v Crook
TO KEEP WET SOCKS FROM CAUSING UNNEEDED BLISTERS PLACE YOUR SPARE PAIR IN A PLASTIC CELLOPHANE WRAP BEFORE YOU PACK TO GO IN THE FIELD
Used plastic cellophane bags, in which the cleaners return uniforms, are handy.
FALL IN...
Thanks and Five to...
1/Lt. PHILIP R. COTTLES
CAMP LEJEUNE, N.C.

*A Better Way*

## To Heat C-Rations

By Maj W. K. Rockey

TIRED OF C-RATIONS BURNED ON THE BOTTOM, COLD ON top, and spilled on the cooker and ground? Most of all, are you tired of reading tips on how to heat C-rations in the field? If so, try this and forget the problem.

Place unopened can of rations over the flame, and let it heat until the top end of the can pops outward. Remove the can from the flame and shake vigorously. This mixes the heated portion of food throughout and causes the ends to pop in again. Replace can on flame with *cold* end down. Let end pop. Remove and shake. Continue this procedure until entire can is too hot to handle with bare hands and both ends remain in the outward position. Open and chow down. You'll finish your hot meal before others have started on the cold top layer of their rations.

Caution: Closed cans will eventually explode, however, it takes a lot of heating to make them blow. USMC

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# Extension School CHALLENGE

### BASIC

**1** You are orienting a map as to location. You notice that the latitude numbers increase from bottom to top and the longitude numbers increase from left to right. This map would represent an area:

a. North of the equator and east of the prime meridian.

b. South of the equator and east of the prime meridian.

c. North of the equator and west of the prime meridian.

d. South of the equator and west of the prime meridian.

**2** The battalion message center forwards a message requiring acknowledgement to you, the battalion adjutant. You know that the acknowledgement can only be made:

a. With the express approval of the commander or his authorized representative.

b. By the operator who actually received the received the request for acknowledgement.

c. With the express approval of the communication officer.

d. Within one-half hour after the receipt of the request.

**3** The principal benefit obtained by using the loop technique in installing a wire system for a rifle company in the defense is:

a. Economy of equipment.

b. Ease of installation.

c. An increase in transmission range.

d. An increase in reliability.

**4** You, as the rifle company commander, direct that a sound power telephone (TS-10) be installed to a company outpost. You know that the range of the sound power telephone is approximately.

a. 1 to 3 miles.

b. 2 to 4 miles.

c. 3 to 5 miles.

d. 4 to 6 miles.

### JUNIOR

**5** Radio is the primary means of communication employed by infantry battalions during fast moving attack situations. Each infantry battalion commander has his own radio net for command and control of his subordinate units. This net is called the battalion:

a. Control net.

b. Command net.

c. Subordinate net.

d. Tactical net.

**6** You are a BLT commander engaged in a terrain analysis of a landing area. One of the most critical features which you must attempt to locate in your study would be the:

a. Fields of fire available to the enemy.

b. Enemy routes of communication into the landing area.

c. Terrain features defiladed from seaward from which enfilade fire may be delivered on the beach.

d. Concealment available for enemy troops.

**7** Following the Korean War the United States, as a detaining power, had no authority to grant asylum to Chinese prisoners of war until a specific agreement was arranged with Communist China in the terms of the armistice.

a. True.

b. False.

### SENIOR

**8** The decision to fire an artillery preparation in support of an offensive action is the responsibility of the:

a. Artillery officer of the supporting unit.

b. Operations officer of the supported infantry unit.

c. Commanding officer of the highest infantry echelon concerned.

d. Commanding officer of the highest artillery echelon concerned.

**9** Regimental air liaison officers normally receive, at the completion of a close air support strike, damage assessment broadcasts over the _____ net.

**(Answers on page 16)**

★ ★ ★ ★

A Gunnery Sergeant says of Map and Aerial Photograph Reading: "This has been the most informative and interesting map reading course I have ever taken."

# THE SCHOOL SOLUTION

(Answers to questions on page 15)

**Note: References designated as TIP (Tentative Instructional Precis), SM (Supplementary Material, and MCS (Marine Corps Schools Publication) are manuals written by the staff of Marine Corps Educational Center as texts for MCEC schools.**

## BASIC

**1** a. Reference: Supplementary Material contained within lesson 3 of Officers Basic Extension Course, subcourse 3104. Crossing the equator at regular intervals are north-south lines which pass through the poles. These lines are known as meridians of longitude or simply meridians. One of these meridians is marked zero and is called the prime meridian, and from it longitude is measured both east and west around the world. Lines east of the prime meridian are numbered 0° to 180° and are called east longitude. Lines west of the prime meridian are numbered from 0° to 180° and are called west longitude.

Crossing the meridians in an east-west direction between the equator and both poles are the parallels of latitude. Starting at the equator these are numbered from 0° to 90° toward both poles. Thus, the parallel halfway between the equator and the north pole is 45° north latitude; the parallel halfway between the equator and the south pole is 45° south latitude.

**2** a. Reference: MCS 3-110, paragraph 75. The commanding officer is the addressee of any incoming message and any acknowledgement is made in his name. Furthermore, an acknowledgement is a separate message in itself, and an outgoing message may be sent only upon release by the commander or his authorized representative. To acknowledge a message means that you have received it, understand it, and will comply with its directives. Under no circumstances would a radio operator be given such authority. No time limit for acknowledgement is imposed.


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**3** d. Reference: MCS 3-110, paragraph 21b. Rifle company wire systems are often installed as one continuous line, going from station to station and returning to the point of origin. This loop type construction will continue to provide communications even though the line may be broken in one place.

**4** c. Reference: MCS 2-103, paragraph 20. The sound power telephone (TS-10) has a range of from 3 to 5 miles. Signaling is accomplished by the sound of voice or whistle; the sound of the operator's voice is the source of power. Each rifle company is authorized eight sets of CE-11 reel equipment (sound power telephone and ¼-mile of combat wire).

## JUNIOR

**5** d. Reference: TIP (COS)2, 25b. The purpose of this net is to furnish the commander with a communications channel for command and control of subordinate units of the battalion. Stations on this net include the battalion CP, the rifle companies, and the battalion commander when away from the CP. Attached and supporting units may be directed to enter this net.

**6** c. Reference: LFM-6, 207b. Any terrain feature which may be used by the enemy to enfilade the landing beach and its approaches may cause an unacceptable delay in the landing, or might even deny the use of the landing beach.

**7** b. Reference: FM 27-10, 199. A detaining power may, at its discretion, lawfully grant asylum to prisoners of war who do not desire to be repatriated.

## SENIOR

**8** c. Reference: TIP (ARM)2, 65f. The commander of the highest infantry echelon concerned decides if a preparation will be fired and, if so, when it will begin and how long it will continue.

**9** Tactical air direction. Reference: TIP (COS)2, 121a (2). The purpose of this net is to furnish a channel for the direction of close air support strike aircraft. At the completion of the strike, damage assessment is broadcast over this net. Stations on this net include the strike aircraft, the tactical air coordinator (airborne), TACPs of the infantry battalions and regiments, division CP, air support radar teams, and appropriate controlling air agencies (TACC, TADC, DASC).

# ADMINISTRATIVE TIME

Being a few words by the editors about the magazine you write

Is the Gazette the "officers' magazine"?

Yes.

Mainly the Gazette is written by and for commissioned officers. And they provide most of its support, so that's fair.

But we think SNCOs have many of the same interests. We aim the magazine at those interests when we can. But here are a couple of things we can't do:

- Have exactly one half articles by SNCOs.
- Print SNCO orders.

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Mike McCorps

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## WORDS & PICTURES

• On the cover . . .

. . . MSgt John DeGrasse's version of the Marine air-ground team in action —at night. This cover was completed nearly a year ago. And at this point, all next year's covers are firmed up. Have to be to get paintings done and checked, engravings made, and so on. Saves money, too. So if you have any good ideas for covers for 1963, let us know soon.

• In the book . . .

. . . on page 34 you'll find, as promised, a profile of that fabulous Marine, Louie Cukela. We are also honored to print both an interview with and a provocative article by that distinguished military expert, MajGen J. F. C. Fuller. The Editorial Board rated the other articles in this issue rather high, hope you do, too.

• In person . . .

. . . the Gazette welcomes new Editor-in-Chief MajGen R. K. Rottet, bids goodbye to BGen J. C. Miller, Jr. Reason for change: hereafter, the Director, MCEC,will be E-in-C and act as Secretary-Treasurer of the Marine Corps Association. Currently, this involves expenses of more than $11,000 per month which the Association pays to provide your magazine. Also leaving, 2dLt A. R. Barton, our assistant business manager. His replacement: SSgt W. S. Reidy.

• In 1962 . . .

. . . we kick off with a special Guerrilla War issue, which has been over six months in preparation. Also scheduled later in the year, a special issue on combat at night. We plan not only covers, but special features of issues more than a year ahead. You'll be seeing some of those special features in the next three months. Don't expect too much, though. Big 1962 project is the end of Troop Copies, except for one per company-sized unit. We lose revenue, but hope Marines will rally round to help support your magazine in the style to which you've been accustomed. Pass the word.

## WRITER'S CORNER

• Something to say? . . .

. . . don't let our larger stockpile inhibit you. Just work a little harder and beat out the competition. We suggest these rules to good writing:

1. Have something you really want to say.
2. Be sure you have all the facts.
3. Sweat.
4. Rewrite at least once.

• Writer Incentive Award . . .

. . . this isue goes to Major B. B. DeWitt. His article Camouflage: A Neglected Art begins on p. 46. You get our regular rates, if published, whether you win the award or not. But winning the award is becoming more of an achievement every month. And the extra $100 comes in handy, too.

• Send a query . . .

. . . before undertaking a long article, save work and send in a query. Our free Writer's Guide explains how.

# Permutations

THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF WAR THERE HAVE BEEN three forms of the offensive: the physical, the economic, and the psychological. The simplest example is the siege of a walled city; it can be carried either by batter and storm, or starved into surrender by blockade, or its garrison subverted by fostering treachery within its walls. Which of these forms is likely to prove the most profitable depends on a variety of circumstances, and to diagnose the dominant one is the first all-important problem in war.

It is not my intention to delve into ancient history, in which innumerable examples of all three forms abound. Instead it is to restrict my analysis to the wars of the present century, to unmask the forms which dominated them, and then to equate my deductions with the circumstances which govern international conflict today.

At the close of the last century, when the General Staffs were thinking in terms of rifles and cannon, battleships and cruisers, a Warsaw banker, by birth a Jew and by name I. S. Bloch, examined the problem of future warfare in an elaborate six-volume work entitled *The War of the Future in its Technical, Economic and Political Relations.* His thesis was that, all the world over, the General Staffs were sailing on the wrong tack, and that the war they were preparing for would founder on the rocks of their failure to relate it to the circumstances which would govern it.

**WWIII is on, Gen Fuller declares, but its dominant form is economic and psychological rather than physical, as has been the case in all major wars of the 20th Century—contrary to orthodox opinion. Failure to understand this fact, he says (and reiterates in a special interview on Page 26), can lead only to repetition of the "appalling mistakes" we made in WWI and WWII.**

# of War

By MajGen J. F. C. Fuller

"What is the use," he said, "of talking about the past when you are dealing with an altogether new set of considerations. . . The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle. . . The soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction. . . At first there will be increased slaughter—increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battle to a decisive issue. . . The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest . . . will become a kind of stalemate in which, neither army being willing to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening the other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. . . That is the future of war—not fighting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the bankruptcy of nations and the break-up of the whole social organization. . . Everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to the soldier as his rifle. . . All wars will of necessity partake of the character of siege operations . . . soldiers may fight as they please; the ultimate decision is in the hand of famine. . . The soldier is going down and the economist is going up."



Written as this was in the late '90s of the last century, it is a remarkable forecast of WWI. Before that, weight was given to Bloch's contention in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in which the magazine rifle, machine-

gun, and recently introduced quick-firing field gun were put to the test.

Two of that war's outstanding lessons were that frontal attacks were suicidal, and that to survive on the battlefield the soldier had to entrench. More significant, although the Japanese won every battle on land and at sea, the psychological impact of the war on Russia's inner, or home, front led to a revolutionary upheaval. This, coupled with its impact on Japan's economy, which reduced her to near bankruptcy, brought the war to an end. In other words, psychological and economic factors dominated the physical. Nevertheless, these cardinal lessons were ignored by the General Staffs, and were left over for WWI again to verify.

### Blockade Did It

In that stupendous conflict the dominant instrument of victory was not the military might of the British Empire, France, and the United States, but as Gen Ludendorff, Chief of the German General Staff, declared: "The strangling hunger blockade and the enemy's propaganda." The latter he likened to "a moral blockade."

As Bloch had predicted, famine—the fruits of the economic attack—was the decisive factor. Lack of food and raw materials—the economic foundations of all strategy and tactics—and not the superabundance of the enemy's munitions, brought the Central Powers to collapse.

It was the blockade that created the fertile soil in which the seeds of the psychological attack were sown. It so completely undermined the moral foundations of the German army in Russia that Lenin, with no army to speak of at his command, set out to convert what he called "the imperialist war" into a series of civil wars. Although he failed in his endeavor, his subversive activities among the German troops were so successful that Gen Hoffman, the German CinC in Russia, declared: "Our victorious army on the Eastern Front became rotten with Bolshevism. We got to a point when we did not dare to transfer certain of our eastern divisions to the West." And the German prisoners, released by the Russians after the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, were found to be so effectively indoctrinated with revolutionary ideas that on their arrival in Germany they had to be confined "in political quarantine camps."

Like so many prophets, Bloch was the slave of an over-mastering idea. Although he foresaw what a magazine rifle war would entail, he failed to realize that its very deadliness would bring into being what I have called the "Constant Tactical Factor": that every improvement of weapon-power in the past has eventually been met by a counter-improvement, which has either modified its effectiveness or cancelled it out.

In WWI the answers to the magazine rifle and machinegun, which were responsible for the prolonged stalemate, were the tank and lethal gas. The one cancelled out the bullet, and the other the rifleman whether in the open or in a trench. Had either of the two belligerent coalitions possessed one or both of these new weapons at the outbreak of hostilities, chances are that the physical attack would have dominated, and the economic and psychological would have played very subordinate parts.

### Changed Situation in WWII

In character, WWII was very different from WWI. In 1914, to all intents and purposes, the belligerents were firmly united nations whose peoples loyally supported their respective governments. But since then a

Hitler learned more from Germany's defeat in WWI than the victors did, Gen Fuller says, and first set out to shore up his economic defenses by establishing a "Lebensraum" (living space) in Eastern Europe which would preclude blockade.

series of violent revolutions had upheaved Europe, and because they profoundly modified political relations, they as profoundly changed the character of war. By 1939, and particularly in those countries in which revolutionary governments had been established, there existed extensive reactionary inner fronts. In many other countries Communist, Fascist, and National Socialist movements had taken root. These fruits and movements enabled an enemy who cooperated with them to attack his antagonist internally by fomenting revolutions or counter-revolutions—as important an operation in the psychological struggle as the overthrow of the enemy's armies is in the physical struggle.

In the technical field changes were even more startling. Since time immemorial the motive power of armies had been muscular, but with the adoption of the internal combustion engine during WWI it had become increasingly more mechanical. For purposes of transport and supply the truck ousted the horse-drawn wagon, the tank was invented, and the airplane was enormously developed. Nevertheless, all these adaptations of mechanical power had remained in what may be called the auxiliary stage—that is, they were looked upon solely as adjuncts to the traditional fighting forces.

Had WWI lasted another year, what was as yet seen by a few would have become apparent to the many—namely, because tank and airplane had added so vastly to military mobility, startling new tactics, which would radically influence the art of war, could be developed. By neutralizing the bullet, the tank added a hitherto unattainable security to superficial movements. By transcending the battlefield and converting the skies into a universal road, the airplane added a new dimension to war. Both favored the offensive.

Out of these possibilities two tactical schools of thought arose. The theories propounded by both were based on the concept of substituting a more rapid and effective process of disorganizing and demoralizing the enemy's fighting forces than could be attained by the traditional battle.

While the tank theorists proposed by means of powerful armored forces to disrupt the enemy's front and attack, capture, or disperse the combat headquarters in rear of it, the aircraft theorists proposed to avoid the enemy's fighting forces altogether, and by means of squadrons of bomber aircraft to attack his civil population and industries.

### Different Objectives

The aim of the one was to deprive the enemy fighting forces of their command, and thereby reduce them to a panic-stricken rabble; the aim of the other was to deprive the enemy government of popular support and means to continue the war, and thereby overthrow it by revolution.

As is common throughout military history, the vanquished learned more from their defeat than the victors did from their victory. When, in 1933, Hitler rose to power, determined as he was to free Germany from the shackles of the Treaty of Versailles, he paid careful attention to the political and technical changes since 1914.

To strengthen Germany strategically, he decided to bring all German minorities which bordered on her frontiers within the Reich. And, in order to make the Reich economically proof against another blockade, he determined to establish a *Lebensraum* (living space) in Eastern Europe—that is, occupy Poland and a large slice of Western Russia, including the Ukraine, the largest and richest minority province. As this was likely to lead to a general European war in which Germany would again be faced with two hostile fronts, it was incumbent on Hitler to create an army so mobile that it could rapidly defeat its enemy on one front before it turned toward the other. The one thing he wished to avoid was a prolonged war like the last one, which eventually drew in the United States.

### Mechanization Appealed to Hitler

In *Mein Kampf* Hitler had written that in the next war "motorization will make its appearance in an overwhelming and decisive form." He had a passion for high speed motor cars, express motorways (*Reichsautobahnen*), and aircraft; therefore, warfare based on high mobility instinctively appealed to him. Both the German Air Force and Army were organized to develop it; but the main task of the former was to cooperate with the latter and not to act independently. Further, Hitler was a firm believer in the psychological offensive, which paid him hand over fist in his annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia. He declared: "The lessons of revolution, these are the secret of the new strategy. . . . To me all means will be right. . . . My motto is: Destroy the enemy by all and any means."

While Hitler built his army in accordance with the theories of the British tank tactical school, the policy

of France and the United Kingdom was to maintain the *status quo* under the aegis of the League of Nations. They had nothing to gain from another war, and as their peoples were pacific so also were their governments. Their military ideas were purely defensive in character; France would shelter behind her Maginot Line and Britain behind the English Channel—the solid and liquid forms of the same concept. Their tactical theory was that the first phase of WWI would repeat itself; therefore, there would be ample time for a blockade of Germany to become effective. Added to this, the British Air Force theorists held that the key to victory should be sought in air attacks on the German industrial centers and civil populations. This was called "strategic bombing."

### Unprecedented Military Feat

From start to finish, the two new tactical theories so completely dominated the offensive operations of the war that the value of the psychological attack was eclipsed, while the value of the blockade was largely discounted by the ability of the Germans to live off their conquests. The tank theory, when put into practice, became known as *blitzkrieg* (lightning-war). Poland was conquered in 27 days, Holland in 5, Belgium in 17, France in 38, Yugoslavia in 12, and Greece in 17. Never since the days of Genghis Khan had such extensive and rapid conquests been made. It was a feat of arms unparalleled in modern history.

When France fell, only the English Channel stood between Hitler and the complete subjugation of Western Europe; but since he was in no way prepared to invade England, to compel her government to accept a negotiated peace, he put the second theory—that of strategic bombing—into force. When it resulted in a costly fiasco, he abandoned his objective in the West and set out to win his *Lebensraum* in Russia.

His problem now became one of time. By the summer of 1941 he was aware that President Roosevelt was actively preparing to bring the United States into the war; the passing of the Lend-Lease Bill by Congress on March 11 had made this a certainty. Could he defeat Russia before the United States intervened?

The answer depended on the correct choice of what Clausewitz called "the center of gravity" of the enemy's military power, by which he meant the weakest link in his harness. Reference to Clausewitz would have told him where it lay. Russia, he had written, can only be subdued "by effect of internal dissension"—that is, by revolution fomented by psychological attack. How to effect this should have been clearly apparent to Hitler.

Between 1929 and 1938 Stalin's brutual collectivization of the lands of the minority peoples, the Ukrainians, White Russians, etc., in which some 10 million people had been shot, transported, and starved to death, had so antagonized them that all Hitler needed to have done was cross the Russian frontier as a liberator and terminate collectivization. This would not only have won over to him the minorities—in Western Russia alone they numbered over 40 million people—but it would also have dissolved Stalin's armies, which were largely recruited from non-Russian collectivized serfs (actually, in 1941, over two million Ukrainian, etc., soldiers deserted to the Germans). The renegade Russian Gen Vlasov told Himmler that this was why Stalin dreaded a German invasion, and why he did not believe that Hitler would be so foolish as to conduct the war "with arms alone."

Instead of relying on the revolutionary strategy he had boasted of, and which had paid him so high a dividend before the war, and in spite of what Dr. Goebbels records in his *Diaries*, that the Ukrainians looked upon Hitler as the "Saviour of Europe," Hitler's brutal nature overmastered him and sealed his doom. Instead of assuming the role of liberator, he proclaimed that all the inhabitants of the USSR were *Untermenschen* (subhumans). He set out to enslave and exterminate them, and thereby drove the minorities into Stalin's arms. "By rousing the Russian people to a Napoleonic fervour," writes Erich Kern in his *Dance of Death*, "we enabled the Bolsheviks to achieve a political consolidation beyond their wildest dreams and provided their cause with the halo of a patriotic war."

After the war, a German officer asked an American journalist: "Do you know where we lost the war in Russia?" "In Stalingrad," was the prompt reply. "No," said the officer, "we lost it long before that—in Kiev, when we hoisted the swastika instead of the Ukrainian flag!"

### Chamberlain's Psychological Approach

Very different was the policy of the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain. On the day following his government's declaration of war he opened a psychological offensive on Hitler. In a broadcast to the German people he said: "In this war we are not fighting against you, the German people, for whom we have no bitter feeling, but against a tyrannous and foresworn régime." He contacted members of the anti-Hitler opposition in Switzerland, and propitiated the German people by declaring in the House of Commons: "Whatever be the length to which others might go, the Government will never resort to blackguardly attacks on women and other civilians for purposes of mere terrorism."

When, on May 10, 1940, Mr. Winston Churchill became Prime Minister, he forthwith scrapped the psychological offensive. On the following day he instructed his Bomber Command to bomb the ancient university city of Freiburg in Breisgau in order to demoralize its inhabitants. This was the psychological attack in reverse. Few things were more likely to damp down opposition to Hitler than the indiscriminate slaughter of the German civil population. Better be alive under a dic-



**But the Fuhrer failed to understand the psychological side of his war when he invaded the Ukraine in the role of "conqueror" rather than "liberator."**

tator than dead under a liberator was the moral. Throughout the war it was disregarded by Churchill and the strategic bombing enthusiasts.

A few months later Churchill declared: "The Fighters are our salvation, but the Bombers alone provide the means of victory. We must therefore develop the power to carry an ever-increasing volume of explosives to Germany, so as to pulverize the entire industry and scientific structure on which the war effort and economic life of the enemy depend."

This was what may be called "blockade on inner lines;" not the cutting off of supplies from outside, but the destruction of the means to use them on the inside. There was nothing unstrategic in this, as long as the targets selected were within the power of the British Force, and later on the American Air Force also, to destroy them. But at no time before the advent of the atomic bomb was bombing sufficiently destructive to bring the war to a rapid end unless it was directed and concentrated against the most vital targets.

Where was the center of gravity of German war energy to be found? In her synthetic oil plants and coalfields. Without fuel she could not continue to wage war; without coal she would be completely paralyzed. And although coalfields are difficult to destroy by air attack, all that is needed to paralyze them is to keep the railways leading to and from them under bombardment—that is, to attack transportation.

Yet, what do we see? Until the summer of 1944 British and American bombing attacks were mainly directed against German industrial centers and cities, and both, according to *The United States Strategic Bombing Survey,* were costly failures. Not until Normandy was about to be invaded did strategic bombing become truly strategic. Then it was concentrated against German transportation and synthetic oil plants, with the result that in four to five months Germany's economy collapsed.

The same error was made in the Pacific theater of war. From the first the position of Japan was one of extreme strategic fragility, because her economic potential was approximately only 10 percent that of the United States. Because she depended on Manchuria and Korea for the bulk of her raw materials and much of her foodstuffs, which had to cross the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, her merchant navy was her strategic center of gravity. This was realized by the American Navy, and the attack on Japanese shipping became the main task of its submarines. Out of the total of 8,900,000 tons of Japanese shipping sunk 54.7 percent is attributed to submarines.

According to the *U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey,* when, after the battle of Leyte Gulf long-range bomber attack on the Japanese homeland from the Mariana Islands became practicable, had it been directed against Japan's extremely vulnerable railroad network, it would have greatly extended and cumulated the effects of the shipping attacks already made. "The Survey believes," we read, "that such an attack . . . had it been well-planned in advance, might have been initiated in August 1944. . . . The Survey has estimated that the force requirements to effect complete interdiction of the railroad system would have been 650 B-29 visual sorties carrying 5,200 tons of high explosive bombs." Instead, as in the case of Germany, the main targets selected were urban and industrial areas, and 146,900 tons were dropped on them without bringing Japan to heel.

### A-Bombs Unnecessary?

Granted that the Survey's estimate is no more than 50 percent correct, there can be little doubt that early in 1945, if not before, Japan's economy would have collapsed, and there would have been no need to drop the two atomic bombs which ended the war. Even as things stood in the spring of 1945, Japan's economy had by then been so ruined that, had the future of the emperor not been in doubt, unconditional surrender would have been accepted by the Japanese government.

Although, throughout the period under discussion, the physical offensive—that is, the clash between fighting forces—predominates, the importance of the economic and psychological offenses becomes more and more apparent. The reason is that we live in an age in which economics dominates civilization from every angle, and in an age in which their repercussions on social life lead to profound psychological disturbances.



In wartime they do not oust the physical attack, they supplement it, and their effectiveness is derived from ability to strike physically, or to threaten to do so. They are additional and essential arrows in the quiver of war.

The economic transformation of the present age is the dividend of the Industrial Revolution of the preceding 200 years. Before its advent nations were self-sufficient, and normally the economic attack played a subsidiary role. Since its advent nations have become increasingly less so, with the result that it has increasingly played a primary part. In the 18th century the Industrial Revolution set out at a quiet walk; in the 19th it broke into a trot and then into a canter. Today it is in a furious gallop with the bit between its teeth.

### The New Technology

We live in an age of fantastic scientific discoveries and inventions, of fantastic economic changes; in brief, of fantastic materialism. And, as far as war is concerned, the most fantastic offspring of the Industrial Revolution is the atomic bomb and its twin, the hydrogen bomb. These are the circumstances in which war is conditioned today. What of the future?

When on the first day of the Potsdam Conference—July 17, 1945—President Truman and Mr. Churchill were informed that the final test of the atomic bomb had proved an unqualified success, they forthwith decided to use it against Japan. Of this decision the latter has written: "Now all the nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision—fair and bright indeed it seemed—of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks."

It is astonishing that Truman and Churchill did not pause to consider what the impact of the destructive use of the very source of creative energy on the future of the world would be. Like the fisherman in the *Arabian Nights,* who hauled up the mysterious brass bottle, they unbottled the atomic-jinnee, a devil which has plagued humanity ever since, and no coaxing will persuade him to return to his bottle. July 17, 1945, was the most fateful day in human history since man discovered how to light a fire.

The physical attack had now been raised to its *n*th degree, and so far as can be seen the Constant Tactical Factor has ceased to operate. One well-directed 20-megaton missile on London would paralyze the United Kingdom; a score on the US or the USSR would reduce both to chaos, and no protective answer is in sight.

Paradox though it may appear, physical warfare in its nuclear form has eliminated itself. Instead of being a positive instrument of policy, it is a negative one. Megatons bunker megatons and are called "deterrents"; they deter their like, because their use would spell mutual suicide. Nevertheless, all other forms remain, and under cover of the threat of nuclear war they are lumped together and called "cold war," which Khrushchev euphemistically defines as "peaceful co-existence."

It is not that he fears that a nuclear war would annul the consummation of world communism, because with all Marxists he holds that it is preordained by the laws of history, but that it would delay its advent. Peaceful co-existence is a change in tactics and not in strategy; the elimination of capitalism is still the aim, and the tactical form of war Khrushchev has decided on is the economic attack. Since he declared it in February, 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress, we live in the days of WWIII.

At that Congress Khrushchev said: "Armed interference is no longer necessary, since the certainty of the victory of communism was based on the conviction that the socialist mode of production possesses decisive ad-

The failure of Allied leaders to understand the economics of WWII, the author says, resulted in senseless bombing of urban and industrial areas in both Germany and Japan. Instead, he says, we should have concentrated on transportation, oil.

vantages over the capitalist mode of production." In other words, because Khrushchev holds that capitalism is doomed through its inherent inefficiency, it is more profitable to besiege its garrison and starve it into surrender by economic competition than to assault it by military force.

At the Twenty-first Party Congress, in January, 1959, Khrushchev launched his Seven Year Plan, the aim of which is to outdistance American industrial production. Under cover of the terror induced by the threat of nuclear attack, war was put into cold storage. Armies were to give way to factories, weapons to goods, and markets were to become the battlefields of the future.

As in actual war, the economic offensive demands for its success the concentration of the means of attack—that is, the integration of the economies of the Soviet bloc of nations. This was fully explained by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. In brief, the economies of the satellite countries are to be organized so as not to overlap the economy of the Soviet Union, and are progressively to be converted into departments of one gigantic workshop, which will constitute a common powerhouse as well as a common market. All production not absorbed by the latter will become "ammunition" wherewith to bombard the capitalist countries.

Should China be included in this economic bloc, in his *The Great Contest* Mr. Isaac Deutscher estimates that eventually a single economic entity will come into being with a common market four or five times larger than the North American, and at least twice as large as the North American and European markets combined.

The capitalist powers must realize that the challenge they are called upon to respond to is very different from the international trade rivalries of former times, the aims of which were purely economic. Today they are faced with economic warfare on military lines, and its aim is a revolutionary one: To undermine the foundations of capitalism; to create ever-increasing discontent in the capitalist countries by impoverishing them; and then to detonate that discontent into a series of revolutions by violent psychological attack.

As the situation stands today, the Western Powers are divided and are not responding to this challenge. To do so they must abandon their trade rivalries and integrate their economies, because in this age of economic wardom, rivalries between them are tantamount to economic civil war, the very thing their formidable enemy most desires.

Bloch was right in idea but not in timing—his forecast has now come true: "The soldier by natural evolution has so perfected the mechanism of slaughter that he has practically secured his own extinction." War is now too deadly to wage with profit: "The soldier is going down and the economist is going up." USMC

A special interview with General Fuller begins on next page ➧

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### *And That's A Lot*

Before dawn one morning in the spring of 1951 a runner awoke the Assistant Division Commander, BGen "Chesty" Puller, and informed him that the Chinese had broken through the front line of an ROK division on the Marines' flank. The General immediately grabbed his phone and called the CP of a Korean battalion on the MLR.

"How many Chinese are in the attack?" he asked.

"Many, many Chinese," came the reply.

Dissatisfied with that answer, Gen Puller called the ROK division headquarters and received the same answer. In disgust, he phoned the Marine liaison officer with the ROKs: "How many Chinese you got up there, Lieutenant?"

"A whole damn pot full sir."

"Thank God somebody up there can count," Puller said.

**$15.00 to Maj Norman W. Hicks**



By Robert E. Walters

# interview with general fuller

**Q. On the whole we Americans are somewhat new at the game of world politics and thinking in terms of military action. We have been prone to classify anyone who studies, or has an interest in military matters, as a militarist. Would you care to comment on this point?**

**A.** My view of a militarist is a man proficient in the art of war—and at the highest level. He won't be very proficient unless he recognizes that war is a political instrument. That is the main point.

**Q. Do you think permanent world peace is possible, or, to rephrase the question, what would be conditions for a stable peace?**

**A.** The conditions for a stable peace, I think, are fairly obvious. The causes of war have got to be eliminated. Until they are eliminated you won't get a stable peace. There are a good many causes of war, but one staring us right in the face is a divided Europe. As long as Europe is divided there will certainly be a war atmosphere—if there isn't actually a war.

**Q. You have said or implied that the power of England rested primarily and logically upon seapower. As a soldier could you tell why this is true?**

**A.** As a soldier, I can't get on to a foreign battlefield without seapower unless I'm going to fly. This may come along in the future but at present we can't fly a whole army over.

**Q. Do you think naval power will continue to be important?**

**Foreword**

It has become the consensus among military writers that the works of MajGen John Frederick Charles Fuller are great and will endure.

Aside from poignant insight, his writing has always revealed a deep and abiding concern for the truth, even in discussing his native England. He once wrote: "I have always felt that truth is courage intellectualized." This attitude has made Fuller unpopular during most of his lifetime. It has also served to guarantee him a niche in history, and has made some people wary of his sharp barbs.

Gen Fuller has had a long and distinguished career, first as an active military leader in WWI when he was Chief of Staff of the British Tank Corps (he planned a number of successful tank assaults), and, second, as a prolific military writer after his premature retirement in 1933.

It was therefore natural that Fuller should have been one of the leaders of the school of military thought which arose after WWII advocating use of the tank and airplane in what was later to be called *blitzkrieg* warfare.

Liddell Hart wrote of Fuller that ". . . he was the first who ever made the heads of continental armies look to England for professional guidance." A number of German generals, among them Rommel and Guderian, have paid tribute to Fuller and he likewise has had considerable influence in this country. Gen Fuller's latest book, *The Conduct of War,* has just been released by Rutgers University Press ($6.00).—R.E.W.

## In England last year our interviewer talked to two of the world's top military writers, J. F. C. Fuller and B. H. Liddell Hart. The Hart interview was published last month. Here's the Fuller installment.

**A.** Yes, I think you may say that naval power will continue until man evolves into a flying fish—but I think that's obvious.

**Q. Do you think Mahan's ideas on seapower are still valid?**

**A.** Yes, I think like all these early writers. The principles they worked on are sound, but all the details of their books and studies have to be quoted with modern conditions and I think the same applies to a man like Clausewitz.

**Q. This may be a little out of your field, but do you think the submarine at present is a weapon for denial of the use of the sea rather than control of the sea?**

**A.** To deny or to control seem to me to be interchangeable. If you deny the enemy the use of the sea, then you control the use of the sea. I don't see that there's really any great difference there.

**Q. Capt Liddell-Hart in a recent book said one of the important features of seapower is amphibious flexibility, which enables one to unload troops at almost any point. Would you concur with this point?**

**A.** Oh, yes, entirely.

**Q. You have said night operations are very beneficial to an attacking force. Why would this be true? It probably seems to most people that it would be difficult to control or coordinate operations at night.**

**A.** I don't remember having said this. What I have said is that with certain devices, night attacks can be made extremely profitable. But I haven't laid down that night operations are very beneficial to an attacking force. They wouldn't be very beneficial to an attacking force unless you had certain devices which would enable you to carry them out successfully.

**Q. Do you think night operations could be combined with an amphibious landing?**

**A.** Yes, certainly—again, if the proper devices are used. Let me explain what I mean by "proper devices." In the last war there was an invention called the CDL tank. It was a machine fitted with an automatically self-protecting searchlight, which enabled the area in front of a tank to be flooded with lights, and also practically blinded, or temporarily blinded, your adversary. That was a very, very valuable invention but it actually came late in the war and was never used. But if that invention were used—or something like it—then night operations would be completely altered from what they are at the moment. It remains extremely difficult, but if we can see and the enmy can't, then the whole problem is changed.

**Q. Would you think paratroops can or should be combined with amphibous operations?**

**A.** Oh, yes, I think they can be combined with amphibious operations. I'm not very keen on paratroops myself. In certain cases, I think they might prove extremely valuable. They proved very valuable in Sicily in seizing a bridge and things like that, but they're so

**". . . not altogether a reliable means of waging war."**

much at the mercy of the wind that they're not altogether a reliable means of waging war.

**Q. Our services have developed one-man helicopters. Do you think they might be better employed under cover of darkness since there would be greater control than with paratroops?**

**A.** I don't really see, myself, a very great future for one-man helicopters. I think for purposes of spying or reconnaissance, they are probably quite useful, but I think the real problem is the vertical lift airplane which will carry perhaps 10, 20, 30, 50 men, dump them down on a piece of ground and pick them up again if necessary. As I say, I've rarely seen one of these one-man helicopters, but I don't think they are likely to prove of very great use.

**Q. What is your view on the use of nuclear weapons?**

**A.** Well, I look upon nuclear weapons, as I think most people do nowadays, as a deterrent. Personally, I very much doubt if nuclear weapons, anyhow the more powerful ones, will ever be used at all. I look upon a nuclear weapon more as an anti-weapon—a negative weapon—than as a positive one. I think the really main weapons today are psychological, economic, and so on—ideas, in fact, instead of bullets.

**Q. Do you feel that limited atomic war is possible—that is, with small yield atomic weapons?**

**A.** It's possible, but whether the use of small yield weapons is advisable, of course, is quite another question. The danger in using small yield weapons is to define what you mean by small yield. I have heard somewhere that a small yield weapon mustn't exceed the power of the bomb used at Hiroshima. Well, if that's a small yield weapon, it's liable to detonate a full scale atomic war. But if you mean a weapon which is as powerful or a little bit more powerful than normal artillery, then I think it could be quite useful.

**Q. How do you feel then about the idea of "massive retaliation"?**

**A.** First of all, I don't see how massive retaliation can achieve any practical political aim in war. In a rational war, it's an absurdity. The great value of massive retaliation is in the idea, not its execution. As long as it's looked upon as a deterrent, then it's a very powerful deterrent. But I don't see myself what good or what objective you are going to gain by simply blowing an enemy to pieces and being blown to pieces in return.

**Q. It could lead to a dead end in policy?**

**A.** It leads in my opinion to an absurdity.

**Q. Do you think air power was the decisive weapon in the last war?**

**A.** No. I think it was one of the decisive weapons but I don't think it was *the* decisive weapon. I don't think there was a decisive weapon—there were several weapons. Air power is a very powerful weapon and is decisive in certain phases.

**Q. Do you think then that the doctrine of air power—that is, strategic bombing—was overstated?**

**A.** Well, that really depends. What do they mean—strategic bombing? Most of what was called strategic bombing in the last year was unstrategic bombing. What I think the United States Strategic Bombing Survey shows is that up to the spring of 1944 most of the strategic bombing was a sheer waste. It was only from then on, when bombing was concentrated against German transportation and synthetic oil plants, that it became truly effective. Then bombing became decisive. The blowing of cities to pieces in order to lower the morale of the enemy was a sheer waste of bombs—and I think in many ways a criminal act. It certainly wasn't strategic bombing in my opinion.

**Q. Do you think the Korean war revealed the error of too great a reliance on air power?**

**A.** No—I don't think so myself. What I do think the Korean war revealed was that when soldiers go soft in peacetime, they generally are pretty hard put in wartime. That applies to most peacetime armies. They lose their toughness. I think that was shown very clearly in the early stages of the Korean war.

**Q. Would you say then that conventional troops have a future?**

**A.** Oh, yes, certainly. I think conventional troops have a future because they'll be able in many cases to work under cover of the nuclear deterrent. There will probably be many small wars in the future, in which conventional arms, including tanks, will be used very much the same as they have been in the past.

**Q. In your opinion, General, who were the greatest military leaders of WWII?**

**A.** That question depends on what you mean by "leader." If you mean the highest type of leader, like the Commanders-in-Chief, my answer is that there were none. And one couldn't expect them to show themselves in any numbers, in any case. If you mean commanders of corps, armies, and such, I think there were quite a number of really able generals. But the difficulty of a Commander-in-Chief is that unless he can control policy as well as strategy, he will never really reach the summit of his profession.

**Q. You were one of the first to see the importance of tanks during WWI and had planned an operation for 1919 on a large scale. Could you tell us briefly what was planned and what might have resulted from this operation?**

**A.** What we had planned—it eventually was called "Plan 1919" because it was supposed to be the plan for the campaign in 1919—it really was a change in tactics.

"I should say, judging by the mess we made of the last war, that military officers should carefully meditate on what Clausewitz has to say on war as a political instrument."

The plan was to attack the enemy's brain, his command, striking at his combat headquarters, his army, corps, divisional headquarters by squadrons of fast tanks to paralyze his command before attacking his fighting body—his fighting troops. That was the idea. Of course, in 1919, it might have come off or it might not. But the idea was feasible because there were not a great many anti-tank weapons in those days. Afterwards, of course, they increased in large numbers. In 1940 Gen Guderian, the German, brought this idea up to date and the result was the fall of France. I think that answers the question—whether the idea was of any value or not.

**Q. You were early to see that eventually the Soviet Union and the United States would be the two greatest powers in the world. How did you deduce this?**

**A.** The answer is very simple. My reasons were that the United States was actually the greatest industrial power in the world. The USSR was potentially the greatest industrial power in the world, or anyhow, the greatest industrial power next to the United States. And when you've got two powers which have enormous industrial potentials, incomparably greater than any other country, they are likely to become the two great rivals in any struggle in an industrial age. That's the whole answer I can give.

**Q. Would you care to make any comments on Communist China?**

**A.** I don't think so. I don't know much about Communist China except that Communism of a primitive type is indigenous in Asia. Where you have vast countries containing thousands and thousands of primitive villages you are bound to get a primitive Communism. I think myself that when they started with Marxist Communism, they found a very fertile ground there. Marx was entirely in error in supposing that you need an industrial civilization to produce what he called the dictatorship of the proletariat. What you want is a peasant civilization instead.

**Q. Do you think the slogan—a good offense is the best defense—is valid?**

**A.** No. I think there's a mixup here. What is valid is one of the most remarkable of Napoleon's many maxims, and that is: The whole art of war consists in a well reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack. But I don't think you can mix up the defense and the offense, as seems to be implicit in this question, any more than you can mix up a shield and a sword. But when they work together then you get your powerful tactics.

**Q. What elements do you think should be stressed in the education of military officers?**

**A.** Well, here again is a vast subject. It depends on what kind of military officer. If you mean the very highest type of officer, on the very highest step they can arrive at, I should say, judging from the mess we made of the last war, that military officers should carefully meditate on what Clausewitz has to say on war as a political instrument. If they can never understand what war as a political instrument means, they can never avoid appalling errors of the kind we made in the last war.

**Q. Do you think we are over-impressed with Russia because of her sheer size?**

**A.** Yes. I think myself that Russia's strength is our ignorance.

**Q. You have said it is not a question of whether Europe can survive but whether Europe wants to survive. This implies that from the material standpoint Europe can hold her own against Russia. Is that correct?**

**A.** I think it's correct at present. In population and industrial power Europe, I believe, at the moment exceeds Russia. Should the United States be added, of course, the West exceeds Russia enormously. Whether that's going to hold good in the future, one can't tell. Russia may get ahead to such an extent that Europe will become more or less powerless.

**Q. Do you feel that the menace of Communism will mellow with time or do you think the movement is bound to lead to a clash with the West?**

**A.** From all accounts, Communism has been mellowing for some time. I think this is inevitable under the stresses of industrialization. The clash is now on. I don't think it's bound to come—it actually has come. But it has come in the economic, the psychological, not in the military field. It's a clash for markets instead of battlefields.

USMC

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### *What Else—Sir?*

During a battalion commander's inspection, one of the inspecting officers picked up a bayonet displayed on the bunk. The weapon was nicked and scarred and evidently had been used to open "C" ration cans in the field. The inspecting officer turned to the young private standing at attention and asked: "What do you use your bayonet for, lad?" The reply came blandly: "To kill, sir!"

**$15.00 to 1stLt H. W. Hale**

By LtCol A. J. Clapp

# Missing Link:

GENERAL SHOUP, IN HIS "STATE OF THE MARINE CORPS" talk in January 1960, included this remark: "In future warfare we will need to use, more and more, the best camouflage to be had. It is provided every twenty-four hours by nature. Emphasize night training." In a similar talk in 1961 he said: ". . . Marines are getting more night training. I want even more emphasis on this type training in the future. Remember, God provides the best camouflage several hours out of every twenty-four. . . ."

These remarks should leave no doubt about what the Commandant expects—the Marine Corps will be prepared to fight at night. It is assumed, therefore, that Marine ground units will continue to make every effort to increase their effectiveness in this area. Even after they have become proficient night fighters, however, they will have to be delivered to the vicinity of the enemy before they can cash in on their ability. That is the prime concern of those of us in the helicopter business.

Whereas darkness may be the *best* camouflage for ground combat, it is the *only* camouflage or concealment that can be counted on for helicopter operations. Furthermore, if the ground troops are going to fight at night, it seems reasonable to assume that they would like to arrive at the scene of combat during darkness. The basic requirement seems perfectly clear then: helicopter units must be prepared to land ground troops, in close proximity to where they plan to engage the enemy, under other than visual flight conditions. As of now, however, helicopter operations into rugged, unfamiliar terrain under instrument flight conditions (i.e., dark night-time or low-visibility day-time) is an under-

If we're going to fight by night, we need an electronic guidance system that will get choppers into the landing zone under instrument flight conditions. That's the problem the author wants solved.

# all-weather terminal guidance for helicopters

taking bordering on *Kamikaze* tactics.

Ironically, there is only one really significant reason why this is so—one missing link. Before this missing link is examined, however, perhaps it would be advantageous to see what we *do* have today in the helicopter all-weather system.

### The Vehicle

The standard Marine Corps transport helicopter, the Sikorsky HUS, is entirely capable of instrument flight. First of all, the helicopter itself has built-in Automatic Stabilization Equipment (ASE). It is also fully instrumented for non-visual flight, including a set of instruments for pilot and co-pilot and an adequate cockpit lighting system for night operations. Finally, it is equipped with just about as much communication and navigation radio equipment as is practical to install in a machine this size.

ASE is a long step forward in introducing instrument flight qualities into a helicopter. To understand why this is so, it must be understood that the rotor is actually the flight element of a helicopter, and that there is no rigid relationship between the path the rotor is flying and the attitude of the fuselage. Therefore, flight relying solely on instruments mounted in the fuselage of a non-stabilized helicopter is a very imprecise operation, to say the least. The ASE receives signals from a gyro and stabilizes the attitude of the fuselage with respect to the attitude of the gyro. It also has some of the characteristics of an automatic pilot.

The HUS flight instruments are similar to those mounted in most transport-type aircraft (i.e., artificial horizon, airspeed indicator, altimeter, etc.). Because they were designed for fixed-wing aircraft, the instruments read true only when the helicopter is in forward flight like a fixed-wing aircraft. Therefore, if the helicopter is airborne, yet not in forward flight, there is no way for the instruments to tell the pilot whether he is in a steady hover or moving backward or sideward. Lack of a hovering indicator makes it mandatory that the pilot maintain visual reference to the ground during take-off and transition to forward flight, and, conversely, during the transition from forward flight to hover and landing. Except for hovering, landing, and take-off, the installed instruments provide adequate reference for maneuvering the helicopter through its entire flight regime.

The HUS helicopter has radio equipment for communication on low frequency, ultra high frequency, and FM. For navigation, it has: (1) a TACAN set which indicates bearing and distance to a TACAN transmitter; (2) a low frequency receiver which is coupled to a radio compass and may also be used for navigation on directional radio stations; and (3) provisions for homing on any UHF transmitter.

One feature the HUS does not have, however, which could limit its operation under certain conditions, is de-icing equipment.

### Flight Personnel

Helicopter pilots are required by regulation to maintain instrument flying proficiency. The only real problem in this area is flying experience under actual instrument conditions. The pilots are trained for, and the helicopters are capable of, instrument flight; but airspace controlling agencies are reluctant to allow slow-

moving helicopters to operate in their zones of responsibility during bad weather. There is some obvious justification for this, of course, but procedures need be worked out (or segments of airspace set aside) so helicopters can operate on actual instruments.

### Home Base

LPHs, from which helicopters normally operate in amphibious operations, are equipped to handle traffic in all weather conditions. On dark nights and in fog when there is no horizon definition, take-offs can be a bit sticky but they're not impossible. Since there is nothing to run into above the surface of the water, the pilot can concentrate on holding a constant attitude until he has gained sufficient airspeed and altitude to commence full instrument flight. When there is no visible horizon, the positioning of a ship with running lights forward of the LPH, as a horizon reference point, saves a lot of wear and tear on the helicopter pilot's nerves during take-off.

During night landings on the LPH, helicopter pilots fly a landing pattern on instruments, maintaining a safe distance above the water by reference to a radar altimeter, until they are in position to observe visually the landing signalman aboard ship. It is also possible to land helicopters during bad weather by Carrier Controlled Approach (CCA). This is a version of the well-known GCA moved to shipboard.

### Enroute Navigation

There are various devices for guiding helicopters to landing sites. The most obvious are maps and photographs, but these can be eliminated from this discussion because they are useless at night and during adverse weather. The only guidance systems usable all the time are in the electronics family.

Shipboard radar can provide guidance part of the way, usually to the landfall, at which time ground return renders it unreliable. Radar sets mounted in aircraft can provide guidance all the way to the landing site, however.

In addition to radar, radio equipment installed in the helicopters can be used to locate the landing site, provided Pathfinders emplace companion equipment at the site.

To sum it up, helicopters can be launched from LPHs and guided to the vicinity of the landing point by one means or another, in total darkness or adverse weather. But being airborne over the landing site with a load of troops is not the same thing as having the troops on the ground, unfortunately, and that is where we find the missing link.

### The Missing Link

The only equipment now available in the FMF for guiding helicopters from initial point to landing zone touchdown is the helicopter pilot's eyeballs. One rather primitive visual aid has been provided to augment the eyeball but that's all. Therefore, a night approach into rugged terrain goes something like this:

The helicopter pilot studies a contour map of the landing point and determines the best avenue of approach and retirement based upon surrounding terrain and prevailing wind. He then predicts the altitude he must have at various checkpoints along his route in order to clear the terrain.

**LtCol Clapp** wants readers to buy two facts in reading this article: (1) Helicopters must maintan forward speed until just before landing; (2) Helicopters are just as vulnerable to objects in their path as fixed wing a/c. He became concerned about the "Missing Link" while Helicopter OpnsOff, T&T Bd., MCLFDC. Before that he spent seven years in fighters (VMF-123, 114, 224), two years in helicopters (HMX-1 and HMR-161). He is currently CO, HMR(L)-362 which very recently went aboard USS Princeton for duty with Seventh Fleet.

With this planning behind him, the pilot reaches the initial point without too much difficulty and commences an approach to the landing site. When (and if) he gains visual contact with the ground, and if the Pathfinders have accurately set up the best equipment available to them, the pilot sees a light which is either red, amber, or green. The color of the light tells the pilot whether or not he is approaching on the glide angle for which the light box was set.

The approach light is a reasonably good aid for establishing a specified glide angle in flat terrain. As a life-or-death terrain clearance device, however, it is totally inadequate. And, of course, it is completely useless if clouds must be penetrated during the approach.

It is difficult to believe that this approach light is the best landing aid our advanced technology can produce. Rather than being technologically infeasible, it is more likely that we don't have an adequate landing aid because of lack of familiarity with the problem. If that's the reason, this discussion might serve at least to get some thinking started on the subject.

To begin with, let's reduce the problem to its basic elements. We can start by acknowledging that the helicopter is an aircraft—that is, it needs forward speed to function properly. We could study power-required charts and review the above-mentioned instrument characteristics to see why this is so, but it would help the discussion if we accept the fact that helicopters must maintain forward speed from right after take-off until just before landing.

Once this basic fact is accepted, we need to acknowledge just one more. There is nothing unique about the helicopter that makes it more capable of flying between hills, into canyons, etc., without running into something than is the case with fixed-wing aircraft. True, most helicopters can fly slower than most fixed-wing aircraft; but it isn't too important whether you run into a hill at 50 knots or 500 knots—if 50 knots is all it takes to make your wife a widow.

The point is this: before they could become truly all-weather vehicles, fixed-wing aircraft were provided with electronic landing aids at established airfields. Now it seems a bit unreasonable to expect helicopters to become effective all-weather vehicles, and to make approaches



**Colored pylons can be used in daylight but the old "eyeball" system doesn't work very well at night.**

into unprepared and unfamiliar sites in all types of terrain, without any terminal guidance at all.

In discussing the problem with other helicopter operators, these basic characteristics of an effective terminal guidance system were determined:

### Terminal Guidance Characteristics

Nearly every type terminal guidance gear has two fundamental components: an airborne component and a ground installation. There is good argument on both sides as to which of these components should be the smaller of the two for assault helicopter application. If the component mounted in the helicopter is heavy, it will of course penalize payload capability. If, on the other hand, the ground installation is very large, Pathfinders might have considerable difficulty in positioning it in the site before the assault.

As Pathfinders often arrive in the landing zone via parachute, they would understandably like to have the ground component pocket-size. For payload reasons, helicopter operators would like the airborne component to have the same characteristics. Rather than try to settle this matter in advance, therefore, it would probably be better to stay flexible on this particular characteristic until some workable system has been tried. There is always the chance, moreover, that equipment manufacturers could draw on miniaturization experience in the missile guidance field to develop a system with *no* exceptionally large components.

The range of the system must be no less than three miles; however, five miles would provide more flexible utilization, and ten miles would be ideal. Generally speaking, if all other design features remain constant, the range built into a piece of electronics gear determines its size. Therefore, the multiple ranges are stated as a guide until more specific details of the proposed system are known.

The system should begin giving the helicopter pilot guidance at the extreme range of the equipment and at as much as 3,000 feet above the elevation of the landing site. It must guide the helicopter to a specific course line and provide means of holding that course all the way to touchdown. At the same time it must provide terrain clearance information all the way to the landing site.

In an oversimplified sense, it should be a discernible beam pointed in a specified direction from the landing site and inclined at an angle that will safely clear terrain on the course line. The angle of the glide slope will be determined by surrounding terrain, but the equipment must be capable of providing low-angle glide slope information (about five degrees) if the terrain permits a glide slope that shallow. In other words, the helicopter cannot fly directly over the landing site at cruising altitude, stop, and descend like an elevator to the site. As absurd as it might sound, this was proposed by one of the more reputable electronic engineering firms.

Besides these performance characteristics, the system should come as close as possible to meeting the optimum characteristics we look for in all military hardware (i.e., minimum size and weight consistent with its function, inexpensive, reliable, easy to maintain, simple to operate, etc.). While these are desirable traits for any piece of equipment, we can no longer afford to wait until a device comes along that is the ultimate in all these respects.

### Summary

We have helicopters capable of instrument flight and pilots trained to fly them. Our floating bases can launch and retrieve helicopters in darkness and foul weather, and there are means at hand to position them over specified geographic locations. What we don't have, however, is a way to get them safely on the ground.

The helicopter is something of a hybrid in that it is an aircraft in every respect but normally operates in a "gravel cruncher" environment. The gray area where it functions perhaps explains why neither ground nor aviation has a device on the shelf that will do the job of guiding helicopters to a landing.

There was a recent news release about the award of a contract to build a machine that will land on the moon, take samples of soil and atmosphere, and return to earth. Surely, with that kind of technological know-how kicking around, it is not asking too much to develop a device that will furnish the missing link for all-weather helicopter operations. USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

## *You Ought'a Know*

A newsboy stopped at the door of my room at Camp Lejeune one evening and inquired if I would like to buy a paper. I asked him if there was any news in the paper. He said he didn't know. Next I asked him if we were at war or not. His reply left me red-faced—but proud. "You're still sitting' here, ain't ya?," he said.

**$15.00 to GySgt Earl G. Darlington**

# LOUIE

He was all Marine and 10 feet tall, a flamboyant character with color, guts, spirit—and character. He stormed into the Corps one day in 1917 and lived a legend that will endure as long as the word "Marine".

France, 1918

# CUKELA

**By Edward A. Dieckmann, Sr.**

THE LATE MAJ LOUIS CUKELA, USMC, WHO HELD eleven decorations for combat heroism—two of which were Medals of Honor—and two sets of official documents attesting to his sanity, literally hurled himself into the Corps one blustery afternoon in January 1917. This was the first act of a career that continued at a break-neck pace for 29 years during which he earned for himself, by right of conquest, a mixed reputation unexcelled anywhere.

Among other things, Louie Cukela was a showman personified. In fact he has been called the Sam Goldwyn of the Marine Corps. Always doing the unpredictable, the totally unexpected, and so attracting attention toward himself to the delight of many and chagrin of a few—this was his way of life. Completely uninhibited, he stormed his way through the years, leaving in his wake a solid story of rousing drama, riotous comedy, inspiring loyalty to the men he commanded, and utter fearlessness. He loved beautiful flowers and brilliant colors. He had a reckless disregard for the conventionalities of military processes. He showed unexpected kindness and consideration for others, always assumed dynamic responsibility for his actions and those of the men in his company or platoon.

Just what his shipmates thought of him as a "good" Marine is summed up in forthright fashion in this eulogy by a retired NCO:

"Remember the Marine Hymn—the part that goes—'if the Army and the Navy ever look on Heaven's scenes they'll find the streets are guarded by the United States Marines'? Well—in my book it's a lead-pipe cinch that Louie Cukela will be the commander of that guard! I can see him now—with his made-to-order sword, his

**Gen Pershing pins Silver Star on Cukela. He also won two Medals of Honor (one Army and one Navy).**

extra-brilliant campaign and medal ribbons—wheeling the new guard to inspection formation for Saint Peter at the Pearly Gates. And I can hear him give out with his special interpretation of the command squads-right-about: 'Squads *right*—do it *two* times, unt dunt foul it up. Ho-o-o-oo!' "

"He strutted in everything he did," as a retired general officer tells it, "one of the finest appearing officers I ever knew. At all formations, he was always on parade—very alert and snappy. His uniforms were perfection, his bearing always so imperiously erect that men turned to watch as he strode along a company street or anywhere else—even on liberty. He wasn't a big man, really, but he sort of loomed up wherever he happened to be. That neatly trimmed black mustache he affected told the world that here was a determined and aggressive man. A fine Marine!"

Louie Cukela strutted that afternoon he enlisted in 1917. He strode into the Marine Recruiting Station at St. Louis and went straight to the recruiting sergeant's desk.

"That sign outside—the one that reads 'join the Marines, the first to fight.' It means what it says?" he demanded.

The surprised sergeant recovered quickly. "Exactly that," he snapped.

"Good! I'll sign up right now!"

### He Came From Serbia

There were certain formalities, of course. Louie Cukela informed the sergeant that he'd been born in Serbia—that he was now a naturalized American citizen; that he'd been educated at the Merchant's Academy and the Royal Gymnasium at Spaltao—a two-year course in each school; that he'd studied for the priesthood for a brief time—until he'd been inducted into the army as a warrant officer, a career cut short because of a duel with another officer.

Once in the United States, he'd settled in Minneapolis where he studied fingerprinting and the Bertillon system of identification, becoming a fully qualified operator. But he'd chucked all that and enlisted in the US Army where he was promptly promoted to corporal. He was serving with Company "H", 13th Infantry, in the Philippines when he received a letter from his sister in Serbia.

"She told me our father was in prison," he explained to the recruiting sergeant, "and that other members of our family were fugitives but still fighting a guerrilla war against the Huns. And she asked me what I was doing. So I bought out of the Army. Now, I want to go and fight those Huns!"

Cukela also told the sergeant that he spoke, read, and wrote six European languages. He didn't include English which was just as well. He never did learn to speak it—or, as has been said by many of his officer comrades, he butchered it with malice aforethought as part of his showmanship technique.

A few months later, Louie Cukela, as a corporal in the 66th Company, 6th Marines, disembarked at St. Nazaire and plunged into a rapid cycle of training with the French. Here his linguistic talent proved a big asset to all concerned. His regiment, as part of the famous 2d Division, A.E.F., moved into the combat area a bit south of Verdun.

Before a month had passed, Louie Cukela—now a sergeant—had been awarded the *Croix de Guerre* by the French. He was also cited in divisional orders by the Commanding General of the 2d Division.

### Action at Belleau Wood

On 27 May all hell broke loose. Forty divisions of veteran German troops suddenly torrented down from the north like a tidal wave, sweeping aside the French defenses as if they'd never existed. The American 2nd Division was hurriedly moved in to take over. The 5th and 6th Marines flung themselves into the tangled forest known as Belleau Wood—later to be renamed the *Bois de la Brigade de Marine* by the grateful French.

Louie Cukela, a gunnery sergeant now, led his platoon through the machinegun infested underbrush. Bayonets, hand-grenades and rifle butts were their principal weapons. His individual fearlessness became a byword among those thousands of Leathernecks and Doughboys of the US regular infantry who made up the 2d Division. Cukela was recommended for the Medal of Honor for his part in the desperate fighting. But it wasn't forthcoming. Not this time.

Then came Soissons.

There are those who have declared with passionate emphasis that the bloody shambles of Belleau Wood was a picnic compared to what transpired when they fought every foot of the way through the *Forest de Retz*.

Again the Marines were up against machinegun nests in depth. As the friendly barrage lifted, those German machineguns began their furious fire. Louie Cukela's platoon was pinned down tight. He decided to do something about it.

The German guns were water-cooled so Cukela, from his position flat on the ground, watched for tell-tale wisps of steam. When he spotted them he began a slow crawl toward the spot. Two of his platoon moved along with him. Both were killed before they'd advanced a dozen feet.

This was the moment when Cukela saw the guns

themselves—three nests, the center nest well forward, the flanking two echeloned back for mutual protection. Three guns were well camouflaged with chopped brush.

Carefully, Cukela worked closer inch by inch. Time and again the hostile gun barrels disappeared only to pop out again in a rift in the underbrush. Louie Cukela began to circle around, to come up on the flank of the left gun. And now bullets from his own platoon seemed to be seeking him out.

On he crept until he was within a few feet of the German gunners. He pulled the pin from one of his grenades and tossed it—*not* into the nest, but well to one side. As he'd hoped, the Germans swiveled their gun *away* from him in order to cover the point of the explosion. At that, Cukela sprang to his feet and leaped into the nest. One gunner snapped a pistol shot at him, searing his face, as he went to work with bayonet and rifle butt. German survivors fled to the other nests and opened fire on Cukela with everything they had.

There were German grenades in the captured nest. Cukela used them—lobbing two in rapid succession into the nearest nest. Then he hurled a grenade into the third nest to cause confusion while he jumped into the second nest before the gunners could recover from the blasts.

Again bayonet and rifle butt—quick, desperate, work that left five dead and wounded Germans, and Louie Cukela went to work on the third nest with more captured enemy grenades. The men in that emplacement surrendered almost at once—just as Cukela's platoon came scrambling through the brush.

There was plenty of fighting yet to be done. The Marbache sector in August; the St. Mihiel offensive a month later; then Blanc Mont in the Champagne, and the Meuse-Argonne affair that ended the war.

Through all these battles went Louie Cukela—piling up traditions of reckless courage, distinguishing himself in an outfit where bravery was a collective quality, and making a name for himself as a leader of men. He was wounded twice—the first time at Jaulny, the second in the Champagne sector. Neither wound was serious. He didn't turn himself in for hospital treatment so there were no Purple Heart awards, a matter that irked him a great deal later on. But they took away his gunnery sergeant's chevrons and pinned lieutenant's bars on his collar.

### He Never Played It Coy

One thing for sure—Louie Cukela wasn't a bit coy about all the fame he was building up. Somewhere—somehow—he procured a snappy, tailored, uniform on which to pin his lieutenant's bars, and he carefully trimmed his heavy black mustache into a fierce, well-waxed bar beneath his nose.

Later on, when asked about his combat experiences in France, Cukela wasn't reticent. He'd explain it this way:

"Well—whenever we would be getting ready to jump off, the skipper would ask 'is Cukela ready?' I'd tell him 'sure' and he'd say: 'all right, let's go. If Cukela is killed we're rid of a dumb Serbian. If not we'll give him another medal!' "

He certainly got the medals. And there's not a bit of doubt but that he earned every one of them. It was at Coblentz that General of the Armies ("Black Jack") Pershing hung two Medals of Honor about Cukela's sturdy neck. One was an Army award, the other from the Navy. Cukela also received the Army's Silver Star decoration that day and the French came through with the *Medaille Militaire.* Then came the *Legion d'Honneur,* the *Croix de Guerre* with Two Palms, another *Croix de Guerre* with a Silver Star along with the French *Fourragere.* Later, Italy awarded him its top decoration—the *Croce al Merito di Guerre.* Yugoslavia presented him with the Royal Order of the Crown.

Louie Cukela was very proud of his decorations—fact is he gloried in them and showed them off in a special way. His ribbons were made up of actually dazzling colors—colors that reflected the sun. And he wanted no competition either. When asked where he obtained such flashy material, he'd close one eye, cock his head to one side, grin widely and reply:

"Well—*I* find them. You do the same!"

### A Little Horseplay

One display of his many decorations will never be forgotten as long as the Marine Corps exists.

All Quantico was buzzing that day. A review was to be held by the 5th Marines in honor of the Secretary of the Navy. The orders of the day specified that the uniform would be dress blues and that all decorations would be worn.

Capt Louie Cukela's company fell in early that afternoon on Barnett Avenue in front of the PX, spick and span in dress uniforms and white gloves. Cukela and the gunnery sergeant were in full uniform all right, but there wasn't a decoration on their chests.

"The regimental adjutant—a Major—came along," is how Louie Cukela's Lieutenant tells this story. "He was making an informal inspection of the troops, rou-

**Cukela between the wars. He was a "determined and aggressive man," says a retired general officer.**

tine procedure at a time like this. The Major halted abruptly before Capt Cukela."

"Captain," he said bruskly, "did you read the orders for this review?"

"Yes, I did, Sir."

"Then *where,* may I ask, are your decorations?"

"Decorations?"

"Yes," the Major was impatient. "You should be wearing them all. You too, Sergeant," he told the gunny.

Capt Cukela snapped a salute. "We'll get them, Major," he said, and motioned to the gunnery sergeant. "Come on, Eddie, we must get our medals."

A short time later, the gunnery sergeant returned alone, the left side of his blouse a'glitter with medals. He saluted briskly. "The Captain said for you to take over the company, sir," he told the Lieutenant.

"I discovered why five minutes later," the Lieutenant relates. "I saw Capt Cukela approaching down Barnett Avenue—a sight none of us has ever forgotten.

"He was leading a beautifully groomed, high-stepping horse—a big bay who tossed his head, fluttering his blonde mane as he looked over the lined up troops. It was Cukela's private mount—one he kept in the base stables and rode at every opportunity. The animal had a blue velvet blanket secured across his back, one side completely covered with glittering medals. Capt Cukela, one hand on his sword hilt, strode along, very military and poker-faced. He wore but one decoration suspended by a scarlet ribbon about his neck. It was as large as a salad plate in the shape of a sun-burst of gold and silver, encrusted with sparkling jewels. The Royal Order of the Crown of Yugoslavia, as I remember now.

"As he came abreast of our company, he beckoned to his gunnery sergeant: 'Come on, Eddie. We will lead the parade,' and off they went down the wide avenue in front of the 5th Marines, marching ramrod-stiff, trying to maintain cadence with Louie Cukela's prancing, medal-carrying horse."

The huge parade-ground grandstand was packed that day. Among the onlookers sat a buxom young woman, Miss Minnie Myrtle Strayer, who was present at the special invitation of Capt Cukela. The Captain married her a bit later—a marriage that lasted through 33 years. It was a good marriage. She was the one person in the world to whom this completely uninhibited Marine demonstrated any deference at all.

That dress parade extravaganza at Quantico was typical of Louie Cukela. Planned spectacles—of every kind—with himself in the leading role were part and parcel of his way of life.

An episode during joint field exercises held in Panama stands out. It was Marines against the Army. Louie Cukela and his company were put ashore one night—their objective, an army post a few miles inland. Cukela marched his men along that jungle road. They arrived near the entrance to the Army post. Four Marines surprised and captured the sentries. Then straight into the fort marched Cukela's outfit—straight to the quarters of the fort commander where Louie Cukela thundered on the door with the butt of his .45. When the astonished, night-shirt clad general opened the door, Cukela informed him that his fort was captured—and that he wanted a good breakfast for his men. They got it too—ham and eggs for all hands—each serving perfectly cooked under the eagle eye of Louie Cukela.

**Mr Dieckmann** is a retired bos'un mate (USN) and chief of detectives (San Diego PD), in that order. He now devotes full time to writing but in researching this article he found that both his service experience and years of police work came in handy. It takes a military man to fully understand one and to be able to convey a convincing picture. Especially when the subject's name is Louie Cukela. And as with any legend, separating fact from fancy calls for high class police work. Detective Dieckmann got only the facts, man.

### Behind the Show

Showmanship? Of course it was. But behind that Sam Goldwyn technique was something else—teamwork, company pride. His men loved it. One of them, now a retired general officer, expresses it like this:

"Before Louie took over the company we were just an average outfit. But it wasn't long before 'company spirit' began to blossom. He had a very special approach to every situation—great or small. The men soon realized that Louie was 'with them' in every respect—that he'd do battle with anyone, regardless of rank, for those men of his. He did exactly that time after time. I consider it a great honor to be able to say that I served with him."

"There was no such thing as office hours in any company he commanded," says another retired officer. "He was always available. A blunt, straightforward commander—very sure of himself. There were no involved conferences, consultations, or uncertainties in any field unit commanded by the 'Cuke'. He'd give his orders simply, directly, and full of fire. Unmistakable too because of the words he used to explain them. And he accepted full responsibility for his orders—one of the reasons his men would literally go through hell for him."

This responsibility business brought Louie Cukela to a meet with destiny at a place named Hinche in Central Haiti. What happened nearly resulted in a General Court for Capt Cukela. Instead, his actions at that time set him up for an all-time high in Marine

Corps tradition and furnished DIs at Parris Island and Mare Island with a new and vivid concept of what makes up a good Marine. It did something else too—Cukela received a set of official documents he would flourish at the least excuse for the rest of his life.

To tell the whole story of the Hinche incident would require a dozen pages of single-space script. Suffice to say that Louie Cukela and the First Sergeant of his company were charged with a violation of the established rules of war, and went before a Board of Inquiry at Brigade headquarters.

The proceedings were secret but some bits of the goings on did leak out. These were to the effect that Cukela went on record, with every atom of his forceful personality, clearing his First Sergeant of any blame—insisting that he and he alone was responsible for what had happened. Another result of the Board of Inquiry was that Louie Cukela was placed under observation by a psychiatric commission.

The Board cleared both Louie Cukela and his First Sergeant and Cukela was handed documentary evidence that he was perfectly sane.

Following this episode there were occasions when someone would blurt out, "Louie, you're crazy!" in response to some remark or action.

"So! I'm crazy, am I?," and out would come the official papers to be waved before the accuser's eyes. "Well, I have the papers here that say I'm sane. Do *you* have such proof?"

Louie Cukela married Minnie Myrtle Strayer in 1921 in Washington. It was Mrs. Cukela who brought out another side of her husband's complex personality—a love for beautiful things, flowers, big shiny cars, and instances of kindness that are still remembered by Old Breed Marines.

It was at Norfolk that the qualities came out for a full view. Cukela fairly haunted the big flower garden at the headquarters building, chatting with the civilian gardener. He'd stop each afternoon in his monster Chrysler, all glistening and polished, and pick up a huge bouquet of blooms the gardner had ready for him.

### He Never Forgot

There were frequent officer's parties on the base. The Cukelas always managed to be last to leave. They'd gather up all the left-over refreshments, sandwiches, cake, ice-cream, and load them into their big car. Off they'd go, with a screeching roar, to pull up abruptly in front of the Base Guard House.

Here they'd unload—with a flourish of course—and carry all the chow into the Guard Room where Minnie would arrange it and serve the members of the guard while her husband, rank forgotten at the moment, swapped jokes and stories with "his" Marines.

Louie Cukela retired as a major on 30 June 1940. He was back in uniform again on 30 July of the same year. He served at Norfolk and Philadelphia all during WWII despite his continual hammering at Headquarters for an assignment in the South Pacific. He was returned to the inactive list on 17 May 1946.

Louie Cukela didn't take his retired status well at all. No more snappy uniforms; no chest full of glittering ribbons to display; no enlisted men to encourage and help; no senior officers with whom to do combat over some infraction of regulations by a Marine of his command—no company to mold into a regimental standout. Just a dull, daily routine of getting up in the morning and barely existing through a long, uneventful day.

But he had some big moments at that. The time he sat with other Medal of Honor holders in special seats alongside the Presidential box at Gen Eisenhower's first Inauguration. He had a chance to do some strutting that day and he made the most of it.

### His Last Years

He and his wife made two visits to his native Serbia—visits they'd relive frequently. His niece's two sons were regular visitors at the Cukela home in Washington. They worshipped him because he was always eager to sit down and regale them with tales—some very "tall tales"—of adventure, always very careful of the words he used.

Maj Louie Cukela died in his sleep at Bethesda Naval Hospital on 19 March 1956. Minnie Cukela survived her husband until August of the same year. They were buried side by side in Arlington Cemetery.

Louie Cukela was, first of all, a Marine. His devotion to the Corps was the greatest. Showman, hero, leader of men—always on the move, busy every living minute. The eyes of his old shipmates actually light up when he is mentioned, and off they go into a stream of fascinating reminiscences that are in all truth spellbinding. They remember him so well that any of them can bring Louie Cukela back to life in vivid style.

"The bravest man I ever knew," is one comment and the speaker goes on to prove it with tales of the explosion at Lake Denmark Navy Ammunition Depot. Another Old Breed Marine will chime in about France, or Haiti, or San Domingo—and how the Major astounded Smedley Butler at Tientsin in 1927 when he decorated the walls of his company's barracks with brightly painted reproductions of his many decorations.

Showman, hero, good Marine—a fighting man with a distinct flair for the spectacular in everything he did, even to the answer he gave to the question a newspaper reporter asked him one time:

"Tell me, Major, what is a good Marine?"

Louie Cukela didn't hesitate a second. "He is a fighting man first of all, that's how he's trained. He has guts, determination, and a love for his country. He is—and it's been proven a thousand times—the first line for the safety of the United States."

This was Louie Cukela. USMC

*I remember*

# GALLIPOLI

## *(the memoirs of a British company officer)*

*After having been wounded in France earlier in WWI, our author (modesty compels the pseudonym) found himself in Egypt in 1915 as a member of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force assigned to the Gallipoli venture. What was Gallipoli all about? In a nutshell: When the Turks sided with Germany in WWI, the Allies laid out a plan to smash through the Dardanelles, reopening the straits to Russian shipping and setting the stage for a land campaign that would defeat the Turks and unite Allied and Russian forces. Trouble was, the straits were mined and dominated by Turkish shore batteries which had to be silenced. "Aiguillette" takes it from there.*

**By "Aiguillette"**

TO RECALL AN EVENT THAT OCCURRED SOME FIVE-AND-forty years ago is to risk tincturing memory with hindsight. Yet the forced landing on Gallipoli of 25 April 1915 was so novel and electrifying an experience that the memory of it remains as clear and vivid as if it had taken place only yesterday.

The Mediterranean Expeditionary Force assigned to the Gallipoli venture was under the command of Gen Sir Ian Hamilton. It consisted of the 29th (regular) Division, of which I was a member, the (H.O.) Royal Naval Division, and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps with an attached French division under Gen d'Amade. If, as was reported, the Turks had 40,000 men on the peninsula and another 30,000 on call at Bulair, not to mention one or more divisions close by on the Asiatic side of the Straits, then it had to be recognized that Gen Hamilton would be confronted by a numerical superiority from the very outset. Even more disturbing was the fact that he was without the 10 per cent margin normally allowed to replace casualties. In the circumstances one tried to console oneself with the thought that the actual theater of operations was so cramped that the Turks could never deploy their full strength without treading on each other's heels. But of course that drawback was more than offset by the power of speedy reinforcement that their greater strength conferred on them.

As finally determined, the plan of attack was to force a landing on Gallipoli with the British and Dominion troops, while the French went ashore at Kum Kale with the object of keeping down the enemy fire from the Asiatic side of the Narrows. At the toe of the peninsula the principal landings—assigned to the 29th Division—were to be at "V" Beach, a small semi-circular stretch of sand below Sedd-el-Bahr castle; at "W" Beach (Lancashire Landing), a cramped sandy bay between Cape Tekke and Cape Helles; and at "X" Beach, on the north side of Cape Tekke, a stroke designed to take the "W" Beach defenders in flank. At the three beaches the cliffs

See map on Page 42

rose steeply, almost exactly as seats rise in an amphitheater. Diversionary landings, to protect the main assault's flanks, were to be made at Morto Bay, above Sedd-el-Bahr ("S" Beach), and at "Y" Beach further up the northern coast of the peninsula.

The Anzacs were assigned a 200-yard beach a mile to the north of the steep bluffs of the Gaba Tepe promontory.

All these beaches were strongly defended with barbed wire entanglements on shore and beneath the water, sea and land mines, and with the Turkish infantry strongly

The Marine Corps has been chewing over the tactical and strategic lessons of Gallipoli for years but here's a fresh approach: an account of the battle seen through the eyes of an officer who was there.



**Sir Ian Hamilton (right) commanded the landing forces, Adm J. M. de Robeck the naval task force.**

entrenched and supported by numerous machineguns and ample artillery.

Assembled in the bay of Mudros, in the island of Lemnos, the whole venture was held up for some days by freakish weather. Calm water was essential if the landings were to have any chance of success. But the delay was not without its compensations, since an opportunity to practice boat drill and the novel tactics attendant on a forced landing was only too welcome.

The most recent occasion on which British troops had landed from open boats in the face of an enemy had been against the Napoleonic forces at Aboukir Bay in 1801. But that had been before the day of machineguns, barbed wire, and magazine rifles. Obviously, things weren't going to be too easy, particularly as no up-to-date doctrine governing such amphibious operations had been laid down, so that all the innumerable problems that arose had to be solved by improvisation on the spot.

Even within land-locked Mudros Bay the short, angry seas added enormously to the difficulties of getting the heavily-laden troops away in the ships' boats—and out of them again on the practice beaches. And this without any interference from an enemy! Moreover, one couldn't help reflecting that since supplies of every description would have to be man-handled over open beaches from lighters swinging about in the local riptide and currents, a few days unhelpful weather subsequent to getting ashore would find both men and weapons without anything to keep them going. Local supplies were non-existent—even drinking water was unobtainable on the barren peninsula. It was the sort of reflection, however, best kept to oneself; although to guard against the contingency meant loading up the men far more heavily with ammunition and emergency rations than if the uninterrupted flow of these could have been ensured.

### Out to Sea

It was not until Friday, 23 April, that the weather changed, bringing a calm sea and smiling skies, so that the transports could up-anchor and steam out of the bay. By sundown on the 24th the troops had all been allocated to the small craft and lighters that would put them ashore. At midnight the whole armada stood out from the temporary shelter of the island of Tenedos and headed for the peninsula. Dawn would be at 0500 and just before first light the landings on the flanks—at "S" Beach and "Y" Beach—were to go in without any preliminary bombardment in the hope of effecting surprise.

It was a still, fine night, with the sea so calm that the ships had no trouble with their long tows of boats and lighters. With everything checked and re-checked, the only thing to do was to follow the men's excellent example and snatch a little sleep while the opportunity




still offered. Once we'd got ashore there'd be small chance for a quiet snooze for the next 48 hours or so!

The objective to which my own contingent had been assigned was "X" Beach, and the troops were to take off in ordinary ship's boats, towed by launches, from *HMS Implacable*.

Even before it began to grow light we knew from the rattle of firearms that the "Y" Beach landing party, to the north of us, had got ashore and was in contact with the enemy. But as the assault force settled themselves in their "whalers," the sound of the localized conflict on "Y" Beach was drowned in the roar of artillery, as the Naval guns opened up all round the peninsula. Behind us *Implacable's* armament was going full blast, the shells bursting on the rim of the cliff ahead and the downs immediately behind, where we knew the Turk to be strongly dug in and protected by a broad belt of wire. My chief hope was that the fierceness of the warship's fire would serve to keep the defenders' heads down until the tows had been safely run in. For there was no protection whatsoever in the open ship's boats; the men were, literally, sitting targets. And every man knocked out before we set foot ashore would be one less when it came to tackling the enemy hand to hand. Moreover, if one of the launches were to be put out of action, the tows would be left floundering in the shoal water until such time as the oars could be got out and the clumsy passage to the beach completed by rowing.

As it turned out, the hazy light of early dawn proved anything but conducive to good shooting and casualties in the boats were not too heavy. As the tows were cast off and swung in to the narrow stretch of sand, the men were out of the whalers and through the shoal water in record time, despite the hidden obstacles that were scattered all along the foreshore. Wherever there was a temporary hold-up the men came under the vicious fire of machineguns cunningly sited in the cliff-face. But the very steepness of the bluff gave us a welcome stretch of dead ground where we could get sorted out. Very little time was lost before a couple of sections were on their way to stalk the machine-gunners, while the main body started to clamber up the steep crag—the scent of wild thyme battling valiantly with the reek of cordite.

The Turkish machine-gunners had chosen their nests with considerable skill. But they were up against men who had learned to snare the wily Afridi on the North-west Frontier of India, an elusive individual of whom it was commonly said that he could "hide behind his own sandals." So it was not long before the stalkers had closed in on their prey *from above*. There was a wild flurry for a couple of minutes, half-way up the cliff, and then the machineguns ceased to chatter.

With this menace out of the way the scramble to the top of the bluff was almost without opposition. For the Turks were unprovided with hand-grenades to lob over at us, and were obviously waiting to blast us with rifle fire as soon as we emerged over the crest. Fortunately, there was some useful dead ground where the troops could be assembled for the rush at the enemy trenches, which we knew to be sited a little way back from the edge of the cliff.

They were short on doctrine, reserves, weapons, and equipment—but long on guts. The "X" Beach landing force, of which the author was a member, lost 492 out of 979 men on the first day of combat.




With a final burst from her secondary armament, *Implacable's* guns ceased fire. That was the signal. Still breathing rather hard from their scramble up the bluffs, the men were over the edge of the cliff and advancing steadily on a trench line vividly outlined by the blaze of the defenders' rifles. At this stage everything was up to the men with the wire-cutters, and never have long hours of rehearsal paid better dividends. With hardly a pause lanes were opened up in the belt and the troops swarmed through. With that, it was a case of bayonet, rifle butt, and revolver—sheer hard fighting against antagonists who invariably gave as good as they got.

### The "Old Sweats" Delivered

Even at this early stage casualties among the officers and senior NCOs had been exceptionally heavy. But with these experienced "old sweats" there was no loss of control. In most cases, in any section of ten men two will have leadership quality, seven will be prepared to follow a lead, and one would prefer to be anywhere but where he is. With these salted old regulars, "taking hold" when the next senior man was knocked out had become so instinctive as to be automatic. Corporals took over command of platoons, sections were handled by the senior soldier left standing. There was no loss either of momentum or cohesion. Down on the beach the boats had brought in another human cargo and as the supports came up to lend a hand Johnny Turk began to give ground.

It was not long, however, before he put in a determined counter-attack with some of his reserves added to the original defenders. But he was up against men whose "ten rounds rapid" were all aimed shots, and the assault broke on the steady volume of musketry and stumbled away in defeat.

From the uproar away on the right it was plain that the very devil of a fight was raging where the Lancashire Fusiliers had got ashore, at heavy cost, on "W" Beach. Thus it turned out that with the Fusiliers pressing hard on their front and the "X" Beach contingent slamming at their flanks, the enemy was gradually forced out of the south-westerly corner of the peninsula, where to hold on further was to court the danger of being cut off altogether.

Actually, any such risk was far from being as potent as the Turks imagined. The landing at "Y" Beach, after a reasonably good start, had run into serious trouble. The troops, having got ashore under a cliff so steep that the Turks hadn't even troubled to put it into a state of defense, were set upon by a force at least five times their number. Hanging on by their eyelids, they were in no position to extend their right and join hands with the "X" Beach contingent, let alone link up with the Anzacs to close the neck of the sack, and bag all the Turks further down the peninsula. Fighting all through the day and the following night, they were gradually borne back to their landing place. Ultimately an exhausted band of survivors was re-embarked under cover of a gallant rearguard made up of a few riflemen of the King's Own Scottish Borderers and a party from the Royal Naval Division.

Further around the peninsula, the landing at "V" Beach had reached deadlock. The plan here had been to drive the old collier *River Clyde* hard on the beach under Sedd-el-Bahr fort, and to disgorge the human freight concealed in its hull across a bridge of lighters spanning the shoal water. In the outcome, a mere handful of men got ashore at the price of appalling casualties. Sheltering behind a shallow bank of sand on the foreshore, they were too weak in numbers to advance, while all the attempts to send them supports

from *River Clyde* had ended in reinforcing the dead that already lay thick on the intervening strip of sand. The only thing to do was for the "W" and "X" Beach contingents to beat off the Turkish counter-attacks and try to press the enemy back up the peninsula, while the pitifully small body of reserves pushed across country to take the defenders at Sedd-el-Bahr in flank.

As the survivors from the "W" and "X" Beach landings at last contrived to link up, news reached them that the Anzacs had managed to get ashore and hold on to a shallow perimeter a little to the north of Gaba Tepe.

It was obvious that Johnny Turk would speedily rally and come back at us in a concerted attempt to throw the whole lot of us into the sea. Meanwhile, those who were not frantically toiling to build up defenses were sweating to improvise an elementary pier and bring ashore the water, food, and above all the ammunition that was so desperately needed. At this stage there was no wheeled transport so that everything had to be man-handled—and nowhere could the area boast any better going than a rough path.

Nightfall brought the inevitable counter-attacks, with fresh, full-strength Turkish formations hurled against the weary survivors of the landing parties. And a pretty meager handful they made. In the case of the "X" Beach contingent no more than 492 remained out of the 979 originally landed.

There could be no question of pressing on. With no field guns ashore and a desperate need to husband small arms ammunition, it was as much as we could do to hold on. If a couple of fresh brigades had been waiting out at sea to leap-frog the original landing parties, with perhaps an air-drop by parachute troops to seize the humpbacked bastion of Achi-Baba, it is more than possible that the Turks could have been cleared from the territory dominating the Narrows in the first 48 hours. But the nearest fresh brigades were away in far-off Cairo and Alexandria, while parachute troops and air-drops were refinements of the distant future.

It is still beyond my personal comprehension how the troops stood up to all that was demanded of them throughout that first 48 hours ashore. The Turks attacked with the fire and resolution that has always characterized them. But somehow or other they were beaten back. Somehow or other a few field guns had been heaved ashore, and it is doubtful if British soldiers have ever been more grateful to their Gunner comrades than they were throughout the night of 25 April and the days immediately following. The Navy worked like Trojans to help keep Johnny Turk at bay; but they had little shrapnel, less HE, and the necessarily poor fragmentation of their armor-piercing shells severely localized their effect, although the 10,000 bullets scattered by one of *Queen Elizabeth's* 15-inch shrapnel could be relied upon to break up any formation caught in the open. But in his trenches, Johnny Turk had little to fear from the flat trajectory of the Naval guns.

Late on 26 April the French corps was disembarked at "V" Beach to take over the right flank. This brought the remnants of the Dublin and Munster Fusiliers to swell the forces of the center and left. But their arrival did not add appreciably to our numbers. For both battalions had been reduced to little more than a cadre, the Munsters having lost one third and the Dublins three-fifths of their strength. If ever a formation was in dire need of its 10 percent margin of reserves it was the 29th Division on 26 April and for the ensuing ten days.

"To expect the same troops who had forced the landing to go on and exploit it... showed a lack of imagination that bordered on the cretinous."

There was no rest for anyone, by day or by night. When not in the firing line the men slaved under the beach-masters, wading breast-high through the shoal water to bring the ammunition and stores ashore on which their very lives depended. Chow was unalleviated hard tack, and none too much of that, and all water had to be strictly rationed. Even so, two or three men would club together to set aside half a cupful so as to be sure of a regular shave. They were soon lousy, of course, and there was no chance of giving them clean clothing. Yet, somehow or other, they contrived to look neat and trim, and their weapons were always immaculate. But each man knew and stoically accepted the fact that his expectation of life was about that of half an inch of lighted candle.

### Link-up Necessary

Yet it was imperative to thrust the Turks back beyond the rounded hump of Achi-Baba, join hands with the Anzacs beyond Gaba-Tepe, and win the high ground commanding the Narrows at Chanuk-Bair. That was the mission we had set out to fulfill. Until it was accomplished the Navy would continue to be held up at the mouth of the Dardanelles.

On 6 May, therefore, a concerted attempt was made to get Johnny Turk really on the run. On 27 April the line had been stabilized across the peninsula from the mouth of the Sighir watercourse (on the Aegean) to Eski Hissarlik (on the Straits). In the incessant fighting of the next few days, over broken country that gave the best kind of cover for the defense, a certain amount of ground had been won, and the large village of Krithia, on the left flank, was only three-quarters of a mile distant. Despite a desperate counter-attack on the night of 1 May, the positions had been held, and they formed the start-line from which the all-out Anglo-French effort of 6 May was launched. By this time the 29th Division had been reduced to half its original

strength; its complement of officers had been whittled away by two-thirds.

Krithia, standing high on its slope, surrounded by its orchards and cultivated patches, made a wonderful artillery target. But the Gunners simply hadn't got the shells with which to plaster it. Since it was seamed with defenses and had been turned into a veritable vipers' nest of machineguns, the approach to it over scrub and tangled thorn-brakes promised to be unpleasantly costly.

### Attack Started, Faltered

At 1130 the attack went in steadily and confidently enough, and at one point the entire line—over four miles in length—was advancing, with bayonets glinting in the sun, as one man. But the assault, lacking adequate artillery support and in any case far too thin on the ground, was badly broken up in the gullies that intersected the line of advance. It also suffered heavily from machinegun fire when it got as far as the enemy's main line of resistance. And there were snipers everywhere, hidden in the scrub over which we had passed, concealed amongst the jumble of rocks in a dried-up watercourse, even perched in the treetops of a lonely clump of pines on Krithia hillside.

Furious detached fights raged everywhere, but the attack had lost direction and impetus; and with an advance of no more than three or four hundred yards in places, we took to our spades to consolidate the modest gains we had won at such prohibitive cost. Achi-Baba still loomed over us with brooding menace, and the high ground at Chanuk-Bair seemed as far away as if it had been on the other side of the moon. What men could do these tired and battle-worn men had done. But there had simply not been sufficient weight behind the punch to turn it into a K.O. And as we dug in and prepared to hold on to the little we had won, the Turks shelled the back areas to knock out the supports coming up—which were not coming up for the simple reason that there was none to come up.

Tremendous fights flared up throughout the ensuing months, but the battle of 6-8 May was the last real chance of accomplishing the task with which Gen Hamilton had been entrusted. For when at last his battered remnant was reinforced, time had been given the Turks to build up in even greater strength. At the outset, a tithe of the men who swarmed onto the peninsula from July onwards would have turned the trick in the assailants' favor. As it was, they had come too late to the fair.

Once one's wounds are on the mend, a hospital bed is an admirable place for retrospective rumination. From the sheltered calm of a Malta sick-bay the enterprise at Gallipoli could be seen in something like its true perspective. To begin with, it seemed unquestionable that the Royal Navy had deliberately ignored the precept of one of the most illustrious of its leaders. Adm Collingwood had long since laid it down that "pitting ships against forts that are supported by land batteries is useless so long as the latter really mean business"—an axiom that all history conspires to support. It is true that in 1801 Adm Duckworth had silenced the fortresses on either side of the Dardanelles and forced the Narrows. But it is notable that on this occasion the fixed land defenses had been unsupported by mobile batteries. In 1859 an attempt to reduce the Taku forts, and force the mouth of the Pei-Ho by purely naval action, had been repulsed with heavy loss, the fixed defenses having been amplified by active field guns. But the year following, an assault force supported by naval gunfire had captured them from the landward side at comparatively small cost. In 1913 a flotilla of Italian torpedo boats had sought to repeat Adm Duckworth's feat, only to be turned back with heavy loss, every one of the vessels having been hit by quick-firing mobile ordnance.

Obviously, the recent venture should have been envisaged as a combined operation *from the very outset.* To turn the Royal Navy loose to bombard the forts in the unwarrantable belief that they would be able to force the Narrows on their own, was only to alert the Turks and set them to the creation of a system of defenses covering all the vulnerable points on the peninsula. Until the Navy had so obligingly rung the alarm bell, Gallipoli had been without any defenses other than its permanent forts. Indeed, when the Navy vessels had first appeared off its shores, a handful of Royal Marines had wandered all over the territory without a finger being raised to prevent them.

When the decision to employ troops had belatedly been arrived at, the scope of the enterprise had been grievously underestimated. It was patent that a forced landing from open boats, in the face of modern machine gun and magazine rifle fire, was bound to prove exceedingly costly. To expect the same troops who had forced the landing to go on and exploit it, without substantial replenishment of their ranks, showed a lack of imagination that bordered on the cretinous.

In short, the Gallipoli venture clearly came under the melancholy heading of "too little and too late" and all that could be said of it was:

*"For of all sad words of tongue and pen*
*The saddest are these: 'It might have been!'"*

USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

## *Small Detail*

I was approaching regimental headquarters when I met two privates walking side by side. The Marine on the right saluted and I returned the salute. A moment later, I turned and called the two of them back and asked the one on the left why he hadn't saluted. His reply: "Sir, I'm a detail and my buddy here is in charge."

**$15.00 to Capt Roger R. Throckmorton**



# Camouflage: A neglected art

By Maj B. B. DeWitt

IN A SPEECH BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AFTER the Battle of El Alamein, Winston Churchill had this to say about the British victory: "By a marvelous system of camouflage, complete tactical surprise was achieved in the desert. The enemy suspected—indeed knew—that an attack was impending, but when and where and how it was coming were hidden from him."

This is probably the highest tribute ever paid to camouflage, a military skill that has always paid high dividends to the force that employed it effectively.

In the past, with few exceptions, our enemies have collected the camouflage dividend and we have had to pay it. Still, the price has never been high enough to prevent final victory. Today, however, tactics based on the possible employment of nuclear weapons, have raised the price of neglecting camouflage to the point where we can no longer afford to pay it.

Effective camouflage has moved from the "nice to have" category to the essential. Without it entire units and installations will be exposed to possible destruction and our scheme of maneuver laid bare so the enemy can bring his full power against it. On the other hand, with effective camouflage our forces can not only survive but also can deceive the enemy and thereby achieve the critical element of surprise.

In spite of the increased importance of camouflage, there has been little effort to improve it. To date the only reaction to the necessity for avoiding destruction and achieving surprise in the attack has been to emphasize night operations. This will solve the problem during darkness. The essential capability of operating effectively during the entire 24-hour period, however, may be lost if camouflage isn't improved—and quickly.

The first step in achieving effective camouflage is to understand the true dimensions of this military skill and the role it is capable of playing on tomorrow's battlefield. In many minds camouflage is synonymous with concealment. This concept is wrong and results in a very restricted use of camouflage. It completely overlooks the other type of camouflage in which decoys and other special equipment are used to simulate actual men and equipment to deceive the enemy. This type of camouflage is most easily classified as deceptive camouflage. It is the primary tool of a deception operation—an operation made to order for present tactics.

### Even Concealment Isn't Understood

Even the real value of concealment is not fully appreciated, familiar as this type of camouflage may be. The most obvious function of concealment is to protect forces from destruction by enemy weapons. At the same time, concealment, because it denies information to the enemy on the existence or location of units and installations, has other effects which are not so apparent. It causes the enemy to make an erroneous estimate of the "enemy" situation. This in turn leads him to make tactical mistakes which sooner or later work to our advantage.

The capability of concealment alone to influence future operations is an important factor which must not be overlooked. Its only limitation is that it isn't possible to predict exactly what mistakes the enemy will make or when he will make them.

However, by using deceptive camouflage—alone or together with concealment—this limitation can be overcome and the enemy led to make the miscalculations we want him to make. This is accomplished by deliberately giving him a false picture of the tactical situation in the form of a deception operation. The deception is especially designed so that, by reacting to the false picture presented to him, the enemy becomes incapable of coping with the actual operation. The authenticity of the false picture, and therefore the success of the deception, depends largely on the skill with which deceptive

We pay a lot of lip service to camouflage and deception, the author says, but that's about all—and the price of further neglect is going to be so high we won't be able to afford it.

**This picture won't win any photography contests but it's a pretty good example of what can be done to hide a truck. Usually, though, we don't bother.**

camouflage is used to simulate actual men and equipment.

The mobility of our forces has increased tremendously the chances that deceptive camouflage will succeed. The enemy must react quickly to any tactical movement he observes. There won't be much time to study it carefully to see if it is phony or real. A hasty evaluation will very likely be wrong.

Camouflage, then, is much more than just a passive defense measure. It is a weapon which can be applied with positive force against the enemy. The many techniques of concealment and deceptive camouflage make it a very flexible weapon too—one that can be shaped and formed to be of value in any tactical situation.

Camouflage differs from other military activities in many respects but it does have one thing in common with nearly all of them. It consumes time, manpower, and material. These precious commodities can't be wasted by making mistakes which result in too much camouflage, too little camouflage, or camouflage which is incapable of defeating the enemy's detection means.

Many such mistakes can be avoided simply by giving a little thought to camouflage before its execution. This "thinking before acting" must be undertaken by commanders at all echelons as well as the Marines who are to do the actual work. It need never be a complex and burdensome procedure. In fact, in most cases it should be a quick mental process.

The need for planning is most apparent in the relatively tricky deception operation where deceptive camouflage, and perhaps concealment too, are used to portray a false picture. The commander, after deciding on the false picture he wants to create, must then decide which portions of his force must be concealed and which simulated and revealed to produce the most authentic picture possible.

The problem of integrating concealment and deceptive camouflage is only applicable to a deception but there are two questions which must be answered before any type of camouflage even the simplest concealment is undertaken. These are: (1) Which method of enemy detection should the camouflage be designed to defeat?; and, (2) Exactly what items of equipment, units, vehicles, weapons, etc. must be camouflaged?

It is necessary to examine these questions in more detail to see why the answers are essential for optimum camouflage results.

*Which method of detection should the camouflage be designed to defeat?*

It would be a difficult job to camouflage a target if visual surveillance from the ground and air; aerial photography with black and white, color, infra-red and camouflage detection film; and electronic devices similar to our AN/TPS-21, were all employed against it simultaneously. On the other hand it would be just as difficult, and therefore unlikely, for the enemy to muster such a massive detection effort. The logical approach, therefore, is to determine which means of detection poses the greatest threat and to design the camouflage primarily to defeat it.

In making this determination the first factor to consider is the enemy's capabilities. In Korea, for instance, detection from the air was seldom a problem. Next consider the proximity of the enemy. Detection by ground reconnaissance elements is a greater danger to units in contact with the enmy than to those in rear areas. The final determining factor is the planned tactical employment of the unit itself.

If a unit plans to move in a short time, the means of detection which produces information in the shortest time is the greatest threat. Visual observation is usually this means. Aerial photography is of minimum concern to a unit which will be gone by the time a photograph has been processed and interpreted. Rapid and frequent movement increases the importance of camouflaging against visual observation, both ground and air. Each time a unit moves, however, the situation must be re-evaluated to make sure the new tactical posture doesn't result in a different primary detection threat.

Frequent movement calls for rapid camouflage as well as rapid detection. Fortunately, camouflage which is effective against visual observation can be achieved more quickly than any other type. In other words, the burden of time falls equally on both camouflage and detection systems. Lack of time is no excuse for neglecting camouflage.

On the other hand, there is plenty of time for aerial photography to detect a fixed or relatively static installation. If the installation is a large one, such as an airfield, it may be impractical to camouflage against it because of the tremendous effort involved.

Yet, in such cases, camouflage must not be ignored. With a relatively small amount of camouflage the distinguishing features of the installation can be blurred just enough so that the pilot who tries to bomb it may become confused and miss his target. This is the protection which is essential.

Electronic and infra-red detection devices may be a threat after dark. A force operating at night should be able to protect itself against this type of detection. However, it would be a mistake to take elaborate precautions against such methods until definite evidence existed that they were being employed.

In the final analysis the point to remember is this: under nearly all circumstances the greatest threat to camouflage is visual observation. Fortunately, camouflage designed to defeat visual observation also provides a great deal of protection from aerial photography. In any case, after protection from the greatest threat has been taken care of, camouflage should be improved to give better protection from other types of detection whenever possible.

*What must be camouflaged?*

It isn't necessary to conceal or duplicate every last man and piece of equipment in order to obtain effective camouflage. But it is necessary to camouflage the distinguishing features which the enemy uses for identification. These distinguishing features are called signatures, and every object on the battlefield has one. The tank has its long gun, the airfield its runway, and the infantry battalion its distinctive equipment such as 81mm mortars.

Even different types of operations can be identified by their signatures. For example, a helicopter operation, in addition to the helicopters themselves, may be identified by the pre-landing activities of pathfinders and the supporting arms preparation of the landing zone and approach lanes. This is the type of signature which is the essential element of a deception plan. The deception, or in other words the false picture, is nothing more than the signature of the operation the commander has decided to duplicate.




**Typical signature of a rifle platoon in defense**

Signatures don't remain the same. They change with changes in visibility. In daylight, for example, an airplane is identified by its distinctive shape; on a clear night, by lights moving in the sky. Finally, on a cloudy night or in a dense fog, the plane is identified by its sound alone. Thus, as observation becomes restricted, signatures become easier to hide or simulate.

Every Marine must know the signature of his piece of equipment and concentrate on camouflaging it. Commanders must know several operational signatures in order to plan a deception operation. Also, by knowing their command's signature, they can, when time is not available for complete concealment, assure that the signature is given top camouflage priority.

By concentrating on camouflage of signatures the best possible camouflage is achieved in the shortest time. With the signature concealed or duplicated, the essential camouflage is complete. Later, if time permits, the camouflage can be improved by taking care of the less important details.

By making decisions like those just mentioned, commanders can plan and guide the camouflage effort. Our camouflage has always suffered from an almost total absence of such command guidance. Commanders usually speak of camouflage in such general terms as "camouflage is important," or "camouflage will be continuous." The result is that even if the men know how to camouflage they are never sure exactly what they are supposed to do.

Today, thought and planning prior to execution are more important than ever before. Frequent movement causes frequent changes and readjustments of camouflage requirements and plans. In addition it increases

Every command, every weapon, and every operation has a distinguishing feature called a "signature" and to deceive the enemy it is necessary to know what those features are.

the opportunities for employing deceptive camouflage, which requires more careful planning than concealment.

**The Final Step: Execution**

In camouflage, as in any area of military endeavor, "the proof of the pudding" lies in translating knowledge and plans into action. The first and most important step in this process is the application of the fundamental principle of camouflage—site selection. Site selection, or choice of position, simply means positioning any object, be it an individual or an airfield, so that maximum camouflage is obtained from the surrounding terrain.

It is impossible to overemphasize the importance of site selection. If it is ignored the most skillful camouflage is probably doomed to failure. At best, a great deal of time and material can be wasted in needlessly duplicating what nature has already provided. Site selection alone, without any embellishment, provides some concealment in any environment. It requires little time and absolutely no materials—a tremendous advantage with today's tactics.

Of course, sometimes the best natural camouflage must be sacrificed to other considerations. Time after time, however, it is sacrificed solely to park the trucks here on the road rather than under those trees etc., etc., etc. This is the type of thinking that dooms camouflage right from the start.

**Techniques of Concealment**

Except in areas of dense vegetation, man can nearly always improve on the concealment nature provides by adding camouflage materials. These materials should not only hide the target but they also should be made invisible by being blended into the natural background. If this is not possible it may be necessary to settle for simply hiding the target and exposing the camouflage material. This can still be effective, for although the covering material can be spotted it's still impossible to tell what's under or behind it.

Camouflage materials can be divided into two categories, natural and artificial. The most important natural material is cut vegetation; the most important artificial material is the camouflage net with burlap garnishing.

As a means of gaining concealment, cut vegetation offers several advantages. It usually blends more effectively with the background than a camouflage net. It is more effective against infra-red photography. Of particular importance today, it can be employed quickly and relatively easily and doesn't place a burden on the supply system. One problem in using cut foliage—the need to replace it before it wilts—has been diminished by the frequent displacements which are characteristic of present operations.

For these reasons cut vegetation and other natural materials should be used to the maximum. The trouble is that in many areas they are in limited supply or not available at all. The more barren the environment, the more important is the use of nets and burlap to obtain concealment.

In the Marine Corps camouflage nets are plentiful. TE for FMF units authorize a net for nearly every vehicle and every weapon from mortars on up. These nets give us a tremendous camouflage potential. Unfortunately, that potential hasn't been realized. This is largely because of the incompetent way in which the nets are usually handled. They are poorly maintained, inadequately garnished, and improperly erected. In fact, probably no other piece of military equipment is used with less skill than the camouflage net. The inevitable result is poor camouflage.

There is a fairly painless remedy for this situation. It is simply to learn the correct procedures, most of which are contained in FM 5–20, *Camouflage, Basic Principles and Field Camouflage,* and FM 5–11 *Camouflage Materials.* The procedures outlined in these manuals are no more difficult or time consuming than the slipshod methods now employed.

The garnishing of nets could be improved in another way. Instead of purchasing only ungarnished nets as at present, a number of pre-garnished nets could be purchased and a few issued to every unit. By using these

**Major DeWitt** was commissioned via US Naval Academy in 1950. After Basic School, he spent two years in 7thEngBn, CamPen, then went to Korea for a tour with 1stMarDiv (1stEngBn and G-3). He has since served as I-I (Roanoke, Va.) and as Company CO in 2ndMarDiv (Shore Party Bn and 2nd Marines). He completed Junior School in '59 and is now an instructor at the Naval Academy. This is Maj DeWitt's first try at writing for publication. He wrote the article "to stimulate interest in a military skill which at present is largely neglected."

pre-garnished nets as models the correct camouflage pattern could be applied to all the others.

One method of concealment often overlooked is the combined use of natural and artificial materials. There's nothing wrong with using cut vegetation as additional garnishing for nets if care is taken not to tear the net. In fact, this is an excellent concealment technique. It eliminates the necessity of piling vegetation directly on the object being concealed, thus making it difficult to operate or use. At the same time the superior blending qualities of the vegetation can be utilized.

There is a rationale that attempts to attribute good concealment to a natural instinct for camouflage. This is nonsense. Good concealment can only result from a definite effort to learn and develop effective techniques based on proven camouflage principles. We need to devote more effort to this task.

### Techniques of Deceptive Camouflage

While improvement of concealment depends largely on correcting bad habits, to acquire skill in deceptive camouflage one must start almost from scratch. Only a few individuals, nearly all of them engineer personnel, have had any experience in using deceptive camouflage. In order to take advantage of the possibilities for deception which present tactics have created, this situation must be remedied. Infantry units, down to at least battalion level, should be able to plan a deception operation and use deceptive camouflage to execute it without relying on outside assistance.

The value of deceptive camouflage is that it can greatly reduce the number of men and actual equipment required for a deception operation. The men and equipment represented by the various simulators and decoys are then available for the actual attack. Without this economy of force most deceptions would be impractical.

It is usually easier to employ deceptive camouflage at night because the signature that then must be duplicated consists almost entirely of lights and sounds. Daylight employment requires more effort and skill but is likely to have a more decisive influence on enemy action. "Seeing is believing," and the more of a false picture the enemy sees the more likely he is to react to it.

The North African Campaign offers the best proof of this statement. There the British disguised and simulated hundreds of tanks, guns, and other equipment—even building a dummy railhead. In that barren terrain the deceptions were an almost unqualified success against a very comprehensive surveillance system.

Deception devices that can be used to reproduce signatures are many and varied. They range from prefabricated replicas of the actual item—including even proper infra-red reflectiveness—to hasty field expedients improvised from materials on hand.

In the prefabricated class the most familiar type is the pneumatic decoy. In addition, many devices have been specifically designed to simulate various items of equipment or special activities. Most of these are classified. The advantages of prefabricated devices are that they are accurate reproductions and require relatively little time to put in place. On the other hand, since they usually require special handling and increase the load on the supply system, they should be used only for high priority targets such as missile launchers. A pneumatic jeep is of little value and not worth the effort required to carry it around.

A limited supply of prefabricated decoys does not limit the use of deceptive camouflage. Nearly any decoy or disguise can be created from materials usually available. Again in North Africa, the British used canvas, primarily, to disguise tanks and artillery pieces as innocuous cargo vehicles. They used the same material hung from camouflage nets to create dummy artillery positions that fooled the German photo interpreters.

The most important ingredient of deceptive camouflage is ingenuity. A list of improvisations would be endless. Any device that duplicates a signature well enough to fool the enemy is a good one.

### The Forgotten Weapon

A knowledge of the true nature of camouflage and its capabilities and limitations; use of this knowledge to plan for optimum employment of camouflage under any circumstances; and mastery of the techniques required to execute the plan—this is the recipe for good camouflage. The ingredients don't involve large sums of money or development of new weapons. Why, then, hasn't the end product been produced? Primarily because we haven't really tried.

It's been over three years since a Marine has attended the Army's camouflage school at Ft. Belvoir. Camouflage instruction at unit level schools is usually confined to concealment of the individual. In officer schools deception is seldom mentioned or worked into the solution of theoretical problems. During training exercises—the real proving ground—camouflage receives too much lip service and not enough real effort to initiate, test, and develop sound concepts and procedures. Camouflage remains the forgotten weapon.

The premise that in future operations we must have good intelligence has been recognized. Yet, the advantages of our intelligence will be neutralized unless at the same time we prevent the enemy from having good intelligence. Real information must be withheld from him and false information deliberately supplied. This is the job for camouflage. It must not remain forgotten. Camouflage is needed—now! USMC

★ ★ ★ ★

### *And Peachy Keen*

The young Lieutenant was standing his first formal guard mount in the position of adjutant. All went well until the Sergeant Major halted six paces in front of him, saluted, and reported, "Sir, the guard is correct."

There was a long pause while the Lieutenant mulled over what the book called for him to do next. Finally he took a deep breath and said in a loud clear voice, "Splendid." **$15.00 to G. J. DeCaro**

# BASEPLATE

## Mc GURK

### Says Mr. Kernoodle: "A bone-crushing handshake is no tip-off on how a Marine will act in battle."

BERTRAM-THE-BAR-KEEP SCOWLED AT THE THREE OF US as we chose a table rather than stools at the bar.

"Old 'Laughing Boy' must be suffering from rheumatism in this moldy weather," Dusty chuckled. "Let's give him a break and pick up our own brews."

"Nix!" Tex whispered. "He is his most succinct, ungracious self when properly riled. Let's stir him up and get a real charge."

"Baseplate," Tex continued in a loud voice, "have you noticed how the service in this slopchute has deteriorated? They have a saying about Old Soldiers fading away. Wonder what happens to Old Marines?"

"Theirs is the worst lot of all!" Bertram growled as he shuffled to our table. "They have to pay for their past mistakes and innocent blunders by taking a lot of gaff from sassy lieutenants. In the Old Corps, the young officers had more respect for age and experience. And, Mr. Baseplate," he added menacingly, "Take your meat hooks out of that pop-corn bowl. This is no free lunch counter!"

"Speaking of the Old Corps," Dusty laughed, "Let me ask you something, Mr. Kernoodle. We've been arguing about the relative merits of some of our NCOs as leaders. Were you always able to spot the real leader as soon as you saw him in your day?"

"Nope!" Bertram snorted and moved off to wait on some new arrivals.

"Man! He sure is succinct today," Tex remarked. "Maybe I needled him too hard."

"He'll be back," Dusty predicted. 'If there's anything Bertram loves to talk about more than the Old Corps, it's leadership. I offered him an irresistible combination."

Sure enough, before too long Bertarm was back, one ear cocked apprehensively to see if we'd picked another subject. Reassured, he pulled up a chair and wasted no time in picking up where he had left off.

"You learn after awhile not to make snap judgments concerning a man's worth," he said earnestly. "I've seen big, rugged, noisy apes come apart at the seams the first time they had to make a command decision in combat I don't mean they were physically yellow. They could follow, but they couldn't lead."

"I suppose, then, that you've also seen quiet, innocuous looking characters who qualified as really outstanding leaders?" Dusty asked.

"Definitely!" Bertram nodded.

"You mean to tell me that I can't size up a man's capabilities within 15 minutes after I meet him?" Tex laughed derisively. "Why, hell! I can usually tell by his handshake whether he has steel or syrup in his backbone!"

"I'll admit that you can often get a pretty good clue within a short time," Bertram said patiently. "However, I personally have more confidence in what I learn by talking to a man. I've been fooled by relying mainly on the appearance he makes or how hard he shakes my hand. Anyhow, this is not exactly the point Mr. Rhodes was making, as I understood his question."

"That's right," Dusty came to Bertram's defense. "I asked if he was always able to spot a man's leadership capability as soon as he saw him. As I understand it, Bertram, you said 'not always' and warned us against snap judgments."

Bertram nodded, saying, "You all know that a properly led outfit reflects the imagination, effort, and dedication of its commander.

"So remember this in rating your NCOs," he added as he stood up and prepared to leave. "The true worth of a leader is not judged by his personal appearance or gift of gab. It is measured by the overall results he obtains." USMC



MARINES AROUND THE WORLD

THIRD OF A SERIES

# Netherlands Marines

**By Carl Strandberg**

THE NETHERLANDS MARINE CORPS CAME INTO EXISTENCE nearly 110 years before Tun Tavern became the birthplace of the US Marine Corps.

The Korps Mariniers was founded 10 December 1665 on the advice of Adm de Ruyter. The Admiral was deeply concerned at the inferior military qualities of his "landsoldiers," who usually embarked more or less at random at the eleventh hour before ships of the fleet of the *Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden* put out to sea.

It had long been Dutch custom for soldiers to be embarked in ships to help defend them and to fight on land when necessary. At the time, the Republic was involved in a life and death struggle with England for mastery of the seas. The need for a permanent corps of specially trained sea soldiers was felt after several defeats during the first Sea War (1652-1654). During the second Sea War (1665-1667) the newly-formed Marine Corps proved its worth in the "Four Days Sea Battle" (1666) and again during the famous expedition to Chatham in 1667. On that occasion the fleet of the Republic sailed up the Medway River and a raiding party of 800 Marines was landed to take the fort of Sheerness.

Marines played an important part in the fighting of 1672 when the Republic was very nearly overrun by neighboring enemies. Battle-seasoned Marines first took part in warding off the enemy at sea (Solebay 1672 and Kijkduin 1673), then fought bravely on land, staving off advancing enemy land armies at Seneffe in 1674.

During the Spanish War of Succession (1702-1713) former rivals combined forces against Spain. In August 1704 English and Dutch Marines stormed and occupied the fortifications at Gibraltar. After Gibraltar were many more battles on the Iberian Peninsula in which Netherlands Marines took part.

In 1763 and 1773 Marines were sent to the West-Indian colonies where uprisings of negro slaves had reached alarming proportions. After a long and difficult struggle these were suppressed.

The American Revolution precipitated another war between the Netherlands and England in 1780. The only bright spot in this otherwise unfortunate war (for the Dutch), was the battle of Doggersbank in which the Marines distinguished themselves.

### They Served in Peking

In 1816 a combined English-Dutch fleet sailed against the pirates of the Barbary coast, who had been raiding Mediterranean shipping and holding many Christians in slavery. The Marines played an active part in clearing the pirates' nest at Algiers.

During the long pacification of the Netherlands East Indies in the 19th century, Dutch Marines engaged in numerous actions with the fleet and with the colonial army on land. Especially noteworthy were actions in the rebellious province of Atjeh where much glory was won. From 1846-1849 there were three expeditions against rebellious native rulers on Bali. Here, also, the Marines distinguished themselves.

After the wars in Atjeh (1873-1876) there followed a long period of inaction. From 1900-1923 the Marines had a rather delicate task to perform in China. After the outbreak of disturbances there, a Marine guard

was established in Peking for the protection of the Netherlands Legation. During WW I this guard detachment was reinforced, since protection of the German and Austrian legations was added to the Dutch responsibilities.

In 1935 a Dutch Marine detachment formed part of the international military force attending the plebiscite in the Saar district under supervision of the League of Nations.

When the Low Countries were invaded by Hitler's troops in 1940, a handful of Dutch Marine recruits held out for several days on the Maas bridges in Rotterdam against superior German forces.

During the Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies, Marines served with RAdm Karel Doorman's fleet in the battle of the Java Sea. They also fought bravely against the Japanese on Java.

From 1945 to 1949 a Netherlands Marine brigade took part in military operations against rebel forces in the Dutch East Indies.

At present Dutch Marines are serving in the Netherlands, in larger ships of the Dutch Navy, and in overseas territories.

The Korps Mariniers has a Marine Corps Reserve but no integral air arm. Close air support and air transport, when required, are provided by other branches of the Netherlands Armed Forces.

Numbering about 4,000, the regular branch of the Netherlands Marine Corps is composed largely of volunteers who enlist for six years. The remainder of the Corps is affiliated with a Universal National Service program.

### Strength Varies

The peacetime strength of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps varies with its commitments. There is no prescribed ceiling. The Corps consists partly of regular Marines and partly of conscripts, which enables the Corps to build a reserve for wartime expansion.

Netherlands Marine recruits receive their training at Marine Barracks in Rotterdam and Dorn (near Utrecht). There is an amphibious training center on the island of Texel opposite the naval base, Den Helder. During WW II Dutch Marines trained with US Marines at Quantico, Camp Pendleton, and other posts and stations.

Once their training is completed, Netherlands Marines may be shipped out to operational units in the Netherlands Antilles (West Indies) or Netherlands New Guinea (Far East). Small detachments may embark on board ships of the fleet.

Training, organization, armament, and equipment are basically similar to those of smaller infantry units in the US Marine Corps.

The enlisted rank structure is composed of Marine (3rd, 2nd and 1st Class), corporal, sergeant, and sergeant major. The rank of adjutant is comparable to that of warrant officer. Commissioned grades are 2nd lieutenant, 1st lieutenant, captain, major, lieutenant colonel, colonel, and major general.

The headquarters of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps is in Rotterdam. The present Commandant of the Corps is Major-General J. G. M. Nass, R.N.M.C.

USMC



# OBSERVATION POST

**This department is for new, constructive ideas. They may be controversial; they must be short. Payment: $30. Length: 250-950 words.**

## Cannoneers, Hop To!

**By Maj G. W. Ferguson**

FOR ALMOST FOUR YEARS, MANY OF the Old Pros in our proud legion of field artillerymen have fussed, fumed and gnashed their teeth while attempting to operate under the provisional T/O.

As of 1 July this year, division artillery of the Marine Corps has been directed to organize under the "M" series T/O.

There is really no appreciable difference between the two structures. However, each has heated our collective powder temperature to the cook-off point. The GAZETTE's June announcement of proposed changes activated the firing pin; the result has been a verbal broadside out here in the field.

I would like to pass along the feelings and opinions of one old cannon cocker regarding a few of our "artillery type" problems. GAZETTE's announcement was to the effect that in the not-too-distant future (about the time we expect to put a man on the moon), Artillery's fire power will consist of three D/S battalions of 105's and a G/S battalion armed with the 155mm howitzer, about the same boom as heard in WWII and Korea.

Now, if we "look ahead to a vastly improved Marine division in 1965," as suggested, and see basically what we had in Artillery 20 years before, then somewhere in between (like for the last four years) we must have gotten derailed.

This isn't a revelation to most old artillerymen. In fact, there were many who made their feelings known four years ago and have continued loud and clear since that time. The return of the 155 and the commander's release from bondage in the FSCC is greeted with glee. But Artillery still faces other ills contracted at the same time. We might soon have the weapons but can't use them as well as we did during WWII or in Korea. Not while we're shackled to a T/O and T/E that were and are geared to singular employment doctrine.

The philosophy basic to the present "M" Series T/O and T/E is that in order to employ division artillery in support of widely separated battalion landing teams, it is necessary at first and always to have D/S artillery organized and geared for that particular contingency.

This philosophy has been reflected in a highly decentralized organization. It requires an excessive number of hard skill billets and imbeds preponderant amount of the communication equipment at the battery level. At the same time the very nature of the rank and experience structure has remained skewed toward higher echelons leaving the battery (as usual) with only one or two officers with any artillery knowhow.

Besides, there is an organizational point below which the permanent heterogeneous grouping of skills and equipment is detrimental to their individual training and maintenance.

This point might not be readily apparent to the individual not intimately experienced in the skills and techniques involved in Artillery. However, to prelocate these technical skills and equipment at the firing battery level is to practically quadruple the Artillery Battalion's need for such skills and equipment.

In a single direct support battalion, the "M" Series requires more than 78 fire control Marines. This is 21% of the artillery Marines in a battalion. T/O assumes that there are that many men in a typical artillery battalion with the intelligence and educational prerequisites necessary to master this specialty. Having selected and taught most of the gunnery personnel who were trained for the Korean War, in addition to experience from corporal to major in FDC, battery through Force Artillery, I can say that it just ain't so.

Along with resultant shortage in critical skills comes more problems:

Battalion commander now finds that in order to exercise centralized fire direction over his battalion (new T/O indicates he must do this "when practicable") he must ask the battery commander to loan him some men and gear.

The invention of the Comanche or target grid system in 1949 allowed Artillery to keep most gunnery skills and equipment in the hands of a relatively few men. These were especially trained, highly skilled and extremely proficient. There was not, and still isn't, a great deal of difference between our guns and those of other nations. These highly skilled men using a superior gunnery system gave us our superior artillery capability. Can we now possibly expect that each and every one of the 78 fire control Marines in this decentralized battalion has attained the same degree of excellence?

Can we also expect, as does the pertinent MOS, that these same Marines will not only be experts in this field but will also have an equal skill in 4.2" mortar gunnery. And also know survey? To circumvent the problem by employing ground rules or jury-rigged battalion organizations, will only result in more unrealistic structures and plans built upon a system that has not been pragmatically proven.

Also, D/S Artillery Battalion's primary means of communication is based upon a static relay system, employed by and for the supported unit. This causes artillery to rely upon its organic means of communication. The result is less efficient communication than we had 10 or even 20 years ago.

Secretary of Defense McNamara and our Commandant have indicated that ideas and questioning of current practices with an eye toward improvement is our duty. GAZETTE has encouraged comment concerning the ideas basic to our new T/O.

The artillery field is resplendent with professional officers and non-commissioned officers who have a wealth of experience unmatched by any group in the world. This is their chance to help fashion and mold an organization capable of resuming its rightful place on the big team that is second to none.

Cannoneers, hop to! USMC

1/11, 1stMarDiv
CamPen, Calif.

# So You Don't Want to Be a Recruiter?

By WO J. A. Davis

IN THE RECRUITING BUSINESS ONE OF best selling points for the Marine Corps is the Challenge.

We challenge the young men of Amercia to be Marines, to be man enough to take what we are putting out at our Recruit Depots, the Challenge that he too is man enough to be a US Marine.

This Challenge is being accepted daily by young men throughout the country, but a challenge with our own Corps to our NCOs is in many cases going unanswered.

This Challenge is the recent call for applications for recruiting duty.

Some darn good NCOs are overlooking a good thing in shying away from recruiting duty. Not only it is a challenge to the man with enough spunk to want a job with some responsibility but it's a golden chance to speed that next promotion.

CMC and HQMC have time and again emphasized the importance and responsibility placed in recruiters.

This alone should put some of the Marines in the "slow promotion fields" to thinking.

The main objection I often hear to applying for recruiting is that monster of a school at P.I. that devours Marines faster than the Sgt Maj can down a beer at dime night. Rumors and scuttlebutt! Recruiter's School is just like any other Marine School with one possible exception: The instructors, I have found, are the finest in the Corps. Motivation is their key. Personal appearance and uniform fitness are kept at the highest standard but this is nothing new to the Marine NCO.

A few of the subjects that might be new are public speaking, typing and salesmanship but no prior experience is necessary in any subject taught. In the six weeks of school you cover the basic subjects that will make you an effective recruiter. Let's look at it this way: recruiting is selling and the product you will be selling is the Marine Corps. Who knows more about the Corps than the Marine NCO? It's just a matter of talking about something that you are an expert in.

After school what can you expect? You will be assigned to a recruiting station or sub-station (in most cases within the area of your choice). You may be assigned as an NCOIC or recruiter depending upon rank. Each station is given a monthly quota; this is the minimum number of men to be enlisted for that month. Your mission is to fill that quota and it's not nearly so difficult as some scuttlebutt has it. It's a time consuming job and no place for an eight-to-four plodder. If you like being around people and talking about the Corps you will find your job rewarding .

There are other rewards to be mentioned also. As a recruiter you are often left to your own ingenuity and methods. It is a good feeling to know you have tried something different, your own idea, and it has worked. But the greatest reward of recruiting is to prop your feet up on the desk (but not for long) on the last day of the month and know that you have put 2 or 20, or whatever the number, good qualified young men into the Corps, men that you would be glad to have in your section in combat or any other time. This is the satisfaction of a job well done and it starts all over the next day. For recruiting is a new job each month, a new quota, a new objective and a new challenge. Are you sure you don't want to be a recruiter?

USMC

MASS-1, 2d MAW
CherPt, N. C.

# How Bad Is a Bad Debt?

By 1stLt J. M. Gratto

MY OFFICE, LIKE MANY ANOTHER such, becomes involved periodically in the machinations which evolve from a letter of indebtedness. Sometimes the letters are a valuable indicator of personal irresponsibility in the case of someone who ought to know better. Most of the time, though, an entirely different pattern prevails. The recipient is seventeen or eighteen years old and has purchased either jewelry or clothing on credit. A minor, he would not ordinarily be extended credit in a strange town without the approval of his parents. But now he's a serviceman, and the threat of contacting his commanding officer if he doesn't pay off is wielded like a club by the unscrupulous clothiers and jewelers who abound outside the gates of every base.

Now this threat of contacting the CO bears examining. The average trooper is not entirely sure of what will occur if that happens. He sees the CO for discipline when he's been bad, and not paying a bill certainly is within his definition of being bad. What will the CO do then? Most of the troopers aren't interested in finding out. I usually have the man return the merchandise. Its real value is rarely equal to the outstanding value of the indebtedness. Sometimes the merchant cries "foul," but not very loudly.

If a mechanism of prompt handling of letters of indebtedness did not appeal to unscrupulous merchants so greatly we'd be better off. Our official attitude is not so different from that of a parent in this matter. We regard bad debts with a jaundiced eye because they tend to "besmirch" our "family's" good name. I would like to see our parental attitude in this matter extended to a statutory requirement of CO's approval prior to the credit sale of merchandise to minors. I am quite certain that some of the gross overpricing of merchandise and the misleading pitch that a salesman can trick some young PFC with would evaporate nicely under such a situation. That stack of letters of indebtedness would diminish, too.

Such a Utopian law may not be passed right away, though. Meanwhile I have another suggestion. Answering a form letter with anything more than a postcard seems to me a waste of man-hours, paper and postage. The West Coast jewelry firm which asks if it "should contact the chief of naval personnel" ought to be informed succinctly where to put all of its letters rather than the brief summary of service policy on indebtedness that is now recommended. A form letter certainly needs no typed reply. Furthermore, if we receive an excessive number of letters from a given firm, the command in the area of its operation ought to have it put off limits for being a shyster outfit. Obviously an organization which needs form letters to keep the military informed of all the bad debts is plagued—not with poor credit risks in uniform—but with poor business practices which we help inadvertently to perpetuate. *Caveat emptor* went out in the twenties.

H&S 1/8
CamLej, N. C.

Ed: Also see *MCA Newsletter*, page 3.

# OBSERVATION POST CONTINUED

## Wanted: A Good Five Cent Flash/Bang

### THE PROBLEM

**By GySgt F. E. Bousquet**

THE ACTION-PACKED PICTURE OF Marines in the attack described by Maj F. A. Green (*Training Can Have More Realism,* OBSERVATION POST: Oct '61) should apply throughout the Marine Corps. It doesn't.

Small arms exploding on the flanks, sporadic fire increasing to a high assault pitch, and weapons blazing are just the things needed to motivate exercising Marines. Too often Marines in training assault objectives yelling "Bang! Bang!" Yes, the only sounds of battle are their voices which usually increase to a high assault pitch only when the fire fight is over and the cooks bring up "C" ration instead of promised hot chow.

Let's give our Marines blank ammo, grenade simulators, M80 firecrackers, rifle smoke grenades, booby trap simulators. These are the things needed first. This is what adds realism at grass root level. This is what you can build from. Camouflage, simulated enemy dead, captured enemy pretending not to understand English are all well and good. I'm for it. But it's the noise and smoke that makes an atmosphere resembling combat.

It's a hard thing to imagine Marines performing tactics and trying hard to add realism by shouting noises. Can you practice a successful night attack without blanks or pyrotechnics to add realism and help simulate enemy contact, the start of a fire fight or the assault jumping off?

Is there help in sight? Let's hope so. But I read in GAZETTE *Newsletter* that our blank ammo quota is being cut in half for the coming year. It is not half enough now, and pyrotechnics are just about unheard of.

Let's train Marines with our big word REALISM by buying the things so it can be, with money at hand and with training in mind.

It gets hard to understand everyone wanting something yet everyone neglecting it and not helping to correct it so we can really and truly have more realism in our training. Bang! Bang! Gotcha, didn't I? US MC

L/3/8 2dMarDiv
CamLej, N. C.

### A SOLUTION

**By Capt W. C. Holmberg**

ONE ROUND OF BLANK .30 CAL AMMO costs about the same as a good five-cent cigar.

Let's see how much training we're getting for our nickel:

- It makes a noise
- At night it obliges with muzzle blast
- It provides practice in loading
- It generates recoil
- It is a training aid for ammo redistribution
- It helps to teach ammo conservation
- In quantity it serves to acquaint Marines with the basic load
- In bigger quantity it helps to evaluate our supply and resupply system.

Are we getting our money's worth? Let's take a back azimuth of the above items:

**Supply and resupply training**—Ammo boxes filled with sand might achieve same purpose.

**Basic load familiarization and ammo redistribution**—Why not empty magazines or bandoleers filled with practice rounds?

**Recoil action**—Do we really need this?

**Loading practice**—What about our week on the range and live firing problems?

**Muzzle blast and noise**—Ah, the flash and the bang. Now we're cutting the black. For these two characteristics add significant realism to our training.

I say surely American technology can mass produce a gadget that will give us a full measure of flash and bang for our nickel. Many of us with children are all too familiar with the noise that toy manufacturers build into their weapons.

Not being an inventor I make no attempt to blueprint a handy dandy flash/bang mechanism to fit our small arms. But I see no reason why it couldn't be done.

Besides saving money we will be able to prolong the interest of the rifleman, who is now half out of the problem once his allotted four clips of blanks are fired.

And there is a bonus feature: A flash/bang simulator would be safer in operation than blank rounds, would add realism to training where there is no allocation of blank ammo.

US MC

Box 671
San Juan Capistrano, Calif.

# Roll or Pull

**By Capt R. B. Arneson**

TIME AND SPEED ARE VERY IMPORTANT on the modern battlefield. We must be able to shoot and move fast. The self-propelled weapon travels at 30-35 miles per hour on level ground, while a towed weapon being pulled by a TD-18 tractor travels at eight miles per hour. A self-propelled can move eight miles in about 20 minutes, but it would take a towed weapon three times as long.

Question is then asked: "Why not use high speed tractors which can tow a weapon at speeds up to 45 miles per hour?" There is still one problem of time to overcome: That is the time required to emplace the weapon. A self-propelled weapon can be in position and ready to fire in about one minute, but by the book it takes anywhere from 30 minutes to six hours to emplace a towed heavy artillery weapon. Therefore it can be seen that the self-propelled heavy artillery weapon has the speed required to both displace quickly and emplace in the new position fast. This ability for a fast displacement and emplacing in a new position is a very definite advantage when direct fire is required on target that is holding up the infantry in the attack.

Big disadvantage of self-propelled weapons is maintenance. When the carriage is deadlined, so is the gun. T/O and logistical problems also increase. More spare parts and trained maintenance Marines are needed.

Another disadvantage is weight. The self-propelled weapon can't be lifted by helicopter and in the case of the Marine Corps they can't be air transported. Towed weapons can all be air transported by GV-1 transport.

Some people say cost should also be included in a discussion such as this, since the self-propelled weapon costs twice as much as a towed weapon. I disagree. Let's buy the weapon that does the best job.

What is the answer? I think light artillery should be towed, but medium and heavy artillery should be self-propelled. The self-propelled weapon gives the artillery battery commander more freedom of movement on the battlefield.

Consider yourself as the commander of a mechanized/motorized assault force. Which type artillery weapon can best furnish the support when you need it? I say self-propelled because it can move right along with you. USMC

5th 155mm How Btry
Reading, Pa.



# FMF 1965

## Proposed Organization and Major Equipment







## H&S COMPANY ENGINEER BATTALION

**CONCEPT** — Organized to provide for: BnHq, which plans, directs, coordinates actions of battalion and reinforcing elements; SupPlt; CommPlt; Medical Plt; Utilities Plt, which provides water for division and power for division CPs; CoHq, which provides administrative, security and logistics support for company, messing facilities for battalion. Company decentralizes support fuctions necessary to meet needs of tactical disposition of other elements of battalion and division.

**COMMUNICATIONS** — Internal communications are provided by Comm Plt.

**FIRE POWER**—Individual weapons capable of semi-automatic point fire; organic machine guns and rocket launchers.

**MOBILITY**—Vehicles for command, medical and logistic support are provided by EngSupCo.

**LOGISTICS** — Provided by organic support elements (less MT). Motor Transport support is provided by Eng SupCo.

**MAINTENANCE** — All elements of company provide their own organizational maintenance (1st echelon) on assigned equipment. 2d echelon maintenance is provided by CommPlt on all battalion comm gear; Utilities Plt on all utilities gear; SupPlt on all ordnance authorized battalion.

**MEDICAL**—MedPlt provides emergency treatment, prepares battalion casualties for evacuation, operates field dispensary, supervises measures for control and prevention of disease. Can be decentralized to meet needs of tactical deployed units.

**SUPPLY** — SupPlt requisitions, receives, stores and issues all classes of supplies for battalion.

**MESSING**—Capable of operating a battalion mess in garrison or in the field.

## ENGINEER/SUPPORT COMPANY

**CONCEPT** — Organized to provide for: Equipment Plt, which augments EngCos with heavy equipment, operators and support Marines when required; MT Plt, which augments H&SCo and EngCos with vehicles, drivers and support Marines when required; three Eng Plts capable of general engineer support for division. Company can be rapidly task organized to meet needs of battalion. Company is capable of all kinds of engineer tasks for which battalion is responsible. Construction support will be temporary, limited to essentials for combat operations.

**MISSION**—To provide essential engineer support for division and to augment EngCos and H&SCo.

**COMMUNICATIONS** — When augmented with Marines and gear from CommPlt, H&SCo, company is capable of providing reliable communications between CoHq and higher headquarters.

These specific functions are the responsibility of Eng/Sup Co:

- Engineer Reconn
- Construction, repair and maintenance of roads.
- Erection of prefabricated bridges and ferries provided by external sources.
- Repair existing bridges.
- Construct and maintain airstrip for VMO and VTOL aircraft.
- Help install AABFS (Amphibious Assault Bulk Fuel System).
- Build obstacles
- Help build field fortifications and shelters.
- Supervise placement and clearance of mine fields and booby traps.
- Supervise division camouflage.

**FIRE POWER**—Individual weapons capable of semi-automatic point fire; organic machine guns and rocket launchers.

**MOBILITY**—Command, medical and logistic support vehicles, including heavy trucks, are provided to support all units of battalion in consonance with assigned mission.

**LOGISTICS** — Authorized allowance of all classes of supply. Other supplies, maintenance and transportation support needed is provided by H&SCo and division service units.

**MEDICAL**—None organic. H&SCo provides as needed.

**MAINTENANCE**—Performs 1st echelon maintenance of all material authorized company; 2d echelon maintenance of all material authorized company; 2d echelon maintenance of MT and engineer material authorized company.

**MESSING** — None organic. H&SCo provides.

EDITOR'S NOTE: These three pages complete FMF 1965. Series began in July, covered all of the proposed changes in the Marine Division, Comm Battalion and Force Artillery, resulting from Phase I of Troop Test Program. No attempt will be made to report Phase II in such detail. For a brief look at Combat and Service Support proposals see MCA Newsletter, pp. 4 & 5 this issue.

**PROPOSED**

**ENGINEER/SUPPORT COMPANY**

| USMC Off | USMC Enl | USN Off | USN Enl |
|---|---|---|---|
| 9 | 255 | 0 | 0 |

| CO HQ | EQUIPMENT PLT | MOTOR TRANSPORT PLT | ENG PLT |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Off 6 Enl | 2 Off 73 Enl | 2 Off 68 Enl | 1 Off 36 Enl |

PLT HQ — 1 Off 6 Enl

ENG SQD — 0 Off 10 Enl

ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

ORDNANCE
- 4 3.5" RL
- 10 M60 MG
- 9 Demo Set, Sqd
- 18 Demo Set, Indiv
- 15 Pistol
- 321 M14 Rifle
- 18 M14 Rifle (Mod)

VEHICLES
- 1 ¼T Ambulance
- 12 ¼T Truck
- 3 ¾T Truck
- 8 5T Truck
- 32 5T Truck, Dump
- 1 5T Wrecker
- 5 5T Tractor, Trk
- 2 2½T Tanker, Gas
- 1 2½T Truck V18A
- 12 ¼T Trailer
- 1 ¾T Trailer
- 11 1½T Trailer
- 6 Trailer, Water
- 5 25T Low Bed
- 5 LubServ Unit

COMMUNICATIONS
None

OTHER
- 3 Compressor, 105 CFM
- 3 Compressor, 125 CFM (Self-propelled)
- 2 Welder, 400A
- 5 Grader (SP)
- 2 Grader, Towed
- 6 Pneumatic Tool Set
- 2 Roller, Sheepsfoot
- 1 Roller, WobbleWhl
- 2 Rooter, Medium
- 3 Chain Saw, GED
- 2 Radial Saw, Trlr Mtd
- Trlr Mtd
- 4 Scraper, 10-Yd
- 19 Tractor, TD18 w/angle dozer
- 7 Tractor, RT, Medium w/BD
- 3 Tractor, RT, w/FEL
- 3 Crane-Shovel, Crawler Mtd
- 3 12½T Crane, Trk Mtd
- 3 Crane, RT, (SP)
- 6 Tractor, PCU
- 13 Winch, Drum
- 2 Torch, Cutting
- 9 AN/PRS-3
- 9 AN/PRS-4
- 1 Tool Kit, Rigging, Wire Rope
- 1 Tool Kit, Blacksmith
- 2 Tool Kit, Chassis Repair
- 4 Tool Kit, Tire Repair
- 3 Tool Kit, Bridging
- 3 Tool Kit, Carpenter
- 3 Tool Outfit, Pioneer, Trlr Mtd

**"M" SERIES**

**PIONEER/SUPPORT COMPANY**

| USMC Off | USMC Enl | USN Off | USN Enl |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 163 | 0 | 0 |

| CO HQ | CONSTRUCTION PLT | EQUIPMENT PLT | MOTOR TRANSPORT PLT |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2 Off 4 Enl | 1 Off 44 Enl | 2 Off 71 Enl | 1 Off 44 Enl |

ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT

ORDNANCE
- 3 3.5" RL
- 19 M7A3 GL
- 10 30cal MG
- 1 50cal MG
- 4 Demo Set, Sqd
- 18 Pistol
- 151 M1 Rifle

VEHICLES
- 12 ¼T Truck
- 3 ¾T Truck
- 24 5T Truck, Dump
- 1 5T Wrecker
- 3 5T Tractor, Trk
- 12 ¼T Trailer
- 1 ¾T Trailer
- 14 1½T Trailer
- 5 Trailer, Water
- 3 25T Low Bed
- 5 LubServ Unit
- 2 Steam Cleaner

COMMUNICATIONS
- 1 AN/PDR-27-J Radiac
- 1 AN/PDR-39 Radiac

OTHER
- 6 Compressor, 105 CFM
- 4 Grader (SP)
- 2 Grader, Towed
- 6 AN/PRS-3
- 6 AN/PRS-4
- 4 Gen Set, 60KW
- 4 2½T Chassis Trlr
- 4 Scraper, Towed
- 1 Minefield Marking Set
- 6 Pneumatic Tool Set
- 2 Roller, Sheepsfoot
- 1 Roller, WobbleWhl
- 3 Chain Saw
- 2 Radial Saw
- 1 Tool Kit, Blacksmith
- 2 Tool Kit, Bridging
- 3 Tool Kit, Carpenter
- 4 Tool Kit, Lineman
- 1 Tool Kit, Pioneer, Trlr Mtd
- 1 Tool Kit, Pipefitter
- 1 Tool Set, Mason
- 3 Tractor, Hough
- 19 Tractor, TD18 w/AD
- 2 Welder, Mod LHL4-57
- 13 Winch, Drum
- 8 Dispensing Pump
- 14 Tool Kit, Mechanic
- 1 Tool Kit, Tire Repair

# FMF 1965




## ENGINEER COMPANY

**CONCEPT**—Consists of CoHq and three engineer platoons. Company, which is basically VTOL transportable, provides direct combat engineer support to infantry task groupments. Construction support will be temporary, limited to essentials for tactical operations.

These specific functions are the responsibility of EngCo:

- Engineer Recon
- Help in cross-country movement of tracked and wheeled vehicles.
- Build, maintain and repair roads and trails.
- Erection of prefabricated bridges provided by external sources.
- Build pioneer-type structures with local materials to help move Marines and machines across ravines.
- Repair and reinforce existing bridges and fords with local materials.
- Build and operate light rafts.

---

Why not "Pioneer?" Planners believe "Engineer" term represents a truer description of actual functions and capabilities of unit. Word "pioneer" cannotes something less than "engineer," is sometimes confused with functions previously assigned to other units (i.e. shore party). It's also believed that morale will get a boost: Marines take a greater sense of pride in being called "engineer" in lieu of "pioneer."

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


- Build and improve helicopter LZ
- Specialized assistance in reaching mine fields and barriers, from high water line inland.
- Help execute barrier plans.

**MISSION**—To provide close combat support of a pioneer nature and when augmented to provide general engineer support to meet needs of infantry regiment.

**COMMUNICATIONS** — No organic. (Same as Eng/Sup Co.)

**INTELLIGENCE** — Collection effort is directly related to combat engineer support operations.

**FIRE POWER**—Same as Eng/Sup Co.

**MOBILITY** — Company is VTOL transportable. When augmented by Eng Sup Co, may be task organized to provide required mobility in consonance with assigned mission.

**LOGISTICS**—Same as Eng/Sup Co.

**MEDICAL**—Same as Eng/Sup Co.

**HAINTENANCE**—Same as Eng/Sup Co.

**MESSING**—Same as Eng/Sup Co.

## General Officers

### Retired

**Burger, J. C.** 9903
FMFLant 31Oct
**Tschirgi, H. C.** 9903
HQMC 31Oct

### Permanent Promotions

**Buse, H. W., Jr.** (BGen)
**Nickerson, H.** (BGen)

### Temporary Promotions

**Anderson, N. J.** (BGen)
**Bouker, J. G.** (BGen)
**Chapman, L. F.,** (MajGen)

### Deaths, Retired

**Bone, B. A.**
USNH San Diego Cal 22Oct61

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

**Wieseman, F. L.,** CG, 2dMarDiv

### Temporary Promotions, Reserve

**Sanders, E. J.** (MajGen)

## Colonels

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

**Brush, C. H., Jr.,** Dir Joint Staff, Ofc JCS
**Campbell, H. S.,** Student, ICAF, Wash DC
**Cool, D. L.,** Hd, DH, PersDept, HQMC
**Dew, E. S.,** CO MAG-12
**Duncan, R.,** Student, NWC, Wash DC
**Frazer, F. J.,** Student, ICAF, Wash DC
**Gilliland, G. A.,** CO SerBn MCS, Quant
**Hoyler, H. M.,** Hd, Discipline Br, PersDept, HQMC
**Jensen, O. T.,** Hd, Plans Br, G-3, HQMC
**Kunz, C. M.,** Wing Inspector, MAG-12
**Olsen, M. R.,** CO 2d ITR, Camp Pendleton
**Platt, F. M., Jr.,** Student, ICAF, Wash DC
**Sanders, A. S.,** Student, ICAF, Wash DC
**Sweeney, J. B., Hd,** DFB, Pers Dept, HQMC

### Permanent Promotions

**Andre, P. L., Jr.** Nov61
**Atkin, E. G., Jr.** Nov61
**Baker, R. R.** Nov61
**Blackwell, J. O.** Nov61
**Bonner, W. R.** Nov61
**Clarke, H. D.** Nov61
**Elliott, B. H.** Nov61
**Ingle, S. C.** Nov61
**Kurdziel, E. G.** Nov61
**Leffers, J.** Nov61
**Martin, G. E.** Nov61
**McGlothlin, J. H.** Nov61
**Miller, R. D.** Nov61
**Miller, N. A., Jr.** Nov61
**Myers, R. R.** Nov61
**Norton, W. R.** Nov61
**Olson, M. R.** Nov61
**Quilty, J. F., Jr.** Nov61
**Schlesinger, F. R.** Nov61
**Sherman, D. W.** Nov61
**Smith, R. E., Jr.** Nov61
**Trompeter, J. D.** Nov61
**Vick, K. B.** Nov61
**Yunck, M. R.** Nov61

### Temporary Promotions

**Anderson, R. W.** Nov61
**Bartram, V. L.** Nov61
**Hood, W. R.** Nov61

### Transfers

**Dehority, C. M.** 9906
Fr HQMC
To 3dMarDiv By25Jan
**Riley, R. R.** 9907
Fr MAG-26
To MB NS SFran By25Jan
**Sachs, C. A.** 9906
Fr FMFLant
To AFSC NorVa By15Jan
**Smith, K. N.** 9908
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCSC Albany Ga
**Vaughan, G. F.** 9907
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCRDep PISC

## Lieutenant Colonels

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

**Barber, N. E.,** CO C-3 School, MCRD, SanDiego
**Doxey, D. R.,** CO 1st RTB, MCRD, PISC
**Johannesen, R. W.,** CO MAG-20, Norfolk
**Lewis, W. B.,** Supply Officer, MWSG-17
**Patrow, L. L.,** S-3 Officer, RTR, MCRD, PISC
**Reighard, R. V.,** CO Staging Bn, Camp Pendleton
**Walters, H. L.,** CO, MAG-31

### College Degree Program (University of Maryland)

**Phillips, A. L.** **Ward, D. L.**
**Semb, A. R.** **Wilson, R. S.**

### Decorations and Awards

**Greenough, K. C.,** Navy and Marine Corps Medal

### Permanent Promotions

**Albers, G. H.** Oct61
**Aldworth, J.** Oct61
**Allen, N. D.** Oct61
**Armstrong, C. B., Jr.** Oct61
**Artnak, E. J.** Oct61
**Assad, A. J.** Oct61
**Barden, A. W.** Oct61
**Beach, W. L.** Oct61
**Berger, E. J.** Oct61
**Bland, R. L.** Oct61
**Boswell, C. E., Jr.** Oct61
**Bowen, R. E.** Oct61
**Brown, W. P.** Oct61
**Campbell, M. S.** Nov61
**Cassidy, E. W.** Oct61
**Cline, R. W.** Oct61
**Coleman, T. A.** Oct61
**Crew, E. B.** Oct61
**Daniel, W. E.** Oct61
**Davis, M. C.** Oct61
**Davis, O. R.** Oct61
**Davis, R. R.** Oct61
**Dennis, N. J.** Oct61
**Denny, R. C., Jr.** Oct61
**Dorsey, J. A.** Oct61
**Dykes, K. T.** Oct61
**Edelmann, G. J.** Oct61
**Elder, T. G.** Nov61
**Eldridge, W. W., Jr.** Oct61
**Fenton, D. L.** Oct61
**Fink, G.** Oct61
**Fornonzini, B. A.** Oct61
**Geissinger, R. S.** Oct61
**Gillis, A. J., Jr.** Oct61
**Githens, D. P., Jr.** Oct61
**Gould, C. H.** Oct61
**Grimes, D.** Oct61
**Hall, W. C.** Oct61
**Hart, H.** Oct61
**Herndon, J. L.** Oct61
**Hines, C. V.** Nov61
**Hinshaw, D. M.** Oct61
**Hodde, G. V.** Oct61
**Huffstutter, H. V.** Oct61
**Johnston, T. J., Jr.** Oct61
**Keim, R. M.** Oct61
**King, G. J.** Oct61
**Leader, S. F.** Oct61
**Leis, S. F.** Oct61
**Lovette, L .L.** Oct61
**Maire, G. J.** Oct61
**Maloney, E. S.** Oct61
**McCain, W. E.** Nov61
**McGlade, L.** Nov61
**McKean, E. A.** Oct61
**Miller, L. L.** Oct61
**Mobley, W. L.** Oct61
**Moore, J. T.** Oct61
**Muller, G.** Oct61
**Mulvihill, T. L.** Oct61
**O'Hara, F. J., Jr.** Oct61
**Oglesby, E. D.** Oct61
**Pearce, J. T.** Oct61
**Powell, J. B.** Oct61
**Rash, R. S.** Oct61
**Riffle, J. C.** Oct61
**Ritter, D. L.** Oct61
**Ritter, L. C.** Oct61
**Roark, W. N., Jr.** Oct61
**Rooney, J. J.** Oct61
**Rowe, C. D.** Oct61
**Seabaugh, P. W.** Oct61
**Shields, J. L.** Oct61
**Sienko, W.** Oct61
**Slaton, C. H., Jr.** Oct61
**Smith, E. L.** Oct61
**Smith, J. B.** Oct61
**Snapper, J. N.** Oct61
**Stender, B. J.** Oct61
**Stewart, W. C., Jr.** Oct61
**Stien, L. J.** Oct61
**Sullivan, J. W.** Oct61
**Takala, D. O.** Oct61
**Tucker, L. R.** Nov61
**Urell, J.** Oct61
**Voth, S. B.** Nov61
**Vroegindewey, R. J.** Oct61
**Waskom, W. M.** Oct61
**Williams, R. M.** Oct61
**Willis, R. L.** Oct61
**Williams, L .F.** Oct61
**Winneberger, G. L.** Oct61
**Youngs, C. A.** Oct61
**Zitnik, R. J.** Oct61
**Zorn, E. J.** Oct61

### Transfers

**Aynes, J. P.** 7304
Fr 3dMAW
To HQMC By5Jan
**Crossfield, C. C.** 1802
Fr STF CINCEUR WDDec
To MCS Quant
**Dellamano, A. F.** 7305
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To HQMC
**Dorsey, J. A.** 7335
Fr 2dMAW
To Ft Rucker Ala By15Jan
**Hollenbeck, M. K.** 7335
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To CG AirFMFPac
**Peebles, V. J.** 7333
Fr 3dMAW
To CINCPac By15Dec
**Stanford, N. R.** 0302
Fr ALUSNA Tokyo WDDec
To MCS Quant
**Turner, B. C.** 1302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To HQMC By22Jan

### Retired

**Coggins, T. M.** 3002
2dMarDiv 30Nov
**Davis, B., Jr.** 0802
9th MCRRD 31Dec
**Mell, D. L.** 0302
FMFLant 31Oct
**Percy, J. G.** 7335
MB NS SFran 30Nov
**Pounds, J. A., III** 0802
LFTULant 31Oct

### Permanent Promotions, Reserve

**Bamerick, R. F.** Nov61
**Beck, J. D.** Nov61
**Benton, E. T.** Nov61
**Cage, J. G.** Nov61
**Chandler, J. B.** Nov61
**Chase, H.** Nov61
**Corpening, C. D.** Nov61
**Davidson, F. E.** Nov61
**Dean, J. L.** Nov61
**Dean, M. L.** Nov61
**Deitz, J. A., Jr.** Nov61
**Donoghue, T. J.** Nov61
**Dufford, J. M.** Nov61
**Ennen, J. H.** Nov61
**Famiglietti, G. W.** Nov61
**Farfan, M. E.** Nov61
**Fitzgerald, E. A.** Nov61
**Gills, R. F.** Nov61
**Gooch, R. M.** Nov61
**Grandy, B. R.** Nov61
**Gregory, A.** Nov61
**Griffin, W. W.** Nov61
**Hagan, W. C.** Nov61
**Hamburg, W. K.** Nov61
**Hawn, H. C., Jr.** Nov61
**Hopkins, T. D., Jr.** Nov61
**Larson, W. N., Jr.** Nov61
**Law, M. J.** Nov61
**Lemmons, A. W., Jr.** Nov61
**Linkiewicz, C. E.** Nov61
**Mackin, A. F.** Nov61
**Marlow, V. N.** Nov61
**McCann, W. R.** Nov61
**McDevitt, H. A.** Nov61
**Mendes, J. D.** Nov61
**Mitchell, H. G.** Nov61
**Mitchell, J. D., Jr.** Nov61
**Mosher, K. H.** Nov61
**Parker, C.** Nov61
**Paterno, F. P.** Nov61
**Peine, R. H.** Nov61
**Piotrowski, E.** Nov61
**Riley, G. G.** Nov61
**Robinson, V. J.** Nov61
**Rolfes, J. F.** Nov61
**Schott, L. J.** Nov61
**Shine, L. P.** Nov61
**Sibulkin, M. L.** Nov61
**Smith, R. C.** Nov61
**Stevens, D. G.** Nov61
**Thompson, M. N.** Nov61
**Vogel, C. L.** Nov61
**Whitacre, C., Jr.** Nov61
**Yeager, E. H., Jr.** Nov61
**Young, R. L.** Nov61

### Temporary Promotions, Reserve

**Bestwick, W. W.** Oct61
**Jenkins, G. M.** Oct61
**Keith, J. W., Jr.** Oct61
**Magoon, F. L., Jr.** Oct61
**McCrocklin, J. H.** Oct61
**Ramsay, J., Jr.** Oct61
**Swalley, R. H.** Oct61
**Watson, R. L.** Oct61
**Woodbridge, C. L.** Oct61

### Deaths

**Buckley, J. E.**
USNH Chelsea Mass 24Oct

## Majors

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

**Eskham, J. A.,** CO 1stAmTruckCo, Camp Pendleton
**Funderburk, R.,** OIC Maintenance Br, MCSC, Albany
**Johnson, R. T.,** Operations Officer, "B" Co 3dAmTracCo
**Mars, W. G.,** Admin Dir, MCSC, Albany
**Montgomery, R. R.,** Ass't Admin Dir, MCSC, Albany
**Moise, F. V.,** Center Legal Officer, MCSC, Albany
**Potterbaum, L. F.,** CO Gen Sup & Maint Co, MCSC, Albany
**Thomas, A. J.,** ExO 1-4

### Decorations and Awards

**Alberts, H. K.,** Gold Star in lieu of second Navy Commendation Medal
**D'Frank, J.,** CMC Ltr of Commendation

### Transfers

**Benton, R. W.** 3502
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MCB CamPen By4Jan
**Caley, V.** 0115
Fr MarCorB CamPen
To MCS Quant By31Jan

**Carpenter, S. H.** 7333
Fr NOTS Chna Lake WDDec
To 1stMAW

**Cosgrove, W. P.** 0302
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMAW

**Harris, W. A.** 7307
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

**Johnson, C. J.** 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Mooney, T. G.** 7302
Fr 3dMAW WDNov
To 1stMAW

**Nelson, R. E.** 7333
Fr 3dMAW
To 1stMAW By15Jan

**Ottmer, W. E.** 7333
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDNov
To 3dMAW

**Peard, R. W., Jr.** 7302
Fr 1stMAW WDNov
To 2dMAW

**Roser, H. E.** 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Ryan, R. M.** 7331
Fr MCAS Kaneohe Bay WDDec
To 1stMarBrig FMF

**Seabaugh, P. W.** 0195
Fr 3dMarDiv
To HQMC By2Jan

**Stempie, J. W.** 0302
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To HQMC

**Stevens, T. J.** 0302
Fr 3dMAW
To I-I 7thInfBn By5Dec

**Sullivan, W. E., Jr.** 7333
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

**Vosmik, J. M.** 0802
Fr 1stMarDiv WDDec
To MB NS SFran

**Webb, M. A., Jr.** 3502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To AirFMFPac El Toro

## Retired

**Capps, A. B.** 0902
ForTrps FMFPac 30Nov

**Erbland, R. M.** 0302
MB NTC GLakes 31Oct

**Pelon, W.** 2502
ForTrps FMFLant 31Oct

## Deaths

**Ryan, J. T.** 7302
Anaheim, Calif. 3Nov

## Permanent Promotions, Reserve

**Baylor, J. T.** Nov61
**Bihr, S. W., III** Nov61
**Capatanos, G. T.** Nov61
**Carr, L. E.** Nov61
**Cassell, G. R.** Nov61
**Castagno, J. T.** Nov61
**Crittenden, C. J.** Oct61
**Dolan, T. E., Jr.** Nov61
**Duplantier, C. J.** Nov61
**Dutton, W. W.** Nov61
**Holcomb, H. K.** Nov61
**Hull, S. S.** Nov61
**Kelly, J. D.** Nov61
**Lynch, L. J.** Nov61
**Mandenberg, E. C.** Nov61
**Matteson, W. J.** Nov61
**McHardy, G.** Nov61
**Moreland, J. R.** Nov61
**Morrison, E.** Nov61
**Morris, H.** Nov61
**Pattison, A. R.** Nov61
**Peppin, D. D.** Nov61
**Peterson, R. E.** Nov61
**Quirk, B. J.** Nov61
**Rogers, V. G.** Nov61
**Rourke, A. L.** Nov61
**Schoning, R. W.** Nov61
**Smith, W. R.** Nov61
**Stuart, T. G.** Nov61
**Stump, R. T.** Nov61
**Thomas, R. V.** Nov61
**Thompson, C. W.** Nov61
**Wallis, B.** Nov61
**Werkowski, J. W.** Nov61

## Temporary Promotions, Reserve

**Corcoran, E. T., Jr.** Oct61
**Naylor, J. P.** Oct61
**Patton, R. S.** Oct61
**Whitla, R. H., Jr.** Oct61

# Captains

## Recent Command and Staff Assignments

**Kiracafe, W. E.,** Ass't Dir, SerDiv, MCSC, Albany

**Knuebel, K. P.,** CO "B" Co 3Am Trac Bn, Camp Pendleton

**Nix, G. H., Jr.,** Adjutant, 1stMAW

**Robinson, A. J.,** Center Adjutant, MCSC, Albany

**Varion H. A., Jr.,** Range Officer, MCRD, PISC

**Vertalina, M. L.,** S-3 Officer WMRTB, MCRD, PISC

**Waurzyniah, S.,** CO Pathfinders, 2 Recon Co.

## Permanent Promotions

**Beeunas, L. F.** Nov61
**Drake, J. R.** Nov61
**Germagian, B. P.** Nov61
**Trapp, E. G.** Nov61

## Temporary Promotions

**Adams, R. T.** Nov61
**Albans, C.** Oct61
**Aliyetti, J. E.** Nov61
**Alwan, H. J.** Nov61
**Andrews, W. L.** Nov61
**Baggett, R. L.** Oct61
**Bailey, C. T.** Oct61
**Barkovich, M. J.** Nov61
**Barner, G. B.** Nov61
**Becerra, R. A., Jr.** Nov61
**Beck, P. S.** Oct61
**Becker, R. A.** Oct61
**Beckman, N. J.** Nov61
**Blackwell, C. D.** Nov61
**Boyd, E. H.** Nov61
**Braun, R. G.** Oct61
**Brokaw, J. C.** Nov61
**Brower, G. H.** Nov61
**Brown, B. L.** Nov61
**Brown, R .S., Jr.** Nov61
**Cannon, C. E.** Nov61
**Carney, R. T.** Oct61
**Carolan, F. A.** Oct61
**Cassidy, T. V.** Nov61
**Chambers, D. L.** Oct61
**Chapin, H.** Nov61
**Chapman, H. P.** Oct61
**Clanton, E. E.** Nov61
**Clark, D. H.** Nov61
**Cobb, C. S., III** Oct61
**Compton, J. L.** Nov61
**Connors, J. P.** Nov61
**Daas, R. F.** Nov61
**Dailey, J. R.** Oct61
**Dauster, E. E.** Nov61
**De Salvo, J. A.** Nov61
**Deibler, H. J.** Oct61
**Dettle, C. J.** Oct61
**Doerner, W. C.** Oct61
**Dolson, T. C.** Nov61
**Donovan, W. J., Jr.** Nov61
**Douglas, D. M.** Nov61
**Dowling, E. H.** Nov61
**Dubac, C. H.** Nov61
**Dwyer, R. H.** Oct61
**Eikenbery, T. L.** Nov61
**Evans, J. S.** Nov61
**Fackiam, A. W., Jr.** Oct61
**Fazekas, A. E.** Oct61
**Felker, J. E.** Nov61
**Ferdinand, W. A.** Oct61
**Firing, F.** Nov61
**Ford, P. D.** Nov61
**Formanek, R. L.** Oct61
**Foulger, S. R.** Nov61
**Fox, E. L.** Nov61
**Fox, C. G.** Nov61
**Frank, A. H.** Oct61
**Fraser, J. H.** Nov61
**Frasier, J. A., III** Nov61
**Fredericks, R. D.** Oct61
**Gillespie, T. E., Jr.** Oct61
**Hancock, T. W., Jr.** Nov61
**Hargraves, W. B., II** Nov61
**Harman, J. R.** Oct61
**Henry, J. W., Jr.** Nov61
**Henry, R. T.** Nov61
**Herlihy, H. F.** Nov61
**Hopkins, J. I.** Nov61
**Houston, T. C.** Oct61
**Hughes, V. R.** Nov61
**Huston, H. V.** Nov61
**Jaczko, E. S., Jr.** Oct61
**Jastrzemski, W. M.** Nov61
**Johnson, B. W.** Oct61
**Kenworthy, R. J.** Oct61
**Klingensmith, C. H.** Nov61
**Knettles, C. E.** Nov61
**Krauss, W. J., Jr.** Nov61
**La Flamme, J. L.** Nov61
**Langford, K. W.** Nov61
**Lee, A.** Nov61
**Leva, R. E.** Nov61
**Lewis, F. J.** Nov61
**Long, W. H.** Nov61
**Looney, E. P., Jr.** Oct61
**Loring, A. P., Jr.** Oct61
**Luedke, B. D.** Oct61
**Lynch, T. K.** Oct61
**Lynch, J. D., Jr.** Nov61
**Lynch, B. G.** Nov61
**Lynn, C. V., Jr.** Oct61
**Marren, H. T.** Oct15
**Martin, J. A.** Nov61
**Maxwell, J. T., Jr.** Nov61
**McDavid, J. E., III** Oct61
**McDaniel, C. E.** Nov61
**McGrath, W. J.** Nov61
**Miller, N. P.** Oct61
**Moriarty, N. F.** Oct61
**Morris, G. S.** Oct61
**Motherway, R. T.** Nov61
**Mulcahy, R. D.** Nov61
**Murtland, J. B., III** Oct61
**Newton, C. W.** Nov61
**Norman, R. E.** Nov61
**O'Brien, R. L.** Oct61
**O'Brien, R. J.** Nov61
**O'Shea, C. J., Jr.** Nov61
**Palmer, J. K.** Nov61
**Palmore, C. A.** Oct61
**Perry, C. R.** Nov61
**Peterson, R. L.** Oct61
**Phelps, J. W.** Nov61
**Phillips, R., Jr.** Oct61
**Pirnie, D. M.** Nov61
**Powers, R. A.** Nov61
**Rader, M.** Nov61
**Reilly, W. J., Jr.** Oct61
**Rice, J. F.** Oct61
**Roach, J. L.** Oct61
**Rourke, W. B., Jr.** Nov61
**Ryan, T. J.** Oct61
**Rychlik, R. W.** Oct61
**Scafe, J. R.** Nov61
**Schaet, D. E.** Oct61
**Schmidt, J. M.** Nov61
**Schneider, J. F.** Oct61
**Seals, C. J., Jr.** Oct61
**Sheridan, R. F.** Nov61
**Shigley, R. T.** Nov61
**Shillinglaw, J. S.** Nov61
**Slough, P. G.** Nov61
**Smith, W. D.** Oct61
**Solomonson, C.** Nov61
**Stauffer, R. M.** Oct61
**Steele, O. K.** Nov61
**Stein, M. E.** Oct61
**Stith, E. E.** Nov61
**Svec, M. R.** Oct61
**Swab, J. E.** Nov61
**Swenson, C. P.** Oct61
**Szafranski, L. J.** Oct61
**Taylor, T. W.** Oct61
**Teague, D. L.** Nov61
**Thompson, M. S.** Nov61
**Thompson, J. C.** Nov61
**Townley, E. F., Jr.** Oct61
**Townsend, J. B.** Nov61
**Treichler, D. R.** Nov61
**Trent, A.** Nov61
**Van Northwick, J.** Nov61
**Vernay, V. A.** Oct61
**Von Carp, H. E.** Nov61
**Wadsworth, M. G.** Nov61
**Waite, H. D.** Nov61
**Weinerth, S. L., Jr.** Nov61
**Whaley, W. M.** Oct61
**Whitton, F. H.** Nov61
**Wildprett, W. R.** Nov61
**Wilkerson, M. V.** Nov61
**Wills, W. M.** Oct61
**Wilson, D. D.** Nov61
**Winoski, W. M.** Oct61
**Wuertz, J. B.** Oct61

## Transfers

**Antczak, A. J.** 0302
Fr I-I Stf 2 InfBn
To 3dMarDiv By7Jan

**Auldridge, C. J.** 0130
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To Lexington Ky

**Badamo, F. J.** 2502
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To I-I Stf 9CommCo

**Balius, D. H.** 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFLant WDDec
To Pt Lyautey Morocc

**Barnes, C., Jr.** 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

**Bearden, M.** 3010
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Becker, W. L.** 7305
Fr MCAS CherPt WDDec
To NABTC NAS Pncla

**Bell, R. H.** 3002
Fr NavSupCen Oak WDDec
To MB NS SFran

**Bickel, D. C.** 0802
Fr NavActs Pt L Moro WDDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Birzer, E. A.** 7333
Fr 1MarDiv WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Brooks, W. J.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Brown, G. L.** 7302
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDDec
To 2MAW

**Bruce, F. H., Jr.** 6502
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Bryson, W. C., Jr.** 3002
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Burns, R. D.** 0130
Fr FMFPac WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

**Chaplin, D. D.** 0302
Fr 4th MCRRD WDDec
To MCS Quant

**Chase, M. C.** 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDNov
To MCB CamPen

**Clark, B. E.** 0302
Fr 4th MCRRD
To MCSupActy Phila By31Jan

**Cline, F. E.** 6602
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MAD NATTC MFS

**Connelly, J. W., Jr.** 3060
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To 3dMarDiv By15Jan

**Cosby, L. C.** 2710
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To FMFPac MCB 29Palm

**Cuthbert, E. W.** 3010
Fr MCSC Barstow
To Camp H. M. Smith By8Jan

**Dezer, C. N., III** 0302
Fr 2MarDiv
To HQBN HQMC By31Jan

**Dimick, G. D.** 3060
Fr 2dMAW
To MAG-31 By1Nov

**Dixon, R. R.** 3402
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCAS Beaufort

**Donohoe, K. M.** 0130
Fr MCRD SDiego WDDec
To FMFPac

**Edson, H. R.** 0302
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Emmons, C. D.** 0302
Fr USS Coral Sea WDDec
To 72d RflCo

**Eversole, C. W.** 3010
Fr 3MarDiv WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Fontenot, K. J., Jr.** 1802
Fr 1stMarDiv
To USS Coral Sea By1Dec

**Ford, C. T.** 1803
Fr 1stMarDiv By10Jan
To 3dMarDiv

**Gallant, R. A.** 2502
Fr 1stMarDiv
To CommCon Cen By15Nov

**Gary, J. H., III** 1802
Fr MB WashDC
To OiC MCRS Hou By1Jan

**Glaser, R. R.** 0302
Fr MCSC Barstow Cal
To 3dMarDiv By7Jan

**Glasgow, H. G.** 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 40RflCo LubbockTx

**Glauser, G. W.** 7302
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To MARTC NAS Olathe

**Godby, L. L.** 7302
Fr Luke AFB Ariz WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Hammons, E. G.** 3502
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

**Hardee, L. H.** 0302
Fr MB NS AdakAl WDDec
To MCB CamPen

**Hardin, R. N.** 3010
Fr MAG32 2MAW
To Cmp S. D Butler By15Jan

**Hatch, D. J.** 2502
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To CINCLANTFLT By20Nov

**Henry, C. G.** 0302
Fr 1stMarDiv
To I-I 14th RflCo By25Nov

**Jacobson, E. E., Jr.** 7332
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Janz, E. P.** 7333
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDDec
To 2MAW

**Johnson, H. L., Jr.** 0302
Fr 6th MCRRD Jax WDDec
To MCS Quant

**Jordan, H. V.** 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Keast, D. G.** 7302
Fr 1MarDiv WDDec
To MAD NABTC NAS

**Kirkpatrick, R. H.** 0802
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

**Kluth, G. J.** 3060
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW

**Ledin, J. W.** 0302
Fr MCAAS Yuma Ariz
To USS Midway By5Jan

**Lowery, H. D.** 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCB CamLej

**Mann, B. H., Jr.** 7333
Fr 2dMarDiv WDDec
To Univ of Omaha

**Martino, F. W.** 2502
Fr 3MarDiv
To Ft Monmouth NJ By3Jan

**Mason, R. B.** 2502
Fr MCRDep SDiego WDDec
To NAG Korea

**Mason, F. S., Jr.** 0130
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To 3dMAW

**McDonald, D. V.** 7302
Fr Castle AFB WDDec
To 1stMAW

**Miller, C. A.** 3010
Fr 4th MCRRD
To 3dMarDiv By22Jan

**Moe, F. J.** 7332
Fr 3dMAW WDNov
To 1stMAW

**Morgan, T. R.** 7302
Fr 2MAW
To 1stMAW By2Jan

**Mueller, K. N.** 0802
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv By10Jan

**Nelson, H. E.** 7333
Fr MCAS CherPt WDDec
To NABTC NAS Pncla

**Morgan, T. R.** 7302
Fr 2MAW
To 1stMAW By2Jan

**Mueller, K. N.** 0802
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv By10Jan

**Nelson, H. E.** 7333
Fr MCAS CherPt
To NABTC NAS Pncla

**Newcomb, F. G.** 7304
Fr NABTC NAS Pncla WDDec
To MCAS El Toro

**Nicholas, A. G., Jr.** 7304
Fr 2MAW WDDec
To NABTC NAS Pncla

**Nugent, T. E.** 3010
Fr MCSC Albany Ga
To Cmp S D Butler By15Jan

**O'Donnell, H. F.** 3010
Fr 2MarDiv
Fr 3MarDiv By22Jan

**Overturf, C. D.** 7304
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

**Palmer, R. L.** 3002
Fr MarCorB CamLej
To MCSupCen AlbanyGa By31Jan

**Peterson, B. K.** 3002
Fr MCB CamPen
To 1MarBrig By8Jan

**Phillips, J. V.** 3502
Fr 2MarDiv
To 3MarDiv By10Jan

**Pitts, C. O., Jr.** 3002
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MarCorB CamPen By31Jan

**Preble, L. A.** 0302
Fr Monterey Calif WDDec
To PorAUPrince Hait

**Pruett, M. R.** 0115
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To OSO Columbus Ohio

**Quick, R. T.** 2502
Fr I-I Stf 4CommCo
To 3MarDiv By4Jan

**Raines, T. E.** 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To VMO-6 MAG36 3MAW

**Reilly, J. K.** 0302
Fr MB NS AdakAl WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Ross, W. H., Jr.** 7335
Fr FMFPac WDNov
To 1stMarBrig

**Ryder, J. N.** 3002
Fr MarCorB CamPen
To MCSupCen AlbanyGa By31Jan

**Scarborough, K. L.** 7302
Fr MAD NABTC NAS WDDec
To 2MAW

**Scoppa, J., Jr.** 0802
Fr 2dMarDiv
To MCB CamPen By4Jan

**Shaver, G. J., Jr.** 7302
Fr 1stMarBrig WDNov
To FMFPac

**Smith, C. L.** 7335
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 2dMAW FMFLant

**Snider, H. L.** 7304
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To MAD NABTC NAS

**Stout, D. E.** 3025
Fr NavSupCen Oak WDDec
To MCSC Barstow

**Sturdevant, C. G.** 7304
Fr 3dMAW WDDec
To 1stMAW

**Sullivan, W. M.** 3002
Fr NavSupCen Oak WDDec
To Atla Gen Depot

**Sullivan, W. J.** 0702
Fr ForTrps FMFPac
To AirFMFPac El Toro By3Jan

**Summerville, H. C.** 0802
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To 1st105MMHowBn By15Jan

**Tilly, R. C.** 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2MAW

**Tinius, D. I.** 2502
Fr 3MarDiv WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Tonnacliff, C. W.** 3502
Fr 3MAW
To HQMC By31Jan

**Tye, C.** 0302
Fr USS Magoffin WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Warczakowski, A. I.** 0302
Fr 3dMarDiv WDDec
To MCS Quant

**Weiler, E. H.** 0802
Fr 2MarDiv
To 3MarDiv By10Jan

**Wilkison, B. G.** 7335
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2MAW

**Williams, K. W.** 0302
Fr MCS Quant
To MCSupActy Phila By31Jan

**Yeam, A. W.** 3010
Fr MCB CamPen WDDec
To FMFPac Oahu Haw

**Young, F. F., Jr.** 3402
Fr 1stMarBrig WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

## Retired

**Dean, J. L.** 0202
FMFLant 31Oct

**Forgash, E. M.** 4002
MCSA Phila 30Nov

## Deaths

**Reppert, J. G.** 7333
Phoenix Ariz 24Oct

**Paine, F. K.** 2077
Moline Ill 16Sept

## Selected for Promotion

**Harrell, W. T.**
**Blakeslee, R. Q.**
**Rilling, G. A.**
**Ruos, G. V.**
**Ingalls, J. F., II**
**Roberson, C.**
**Hughes, C. S.**
**Spence, C. E., Jr.**
**Seitz, F. H.**
**Marron, J. J.**
**Unkle, J. W.**
**Henderson, P. F.**
**Sharpe, W. N.**
**McKown, P. E.**
**Donaldson, J. R.**
**Trent, H. E.**
**Dickison, W.**
**Adams, C. C.**
**Irwin, J. W.**
**Mincey, A. V.**
**Lilliestrand, E. H.**
**Reid, C. C.**
**Nix, G. H., Jr.**
**Smith, W. P.**
**Taylor, J. R.**
**Guice, H. B.**
**Bushwitz, H. W.**
**Schiffman, E. R.**
**Parker, B. W.**
**Lisicky, J. F.**
**Chambers, A. B.**
**Rhoads, E. F.**
**Goodwin, C. W.**
**Kerr, J. F., Jr.**
**Whitney, R. L.**
**Vanliew, W. J.**
**Thomas, R. E.**
**Shea, P. E.**
**Barnes, C., Jr.**
**Webster, W. K.**
**Stiles, H. A.**
**Forde, J. E., Jr.**
**Bailey, A. S.**
**Lorentzen, P. A.**
**McCann, H. N.**
**Kilduff, C. E.**
**Craig, C. C.**
**Bacher, L. J.**
**Hendricks, L., II**
**Warner, C. N.**
**Murphy, G. S.**
**Fellows, L. E.**
**Butler, A. S.**
**Croasdell, T. P.**
**Donahue, L. J.**
**Irving, E. O., Jr.**
**Eaton, H. M.**
**McArthur, R. J.**
**Frye, R. A.**
**Stanton, A. W.**
**Lang, W. L., Jr.**
**Fennessy, M. P.**
**Davis, J. E.**
**Sternkopf, F. R.**
**Chrisinger, E. L.**
**Lawson, J. H.**
**Metz, G. F.**
**Hood, V. B., Jr.**
**Vogler, F. L.**
**Ready, J. S.**
**Simms, B. C.**
**Gray, D. K.**
**Janus, D. G.**
**Belth, R. H.**
**Monahan, E. J.**
**Roti, S. P.**
**Bartlett, G. E.**
**Cline, J., Jr.**
**Faraklas, T., Jr.**
**Johnson, R. M.**
**Alexander, M. H.**
**Elliott, H. R.**
**Butler, E. L.**
**Kibbee, R. F.**
**Woodard, R. J.**
**McCullough, J. D.**
**Piante, D. P.**
**Caslin, W. E.**
**McGee, J. H.**
**Rozinski, F. X.**
**Hansford, J. R.**
**Kieswetter, G. M.**
**Armstrong, M. B.**
**Highhouse, L. D.**
**Ohigren, A. S.**
**Koehler, R. F.**
**Wallach, A. W.**
**Reitz, C. M.**
**Bedwell, E. D.**
**Tremmel, R. M.**
**Damon, R. K**
**Williams, T. W.**
**Newton, G. L.**
**Molesky, R. V.**
**Wolff, W. F**
**Spiesel, W. J**
**Kiracofe, W. E.**
**Wilder, G.**
**Dinse, W. J.**
**Smith, H. O.**
**Bartlett, G. L.**
**O'Leary, R. J.**
**Kent, W. D**
**Nelson, A. O.**
**Livingston, G. M. B.**
**Watson, J. E.**
**King, E. C.**
**Snyder, E. N.**
**Albert, A. D., Jr.**
**Burhans, R. N.**
**Kerr, C. R. J.**
**Miller, W. R.**
**Norton, R. J.**
**Mitchell, D. L.**
**Ziegler, A. G.**
**Wilson, P. E.**
**Kutz, R. E.**
**Bourne, F. L., Jr.**
**Englisch H.**
**Morris, H. L., Jr.**
**Holthus, E. H.**
**Rourke, R. E.**
**Whisman, E. L.**
**Pearce, G. M., Jr.**
**Austin, C. L.**
**Brown, A. M.**
**Simonis, R. L.**
**Frey, H. I.**
**Weston, W. A.**
**Glen, R. A.**
**Douglass, W. D.**
**Mead, H. R., Jr.**
**Adrian, B. M.**
**Lowdermilk, T., Jr.**
**Vielhauer, W. C.**
**Etheridge, M. M., Jr.**
**Schoen, J. F. J.**
**Fuchs, L. E.**
**Fogarty, H. L.**
**Branen, W. E.**
**Griffis, J. K.**
**McDaniel, R. L.**
**Evans, J. W.**
**Gubb, L. A.**
**Turner, J. S. G.**
**Figard, C. R.**
**Robinson, R. L.**
**Hodges, T. A.**
**Barnard, R. H.**
**Clelland, W. M.**
**Toner, E. R.**
**Schulze, R. C.**
**Hildebrand, D. H.**
**Stoetzer, W. H.**
**Jaeck, W. C.**
**Butler, W. O.**
**Jacobson, E. E., Jr.**
**Grabowski, E. Z.**
**Harper, H. M.**
**Bell, R. C.**
**Slawter, L. Z., Jr.**
**Kellogg, W. D.**
**Mulligan, B. J.**
**Carr, J. B., Jr.**
**Little, C. G.**
**Fimian, C.**
**Cain, J. W.**
**Twohey, R. B.**
**Everett, J., Jr.**
**Simanikas, W. C.**
**Smith, T. C.**
**Glowicki, W. F.**
**Moore, K. E.**
**Daniels, W. S.**
**Kephart, W. R.**
**Burnette, L. R., Jr.**
**Parchen, J. W.**
**Jones, R. K.**
**Shatzer, D. E.**
**Metz, J. G.**
**Sudhoff, R. I.**
**Deatley, H. F.**
**Unterkofler, J. J.**
**Donabedian, H.**
**Francis, D. D.**
**Grube, F. E.**
**Cobb, J. H., Jr.**
**Fitzgerald, G. J.**
**Conlin, H. J.**
**Palmer, R. E. B.**
**Stinemetz, B. C.**
**Frazier, K. J.**
**Howland, R. W.**
**Larson, L. W.**
**Christian, R. L., Jr.**
**Murphy, R. M.**
**Thousand, W. H.**
**Schueler, R.**
**Parker, E. B.**
**Kruck, F. H.**
**Woods, J. L.**
**Donahue, J. J.**
**Johnson, R. P.**
**Reece, L. C.**
**Crosby, H. B., II**
**Thuesen, R.**
**Frazier, P. N.**
**McClure, V. R.**
**Newton, D. E.**
**Chaney, R. P.**
**Olmstead, S. G.**
**Coffman, J. L.**
**Hughes, R. C.**
**Marsh, R. C.**
**Hagedorn, E. E.**
**Kelly, T. R.**
**Jolley, M. S.**
**Lasiavic, N. M., Jr.**
**Lawler, G. E.**
**Standley, B. R.**
**Deal, C. T.**
**Wickwire, P. A.**
**Clayborne, J. W.**
**Davis, D. N.**
**Holmberg, W. C.**
**Utley, E. H.**
**Blaz, V. T.**
**Pape, R. A.**
**Rowe, B. C.**
**Nicholas, C. E.**
**Cannon, F. S.**
**Thomas, G. C.**
**Hutchison, W. E.**
**Jones, C. T.**
**Jones, D. E., Jr.**
**Riddle R. G.**
**Dausman, J. E.**
**Duncan, W. B.**
**Heim, W. P.**
**Goodson, J. P.**
**Wood, L. E.**
**Parker, L. W.**
**Naquin, J. J., Jr.**
**Connolly, J. P.**
**Sellers, D. L.**
**Balderston, F. G.**
**Bumpas, H. R., Jr.**
**Matthews, D. I.**
**Collin, J. R.**
**Taber, R. B.**
**Roberts, C. D., Jr.**
**Trainor, B. E.**
**Bolcey, C. G.**
**Stockton, R. C.**
**Meeker, R. R., Jr.**
**Sylvester, V. L.**
**Maxwell, E. K.**
**Lynch, M. B.**
**Buergey, W. L.**
**Abrams, L. H.**
**Bradley, J. R.**
**Hartman, R. S.**
**Ingrando, R. B.**
**Smith, R. W.**
**Tonnacliff, C. W.**
**McKinney, H. E.**
**Hohmann, W. F.**
**Megna, P. E.**
**Chaplin, D. D. I.**
**McElheny, C. L.**
**Banta, W.**
**Traut, E. W.**
**Casey, C. R.**
**Clark, S. T.**
**Rick, R. F.**
**Bailey, J. D.**
**Mogensen, P. C.**
**Mallard, F. F.**
**Stranahan, J. W.**
**Morley, D. H.**
**Maloney, W. R.**
**Siegmund, P. L.**
**Beeler, W. R.**
**Hazard, G. C.**
**McMath, J. B.**
**Shrader, P. A.**
**Smith, J. T.**
**Schramel, R. F.**
**Love, J. R.**
**Hart, H. M.**
**Lawrence, W. A.**
**Young, D. P.**
**Culkin, T. J.**
**Moore, M. A.**
**Grace, J. J.**
**MacLean, F. D., Jr.**
**Reddy, J. J. P.**
**Dooley, P. .**
**Harris, R. E.**
**Mille, R. J.**
**Searles, R. M.**
**Fields, T. C.**
**Fuller, R. A.**
**Barker, D. B.**
**Mattimoe, T. E.**
**Haebel, R. E.**
**Morgan, P.**
**Carpenter, H. U.**
**Cottrell, H. E.**
**Woodham, T. J., Jr.**
**Williamson, C. T.**
**Cawthron, J. C., Jr.**
**Webster, C. B.**
**Thomaidis, S. D.**
**Webster, D.**
**Navorska, D. R.**
**Read, B. F., Jr.**
**McQuinn, D. E.**
**Loferski, S. J.**
**Ittner, E. L., Jr.**
**Murray, F. J.**
**Proudfoot, R. M.**
**Reiniche, H. T.**
**Landers, J. H.**
**Yundt, G. L.**
**Hawes, R. E., Jr.**
**Eidson, R. E.**
**Edwards, T. C.**
**Morrow, S. M.**
**Davis, T. G.**
**Vanairsdale, J. B.**
**Maysilles, D. J.**
**Drummond, M. D.**
**Howard, E. R., Jr.**
**DeCarlo, L. L.**
**Atkinson, H. E.**
**Fortin, V. G.**
**Wray, R. E., III**
**Bates, W. G.**
**Kitterman, W. P.**
**Stewart, R. M.**
**Baylor, J. D.**
**Chene, J. P.**
**Bowie, F. R.**
**Westenberger, P. H.**
**Rice, W. R.**
**Gorski, W. P.**
**Hollen, K. D.**
**Vandenberg, O. W., Jr.**
**Rowley, J. D.**
**Hammond, J. W., Jr.**
**Silverthorn, E. A.**
**Anderton, R. L.**
**Farmer, M. E.**
**Qualls, T. F.**
**Rice, W. H.**
**Hayes, D. B.**
**Black, J. L., Jr.**
**Stanaro, C. J.**
**Kelly, W. H., Jr.**
**Desselle, A. M.**
**Rosecrans, R. D.**
**Gifford, C. C.**
**Dinegar, W. W.**
**Pearson, P. E.**
**Hogan, C. E.**
**Gentry, G. H.**
**Wozencraft, C. R.**
**Hilgartner, P. L.**
**Stuart, T. R.**
**Macklin, D. K.**
**McPheeters, T. A.**
**Benson, R. E.**
**Dyer, R. W.**

Paredes, O. O.
Kull, W. M.
Quisenberry, J. R.
Cook, H. T.
Fahey, J. E.
Croft, A. J., Jr.
Petty, R. N.
Norman, J. L.
Woodcock, C. E., Jr.
Peeler, J. J.
Deboever, V. L.
Bowman, A. R., II
Etter, R. L.
Kyle, D. N.
Elder, R. A.
Wilkinson, J. B.
Roth, H. B., Jr.
Keefe, J. J.
Watson, C. E.
Skaugen, C. W.
Tinius, D. H.
Netka, W.
Willis, T. J.
Reiss, W. R.
Long, G. G.
Manis, J. V., Jr.
Leigh, P. A. E.
Barnes, R. O.
Swilley, C. R., Jr.
Kauffman, T. M.
Graham, E. H.
Hubbard, G.
Byrd, J. A.
Tolle, D. S.
Walsh, J. J., Jr.
McQuown, M.
Hunter, P. R.
Stephens, G. A.
Wilson, W. E., Jr.
Jones, C. F.
Havlik, J.
DiCillo, F., Jr .
Timoney, C. D.
McNally, T. E.
Rauh, S. H.
Vandeusen, L. R.
Bruce, H. A.
Townsend, K. W.
Wilkinson, B. R.
Heintz, W. H.
Bouldin, B. D.
Parrish, D. D.
Gulling, L. A.
Shoup, J. D.
Colia, J.
Vorgang, C. R.
Quinn, J. W.
Topley, F. D.
Spiro, M. E.
Scott, W. A., Jr.
Hemmingway, R. E.
Miller, R. H.
Cliff, D. K.
Ryckman, J. B.
Clark, D. A.
Holmberg, H. H.
Herich, E. W.
Ivins, M. H., Jr.
West, M. W.
Chisholm, C. C., Jr.
Wood, R. K.
Seamon, L. R.
Sullivan, L. F.
Fischer, H. G.
Drumright, W. C.
Ferrell, B. B.
Woodruff, R. L.
Doering, R. L.
Buchmann, C. E.
Chase, H. C.
Brown, B. G.
Waite, A. G.
Poppe, C. R., Jr.
Skinner, B. B.
Moss, R. E.
Nelson, N. A.
Rogers, W. F.
Shearman, J. A., Jr.
Cryan, W. M.
Rice, R. C.
Keller, R. J.
Robison, D. G.
Seaver, R. A.
Paratore, J. F.
Richard, J. L.
Dezer, C. N., III
Anker, H. R.
Huntzinger, H. J.
Britt, W. C.
Coody, J. K.
Sheehan, W. F.
Garner, K. C.
Taylor, W. W., Jr.
Creswell, C. F.
Hopkins, D. M.
Robbins, W. L.
Bruser, G. L.
Ellis, F. B.
Hochenauer, M. J.
Tate, W. A.
Weaver, V.
Hutchisson, W. R.
Dobbratz, J. R., Jr.
Lukas, E.
Laws, J. R.
Moore, R. B.
Lamontagne, E. J.
Farrell, F. L., Jr.
Whalen, G. N.
Gerard, J. C.
Vaughan, G. W.
Marciniak, R. H.
Day, M. E.
Rudy, R. B.
Janssen, P. G.
Spencer, R. T.
Willis, C. H.
Hawkins, L. R.
Duvall, R. L. J.
Hutchings, W. K.
Fithian, J. E., Jr.
Sauls, R. G., IV
Hatch, R. D.
Miller, E. W.
Anderson, D. W.
Kimball, A. B.
Robertson, J. W.
Stewart, W. H., Jr.
Gott, A. T.
Leblanc, L. J., Jr.
Goodsell, W. J.
Taylor, L. A.
Campo, G .R.
Kenyon, R. F.
Drago, A. N.
Thompson, J. S.
Schwindt, L. W.
Ciaburro, M. A.
Lawrence, G. M., Jr.
Graham, W. H.
Garman, W. E.
Hawley, R. I.
Kucharski, C. R., Jr.
Lichtenwalter, E.
Sample, E. J.
Stansel, E. H.
Stanton, D. R.
McMullen, H. J.
Zuern, R. L.
Jameson, R. D.
Purcell, R. D.
Brown, J. B., Jr.
Conrad, B. D.
Fox, J. R.
Mitchell, J. P. Jr.
Bugg, J. S., Jr.
Lepp, J. R.
Willis, J. E.
Rochford, T. F.
Keith, W. H.
Nicholson, R. E.
Smith, H. M.
Love, J. C.
Cook, R. E.
Broadwell, F. C.
Hennelly, J. A.
Dion, J. W.
Strandquist, J. H.
Spence, M. L.
Aschenbeck, T. F.
Griffith, J. K.
Keister, C. F.
Fulton, S. J.
Robinett, H. M.
McLenon, F. G.
Harper, F. R., Jr.
Clements, F. D.
Hergert, J. C., Jr.
Grayson, E. F.
Vanwinkle, A.
Kerrigan, H. S.
Elkins, J. T.
Greer, MacD.
Quinn, F. X.
Detroy, J. W.
Day, J. L.
Fitch, W. E. H., III
Iverson, R. L.
Blake, L. F.
Marshall, H. R., III
Scott, J. W., Jr.
Draper, W. W.
Sobol, H.
Catallo, M. L.
Hedin, J. A.
Sandy, A. D.
DeFazio, E. L.
Stone, J. E.
Cignotti, L. J.
Stark, C. M.
Hardee, L. H.
Matthews, J. R.
Sawyer, H. L.
Herndon, G. G.
Weatherspoon, J. A.
Harris, J. B., Jr.
Gordon, A.
Cappeletto, N.
Simmons, B. P.
Arceneaux, E. J.

# 1st Lieutenants

## Permanent Promotions

**Gonzales, L. H.** — **Oct61**
**Held, A. E.** — **Oct61**
**Huf, W. R.** — **Oct61**
**Wheeler, J. J.** — **Oct61**

## Transfers

**Allen, J. R.** — **1302**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To MCSC Albany, Ga.

**Angle, H. L.** — **0802**
Fr 1st ANGLICO — WWDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Beck, J. L.** — **0302**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To I-I Stf 4thRflCo

**Brennan, G. E.** — **0802**
Fr 1stMarDiv — WDDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Chandler, T. W.** — **3501**
Fr MCS Quant — WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Conetta, D. L.** — **0302**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To MCB CamPen

**Criner, H. H.** — **2502**
Fr MCRD SDiego — WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Curtis, B. B.** — **7335**
Fr 1MAW — WDDec
To VMO-6 MAG-36 3MAW

**Dolan, J. J.** — **7302**
Fr MAD NAATC NASCorp
To 1stMarBrig — WDDec

**Graham, R. E.** — **6701**
Fr 2MAW FMFLant
To 1stMAW — By15Jan

**Grant, R. B.** — **0701**
Fr MCS Quant — WDNov
To For Trps FMFPac

**Grim, C. A.** — **3010**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Grubbs, W. O.** — **7302**
Fr 1st ANGLICO — WDNov
To 3dMAW

**Kimbrough, W. E., II** — **0301**
Fr MCS Quant — WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Lathrop, J. L.** — **0802**
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv — By10Jan

**Lattanze, R. E.** — **0302**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDNov
To MCB CamLej

**Maley, F. W.** — **3010**
Fr 3dMAW
To MCPAXOff SFran — By16Jan

**McElroy, T. R.** — **0802**
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MarCorB CamPen — By31Jan

**McGee, D. O.** — **2715**
Fr 1stMarDiv
To MB NTC GLakes — By5Jan

**McCormack, L. K.** — **3030**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Murray, J. W.** — **0801**
Fr 1stMAW — WDDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Nixon, R. K.** — **3010**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Norton, J. J.** — **0302**
Fr USS Little Rock — WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Oden, J. D.** — **7335**
Fr 1stMAW — WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Parker, L. E.** — **0302**
Fr Indian Head, Md. — WDDec
To 2ndMAW

**Piwowarczyk, R. W.** — **0801**
Fr MCS Quant — WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Rebstock, W. F.** — **0302**
Fr 3dMAW — WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Reece, J. H.** — **3010**
Fr MCS Quant
To 3dMarDiv — ByJan15

**Reed, G. D.** — **2502**
Fr MCRDep SDiego — WDNov
To MCB CamPen

**Rigg, R. J.** — **0302**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To MCS Quant

**Root, R. W.** — **7333**
Fr 3dMAW — WDNov
To 2dCommSptBn Chgo

**Schermerhorn, D. W.** — **0802**
Fr 1stMarDiv
To 3dMarDiv — By4Jan

**Sheetz, W. O.** — **1802**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Shillinglaw, J. S.** — **3010**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDNov
To MCS Quant

**Simon, F.** — **2715**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To MCRDep SDiego

**Sklar, J. H.** — **2502**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Smith, M. E., Jr.** — **0302**
Fr 1stMarDiv
To FtHolabird, Md. — By9Nov

**Smith, R. W.** — **3501**
Fr MCS Quant — WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Spencer, C. K.** — **3010**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To MCB CamPen

**Stackpole, H. C., Jr** — **1302**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDNov
To MCB CamLej

**Steele, O. K.** — **0302**
Fr 1stMarBrig — WDDec
To MCS Quant

**Sudmeyer, P. T.** — **0802**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To NSA Ft Meade, Md

**Tague, F. J., Jr.** — **0802**
Fr MCAS CherPt
To MarCorB CamLej — By31Jan

**Tanner, L. E.** — **0801**
Fr MCS Quant — WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Thornton, R. D.** — **7333**
Fr 1stMAW — WDDec
To 3rdMAW

**Topercer, J. C.** — **2502**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Wall, C. N.** — **1320**
Fr MB Hawthorne, Nev — WDDec
To 1stMAW

**Wells, R.** — **2502**
Fr LanScol Monterey — WDDec
To FMFLant

**Wilks, D., Jr.** — **3010**
Fr 3dMarDiv — WDDec
To 1st MarDiv

## Retired

**Blacque, R. E.** — 2502
ForTrps FMFLant — 31Oct

## Deaths

**Ohman, J. H.** — 0302
Altea, Spain — 1Nov

## Permanent Promotions, Reserve

**Armstrong, G. K.** — **Nov61**
**Bridgewater, B. R.** — **Nov61**
**Cason, B. A.** — **Oct61**
**Connell, C. B., Jr.** — **Nov61**
**Csintyan, S. D.** — **Oct61**
**Daniels, R. L.** — **Nov61**
**Kalas, W. D.** — **Oct61**
**Kiersey, D. A. . .** — **Oct61**
**Lane, R. A.** — **Oct61**
**Linderman, S. W.** — **Nov61**
**McMenamin, J. J., Jr.** — **Nov61**
**Sherwin, R. S.** — **Nov61**
**Watkins, T. L.** — **Oct61**

## Temporary Promotions, Reserve

**Allison, C. R.** — **Oct61**
**Black, D. R.** — **Oct61**
**Carter, J. W., Jr.** — **Oct61**
**Ciccons, R. G.** — **Oct61**
**Furman, H. B.** — **Oct61**
**Jones, J. H.** — **Oct61**
**Jones, R. A., Jr.** — **Ost61**
**Kish, J. P., III** — **Oct61**
**McMullin, C. T.** — **Oct61**
**O'Rorke, T. S.** — **Nov61**
**Schlagel, G. R.** — **Oct61**
**Waeschle, C. R.** — **Oct61**
**Weigand, P. S.** — **Oct61**
**Wibbelsman, F. P.** — **Oct61**
**Wood, C. H.** — **Oct61**

## Deaths

**Nutter, K. A.** — **8Oct**
Vienna, W. Va.

## 2d Lieutenants

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments

**Filkins, E. E.**, WOSO, Atlanta, Ga.

### Transfers

**Alexander, T. H.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Allen, D. R.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Bean, E., r.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To USS Bonhomme Rich By5Jan

**Bodenbender, H. G.** 1301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Byrne, J. M.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Cairns, N. C.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Callard, D. J.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Carney, J. F.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Carroll, P. J.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Casey, R. M.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Clifford, R. F.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Connell, J. J.** 2715
Fr MB NTC GLakes WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Curtis, C. B.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**DeWalt, D. H.** 0701
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Dempsey, D. G.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To For Trps FMF Lant

**Duke, L. M., Jr.** 2501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Durham, G. W., III** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant

**English, J. A., Jr.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Fowler, R. A.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Gatchel, T. L.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To USS Ticonderoga By5Jan

**Gill, J. E., II** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 3dMarDiv

**Glenn, N. L.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Goodnow, W. L.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Graybeal, W. J.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Green, K. N.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Green, R. L.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Grunwaldt, J. C.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Hall, R. G.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Hannah, H. G.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Harrington, P. L.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 3dMarDiv

**Harrington, M. C.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 3dMarDiv

**Hemingway, T. E.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To USS Saratoga By5Jan

**Henderson, D. G.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Hershey, L. G.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Holifield, C. M., Jr.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Houston, A. L., Jr.** 1301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Hurley, W. F.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**James, O. E., Jr.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Jones, J. D.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 3dMarDiv

**Joy, M. E.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Keller, E. F.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Kennedy, T. J.** 3402
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Knibbs, J. R.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Kraus, G. F.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Lambert, C. S.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Lanphier, R. F.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Lee, L. R.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Lehrack, O. J., III** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Lincoln, N. R.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Lipe, P. R.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Long, J. T.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Manz, J. W., Jr.** 030[illegible]
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**Marks, W. F., III** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Martine, J. R., Jr.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Mayers, D., Jr.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**McCarthy, A. J.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To USS ShangriLa By29Dec

**McCoy, R. K.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 2dMarDiv

**McLaughlin, R. J.** 2501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**McLernon, L. A.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**McMullin, E. F.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Miller, W. S.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Moore, D. A.** 1801
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFLant

**Nealy, B. W.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Patenaude, R. L.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Phaenuf, J. R.** 1301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Pipes, K. W.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Pope, C. N.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Powell, C. W.** 0701
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Price, H. E.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Roberts, A. W.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Roche, W. A.** 2501
Fr ForTrps FMFLant
To NavActy Italy By15Dec

**Rogers, W. C.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Roseberry, G. L.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Ryan, J. A., Jr.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant
To USS Essex

**Salerno, J.** 2501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Salisbury, R. E.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Salopek, D. M.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Samouce, J. W.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Schmidt, R. W.** 2501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Schultz, R. E.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Swanson, D. D.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Swanson, C. E.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Turner, R. W.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Vazquez, I. F., Jr.** 0801
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 3dMarDiv

**Walsingham, C. B.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 3dMarDiv

**Ware, R. A.** 1301
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To CG 2dMarDiv

**Wasilifsky, M. F.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To ForTrps FMFPac

**Worth, W. J.** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 2dMarDiv

**Wright, L. D.** 0301
Fr MCS Quant WDNov
To 1stMarDiv

**Young, J. W.** 2501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To 1stMarDiv

**Zoder, W. L., II** 3501
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To ForTrps FMFLant

### Retired

**Cullen, S. J.** 0301
1stMarDiv 31Oct

## Warrant Officers

### Recent Command and Staff Assignments
### W-3

**McIntyre, A**, XO PermPersCo., WMB, MCRD, PISC

### Selected for Promotion
### W-4

**Bell, W. C.** Oct61
**Blinkovitch, J.** Oct61
**Czechowski, W. L.** Oct61
**Gonzalez, F. A.** Oct61
**Green, H. H.** Oct61
**Hazen, C. E.** Oct61
**Lesem, H. F.** Oct61
**Lewis, D.** Oct61
**Pietrzak, W.** Oct61
**Propotnik, M. A.** Oct61
**Quattlebaum, J. C.** Oct61
**Roberson, J. H.** Oct61
**Ross, J.** Oce61
**Stogner, A. W.** Oct61
**Thomas, W. H.** Oct61
**Thornton, A. W.** Oct61
**Vanfleet, T. R.** Oct61
**Wandron, H. F.** Oct61

### Permanent Promotions

**Lloyd, P. V.** Oct61
**Lynch, W. R.** Oct61
**Rains, N. I.** Oct61

### Transfers

**Holmes, C. A.** 2040
Fr MCS Quant WDDec
To Ord Mechbrg, Pa

**Knott, J. L.** 3090
Fr MCB CamPen
To MCRDep SDiego By15Nov

### Retired

**Allen, A. V.** 3302
MAD NATTC MFS 30Nov

**Colwell, J. R.** 0130
MCRDep SDiego 31Oct

### Permanent Promotions

**Woods, R. J.** Oct61

### Selected for Promotion
### W-3

**Arnold, J. L.** Oct31
**Brownson, J. C.** Oct61
**Cabral, L. A.** Oct61
**Cates, C. D.** Oct61
**Ciampa, A. P.** Oct61
**Clements, F. M.** Oct61
**Cline, F. E.** Oct61
**Cosby, L. C.** Oct61
**Cushman, J. R.** Oct61
**Demmond, J. W.** Oct61
**Deuser, J. F.** Oct61
**Everson, R. T.** Oct61
**Finkbohner, E. C.** Oct61
**Hales, N. J.** Oct61
**Herman, G. C.** Oct61
**Kennicutt, O. E.** Oct31
**Kerr, W. H.** Oct61
**Kolva, G. Y.** Oct61
**Lennen, H. T.** Oct61
**Long, E. E.** Oct61
**Lucht, R. W.** Oct61
**Madden, J.** Oct61
**McMaster, B. A.** Oct61
**Miller, F. C.** Oct61
**Mitchell, E. M.** Oct61
**Navolanic, J. G.** Oct61
**Ninichuck, P.** Oct61
**Purdy, S. J.** Oct61
**Rhymer, R. H.** Oct61
**Wyatt, J. B.** Oct61

### Transfers

**Comeau, J. L.** 6402
Fr 1stMAW WDDec
To 3dMAW

**Sparks, T., Jr.** 3010
Fr MB NAD Oahu
To MB NS SFran By4Dec

### Retired

**Friend, V. S., Jr.** 3090
MCRD SDiego 31Oct

**Poliak, W. G.** 3025
MCRD SDiego 31Dec

### Selected for Promotion
### W-2

**Amick, D. E.** Oct61
**Andre, J. W.** Oct61
**Androsko, W. E.** Oct61
**Baird, J. F.** Oct61
**Barger, R. M.** Oct61
**Becker, R. P.** Oct61
**Bernier, R. J.** Oct61
**Bierhaalder, D. C.** Oct61
**Blaydes, A. M.** Oct61
**Bressler, A. L.** Oct61
**Briggs, J. D.** Oct61

| | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Brooks, H. L.** | **Oct61** | **Holden, W. H.** | **Oct61** | **Spahr, E. J.** | **Oct61** | **Favreau, R. D.** | **6720** |
| **Buckley, J. D.** | **Oct61** | **Holdridge, F. B.** | **Oct61** | **Spangler, D. E.** | **Oct61** | Fr 1stMAW | WDDec |
| **Carnahan, D. K.** | **Oct61** | **Houser, J. J.** | **Oct61** | **Sutton, J. R.** | **Oct61** | To 2nd MAW | |
| **Colangelo, N.** | **Oct61** | **Hutton, J. W.** | **Oct61** | **Templeton, G. R.** | **Oct61** | **Handley, C. I.** | **0210** |
| **Conroy, E. L.** | **Ost61** | **Inman, R. L.** | **Oct61** | **Thompson, M. E.** | **Oct61** | Fr FMFPac | |
| **Corbett, M.** | **Oct61** | **Johnson, H. B.** | **Oct61** | **Tinsley, H.** | **Oct61** | To 1stMarDiv | |
| **Cotten, C. R.** | **Oct61** | **Johnson, J. E.** | **Ost61** | **Vaughn, E. R.** | **Oct61** | **High, R. D.** | **3010** |
| **Cox, G. H.** | **Oct61** | **Johnson, R. W.** | **Oct61** | **Wells, G. T.** | **Oct61** | Fr 1stReconBn | WDDec |
| **Currier, B. D.** | **Oct61** | **Kramer, V. S.** | **Oct61** | **Wheeler, E. M.** | **Oct61** | To 1stMarDiv | |
| **Darrow, M. L.** | **Oct61** | **Lorch, R. E.** | **Oct61** | **Whelchel, L. A.** | **Oct61** | **Kimmey, H. C.** | **3310** |
| **Delacqua, R. J.** | **Oct61** | **Losey, C. E.** | **Oct61** | **Wicker, S. T.** | **Oct31** | Fr Chicago | WDDec |
| **Devitt, J. R.** | **Oct61** | **Manning, R. D.** | **Oct61** | **Wildfang, H.** | **Oct61** | To ForTrps FMFLant | |
| **Ditty, G. L.** | **Oct61** | **Maximin, W. K.** | **Oct61** | **Willis, J.** | **Oct61** | **Riggs, R. K.** | **2715** |
| **Dowling, C. H.** | **Oct61** | **McCarthy, W. J.** | **Oct61** | **Work, R. G.** | **Oct61** | Fr MB NTC GLakes | WDDec |
| **Eoff, H.** | **Oct61** | **McGuire, T. W.** | **Oct61** | **Wygal, K. E.** | **Oct61** | To 1stMAW | |
| **Evans, W. T.** | **Oct61** | **Meshke, G. E.** | **Oct61** | | | **Stubbe, H. F.** | **2710** |
| **Farkas, J.** | **Oct61** | **Millang, H. B.** | **Oct61** | **Transfers** | | Fr 1stMarDiv | |
| **Filosa, R. W.** | **Oct61** | **Mueller, C. J.** | **Oct61** | | | To MB NTC GLakes | By5Jan |
| **Fletcher, C. H.** | **Oct61** | **Nagy, W.** | **Oct61** | **Durfee, N. E.** | **2710** | **Tisdale, W. E.** | **3310** |
| **Flynn, R. F.** | **Oct61** | **Nagy, C.** | **Oct61** | Fr ForTrps FMFPac | | Fr Chicago | |
| **Forman, J. R.** | **Oct61** | **Norton, J. J.** | **Oct61** | To MB NTC GLakes | By5Jan | To MCB CamLej | By3Jan |
| **Garrett, C.** | **Oct61** | **Paige, J. J.** | **Oct61** | | | | |
| **Garris, B.** | **Oct61** | **Pryor, R. E.** | **Oct61** | **W-1** | | **Deaths** | |
| **Gendron, L. G.** | **Oct61** | **Reilly, J.** | **Oct61** | | | | |
| **Godley, R. O.** | **Oct61** | **Root, E. R.** | **Oct61** | **Bishop, J. W.** | **2040** | **Lindsay, J. R.** | **7335** |
| **Grant, E. G.** | **Oct61** | **Sagar, H. L.** | **Oct61** | Fr ForTrps FMFPac | WDNov | New Iberia, La. | 28Oct |
| **Harris, W. R.** | **Oct61** | **Schaeffer, H. J.** | **Oct61** | To US Flt Acts Japan | | | |
| **Hasler, F. R.** | **Oct61** | **Shea, R. E.** | **Oct61** | **Cox, G. H.** | **6802** | **Deaths, Retired** | |
| **Hattaway, E.** | **Oct61** | **Sheppard, W. F.** | **Oct61** | Fr 1stMAW | WDDec | | |
| **Haynes, J. L.** | **Oct61** | **Smiley, P. L.** | **Oct61** | To 3rdMAW | | **George, H. L., Jr.** | |
| **Heinz, L.** | **Oct61** | **Smith, D. M.** | **Oct61** | **Currier, B. D.** | **6720** | Lakeport, Calif. | 24Aug |
| **Hinds, G. E.** | **Oct61** | **Sophos, M.** | **Oct61** | Fr 1stMarBrig | WDDec | | |
| | | | | To 1stMAW | | | |

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A Kind Word for Bullpup — Dalby, Jan (OP)
LAW Rocket Grenade Launcher XM72 — Staff, Mar
More on Bullpup — Lisenby, Mar (OP)
Let's Transfer Ontos to Barstow — Trainor, May (OF)
Force Artillery — Anderson, Oct
Missiles — Cunningham, Oct

## AVIATION

GEM Vs Helicopter — **Scrapbook, Jan**
The LPH: Teamwork in Action — Maxwell, Jan
Carrier CAS in AFSOUTH — Steinkraus, Feb
Helicopter Armament — Benis, Feb (Scrapbook)
Level Ready Pilot Training — **McClure, Mar**
Let's Put AOs to Work — Clark, Mar (OP)
What's Ahead for Marine Aviation? — Staff, Apr (Looking Ahead)
Bigger Payloads for the HUS — Nelson, Apr
One Book for Aviation — McClure, Apr (OP)
The Place of the Low Disc Loading VTOL in the Future Manned Military Aircraft Spectrum — Scrapbook, Apr
Why Marine Inflight Refueling? — Bolt, May
Single Engine Transpac — Bolt, May
SATS: A Bright Future — Staff, May (Looking Ahead)
Aviation Ground Training for Defense — High, Jun (OP)
The Case of Jet CAS — Verdi, Jun
Eagle Eyes for the Division — Smith, Jul (OP)
Marine Aviation Needs More Command Billets — Ewers, Sept
Eyes Aloft — Schimmenti, Sept
No Leaks, No Bumps, No Lift — Mitchell, Sept (OP)
Let's Fly the AOC — Browne, Oct (OP)
The Missing Link — Clapp, Dec

## COMMUNICATIONS

Comm Costs on the Rise — Johnson, Jan (Scrapbook)

## FORCE IN READINESS

Fast Amphibious Force — Stephens, Jan
Report from the Ready Forces: 2nd MAW — (two parts) Mar
Report from the Ready Forces: 2nd MarDiv — Mar
Report from the Ready Forces: 1stMarDiv — Jun
Report from the Ready Forces: 1st MAW — Sullivan, Sept
Report from the Ready Forces: Force Troops FMFLant — Oct
Report from the Ready Forces: Force Troops FMFPac — Oct

## FOREIGN MILITARY

The Soviet Threat: A CNO Appraisal — Burke, Jan
Combat Helicopters in Algeria — Bethouart, Jan
Soviet Helicopters — Geiger, Jan
Soviet Military Justice — Gawjesky, Jan (Scrapbook)
Soviet Mine Warfare — Utter, Feb
The Communist Bloc — Scrapbook, Jan
Red China's Military Revolution — Smith, Apr
Some Chinese Thoughts on War — Griffith, Apr
Alliance of the Free World: SEATO — Scrapbook, May
Rommel: Fox or Fake? — **Hill, Jun**
La Guerra de Guerrillas (Part I) — Peterson, Jun

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La Guerra de Guerrillas (Part II) — Peterson, Jul
Alliance of the Free World: NATO — Scrapbook, Jul
Area Fire — Weller, Aug
La Guerra de Guerrillas (Part III) — Peterson, Aug
Alliance of the Free World: CENTO and Strategic Forces — Scrapbook, Aug
Combined Fire — Weller, Sept
Soviet Comments on Vertical Envelopment — Staar, Sept
Aimed Fire — Weller, Oct
The Unorthodox Israeli Army — Ne'eman, Nov
Terrorist Activity in Malaya — Reynolds, Nov
Royal Marines, UK — Strandberg, Oct
Philippine Marines — Strandberg, Nov
Netherlands Marines — Strandberg, Dec
Gallipoli — Hargreaves, Dec

## GEOPOLITICS AND STRATEGY

Danger on the Flanks of NATO — **Liddell Hart, Jan**
Atoms are No Answer — McDonald, Feb
Castro's Threat to the Hemisphere — Macaulay, Mar
Unlimited War: A Non-Nuclear Strategy — Sparks, Apr
Nuclear Weapons and Limited War — Smith, Apr
A Military Briefing on Laos — Nondeplume, Apr
The President: On the Deeper Struggle — Kennedy, Jun
Sticks, Stones, and Atoms — Burnham, Jun
The Communist Strategy of Time — Heilner, Aug
Road to Disaster — Eliot, Oct
Interview with Capt B. H. Liddell Hart — Walters, Nov
Deterrent or Defense — Kennedy, Nov
Interview with Gen Fuller — Walters, Dec
Permutations of War — Fuller, Dec

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Mr. Gish, You're the New S-2 — Davis, **Mar**

## LEADERSHIP, TRADITION, ESPRIT, MORALE, DISCIPLINE

Pass the Word and Keep Control — Spring, Jan (OP)
Morale: A State of the Mind — Moore, Feb
Characteristics of Leaders — Barnes, Mar
Improve your NCOs and You Improve USMC — Shearer, May (OP)
Quadruple Trouble — MacDonald, Jul (OP)
The Care and Feeding of Young Officers — Metzger, Jul
First Aid for Ailing Marines — Duffy, Aug (OP)
Something to Fight For — Tanham, Sept
Tact — O'Brien, Sept (OP)
The IG and the Staff NCOs — Dutton, Nov
Wanted: Hairy Fisted Marines — O'Connor, Nov
New Approach to Leadership Training — **Utley, Nov (OP)**
Tradition: Curse or Blessing — Szuch, Nov (OP)

## MARINE CORPS HISTORY

Waller of Samar (Part I) — Asprey, May
Waller of Samar (Part II) — Asprey, Jun
The Eternal Spirit — Asprey, Nov
Louie Cukela — Dieckmann, Dec

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## MARINE CORPS RESERVE

I&I Duty: A Challenge....Gilbert, Apr (OP)
Merger Training for Air Reservists....Dantin, May
MARTCOM Report....Robertshaw, Jun
One CO for Organized Reserve Units....Edwards, Jun (OP)
Planning a Combined Reserve Exercise....Godfrey, Aug
CO/I&I Setup: Anomaly or Good Sense....Barron, Aug (OP)
One CO, One Staff—a Better Reserve....Penico, Aug (OP)

## MARKSMANSHIP

Let's Shoot to Win....McMillan, Woods, Aug
We Don't Need Team Shots....Hickey, Aug

## MISCELLANEOUS

Duty Officers Are for Duty....Prickett, Jan (Scrapbook)
You Can Speak in Public....Barnes, Jan
Social Security: What it Means to You....Lutz, Feb
Stability: It's Wonderful....Geissinger, Feb
Transplacement: Opportunity and Challenge....Miller, Feb
Retirement Job Outlook....Maguire, Feb
Gift Giving Has Got to Go....Rockey, Mar (OP)
The Last Confederate....Andrews, Apr
Guerrilla Warfare References....Scrapbook, May
An Invisible Barrier....Gabancho, Simmons, May
How to Win at Poker....Snyder, May (OP)
Rig it Right....Galbraith, Good, Jun (Scrapbook)
Marines Afloat....Cryan, Sept
The First Principle of War....Edmond, Sept
Guerrilla Warfare References....Ney, Sept (Scrapbook)
Parris Island Exposed....translated from Krasnva Zvezda

## MOTOR TRANSPORT

Why Not Truck Teams?....Badeker, Apr (OP)
Why Aren't Drivers Good Mechanics?....McManus, Aug (OP)
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## NEW DEVELOPMENTS

Troop Tests: Small Unit Ideas....Staff, Mar (Looking Ahead)
Space Age Conquest....Knocke, May
Modernization: Our Next Step....Shore, May (OP)
FMF 1965 (Proposed Organization and Equipment)....Staff, Jul
FMF 1965 (Proposed Organization and Equipment)....Staff, Aug
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FMF 1965 (Proposed Organization and Equipment)....Staff, Sept
FMF 1965 (Proposed Organization and Equipment)....Staff, Oct
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The 86th Congress....Blandford, Jan
The Symington Report....Staff, Jan (Newsletter)
Where Will You Serve?....Fredericks, Feb
The Commandant's Views, Designs and Policies.
Guidance for You in 1961....Gen D. M. Shoup, Feb
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Saving Time, Words, and Tempers....Wright, Apr (OP)
Our Government....Runyan, May
Benny Suggs—Neglected Marine....Bruce, Jun (OP)
Out of the Foggy Night....Warren, Jul (OP)
Weigh Your Words....Andrews, Nov (OP)

## SUPPLY AND LOGISTICS

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Supply: A Function of Fightin'....Medina, Feb
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The Marines Combat Load....G-4 Staff, HQMC, Jul
Comat Supply Class V: Ammunition....G-4 Staff, HQMC, Jul
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Vertical Envelopment: 1944....Grant, Feb
Hound the Enemy....Clapper, Feb
Organic Artillery for the Infantry....Smith, Feb (OP)
Eyeball Boresighting....Girard, Feb (OP)
So Sorry, No Speak English....Perkons, Feb (OP)
Prospects for a "Multi-Purpose FO" Today....Patterson, Mar (OP)
Rogers' Rangers: Recon Company 1757....Cuneo, Mar
Fighting With Words....May, Mar (OP)
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Recon for Regiments....Pickett, Apr (OP)
Problem: Crossing the River....Strandberg, Apr (Scrapbook)
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Force Recon....Meyers, May
That Direction's North....Clapper, Jun
Problem: Trafficability....Strandberg, Jun (Scrapbook)
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Encirclement Methods in Anti-Guerrilla Warfare..Htaik, Aug (Scrapbook)
Anyone for Squirrels?....Kees, Sept (OP)

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Do-It-Yourself Linguist....Kim, Hawkins, Mar
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| **Asprey,** R. B. | Nov | The Eternal Spirit |
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| **Dutton,** B. F. | Nov | The IG and the Staff NCOs |
| **Eddy,** S. L. | Jan | Fit to Fight? |
| **Edmonds,** E. B. | Sept | The First Principle of War |
| **Edwards,** H. W. | Jun | One CO For Organized Reserve Units |
| **Eliot,** G. F. | Oct | Road to Disaster |
| **Ewers,** N. G. | Sept | Marine Aviation Needs More Combat Billets |
| **Fredericks,** H. D. | Dec | Where Will You Serve? |
| **Fuller,** J. F. C. | Dec | Permutations of War |
| **Gabancho,** A., and **Simmons,** E. H. | May | An Invisible Barrier |
| **Galbraith,** H. T. and **Good,** R. N. | June | Rig It Right |
| **Gawjesky,** L. | Jan | Soviet Military Justice |
| **Geiger,** G. J. | Jan | Soviet Helicopters |
| **Geissinger,** R. S. | Feb | Stability: It's Wonderful |
| **G-4 Staff HQMC** | Jul | Rations: Combat Supply Class I |
| **G-4 Staff HQMC** | Jul | Fuel: Combat Supply Class III |
| **G-4 Staff HQMC** | Jul | The Marine's Combat Load |
| **G-4 Staff HQMC** | Jul | Ammunition: Combat Supply Class V |
| **Gilbert,** W. S. | Apr | I&I Duty: A Challenge |
| **Girard,** D. D. | Feb | Eyeball Boresighting |
| **Godfrey,** P. E. | Aug | Planning a Combined Reserve Exercise |
| **Graham,** L. M. | Apr | The Place of the Low Disc Loading VTOL in the Future Manned Military Aircraft Spectrum |
| **Grant,** W. W. | Jan | Money and Marines |
| **Grant,** F. N. | Feb | Vertical Envelopment 1944 |
| **Green,** F. A. | Oct | Training Can Have More Realism |
| **Griffith,** S. B. | Apr | Some Chinese Thoughts on War |
| **Hargreaves,** R. | Dec | Gallipoli |
| **Heilner,** M. H. | Aug | The Communists Strategy of Time |
| **Hickey,** W. C. | Aug | We Don't Need Team Shots |
| **High,** W. F. | Jun | Aviation Ground Training for Defense |
| **Hill,** L. G. | Jun | Rommel: Fox or Fake |
| **Holmes,** C. A. | Apr | Pass the Ammo—to a Specialist |
| **Htaik,** T. | Aug | Encirclement Methods in Anti-Guerrilla Warfare |

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| **Johnson**, C. M. | Jan | Strength From Within |
| **Johnson**, L. E. | Jan | Comm Costs on the Rise |
| **Johnson**, W. R. | Aug | Survive! |
| **Jones**, M. | Mar | This is BUWEPS |
| **Kees**, E. | Sept | Anyone for Squirrels? |
| **Kelly**, J. J. | Sept | MOS + MCI = G-2 |
| **Kennedy**, J. F. | Jun | The President: On the Deeper Struggle |
| **Kennedy**, J. F. | Nov | Deterrent or Defense |
| **Kim**, C. C. and **Hawkins**, D. C. | May | Do-It-Yourself Linguist |
| **Knocke**, J. K. | May | Space Age Conquest |
| **Krasnava Zvezda** | Nov | Parris Island Exposed |
| **Krongard**, A. B. | May | A Modest Proposal |
| **LaRussa**, H. J. | May | Who's Got the Ball? |
| **Liddell Hart**, B. H. | Jan | Danger on the Flanks of NATO |
| **Lisenby**, W. E. | Mar | More on Bullpup |
| **Long**, F. A. | Jan | Embarkation Via MSTS |
| **Love**, J. R. | Jan | Trained to Kill |
| **Lutz**, R. C. | Feb | Social Security: What it Means to You |
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| **Maguire**, J. B. | Feb | Retirement Job Outlook |
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| **May**, R. E. | Mar | Fighting With Words |
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| **McClure**, G. C. | Apr | One Book for Aviation |
| **McDonald**, J. K. | Feb | Atoms Are No Answer |
| **McDonald**, J. A. | July | Quadruple Trouble |
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| **McMillan**, W. W., and **Woods**, R. M. | Aug | Let's Shoot to Win |
| **McMillan**, G. | Nov | P I Today |
| **Medina**, T. J. | Feb | Supply: A Function of Fightin' |
| **Metzger**, L. | Jul | The Care and Feeding of Young Officers |
| **Meyers**, B. F. | Jan | Battalion Air Mount Out |
| **Meyers**, B. F. | May | Force Recon |
| **Miller**, J. G. | Feb | Transplacement: Opportunity or Challenge |
| **Miller**, W. L. | Mar | Riot Control With Chemical Agents |
| **Millett**, A. L. | June | Combat Refresher Course |
| **Mitchell**, F. H. | Sept | No Leaks, No Bumps—No Lift |
| **Moore**, Y. H. | Feb | Morale: A State of Mind |
| **Myers**, L. B. | Oct | It's Your Decision |
| **Ne'eman**, Y. | Nov | The Unorthodox Israeli Army |
| **Nelson**, H. A. | Apr | Bigger Payloads for the HUS |
| **Ney**, V. | Sept | Guerrilla Warfare References |
| **Nomdeplume** | | A Military Briefing on Laos |
| **O'Brien**, L. J. | Sept | Tact |
| **O'Connor**, J. F. | Nov | Wanted: Hairy Fisted Marines |
| **Ogorkiewicz**, R. M. | Apr | Unexploited Concepts |
| **Ottot**, G. E. | Sept | A Priority for Physical Training |
| **Patterson**, K. G. | Mar | Prospects for the "Multi-purpose FO" Today |
| **Penico**, E. F. | Aug | One CO, one Staff—A Better Reserve |
| **Perkons**, P. J. | Feb | So Sorry, No Speak English |
| **Peterson**, H. C. | Jun | La Guerra de Guerrillas I |
| **Peterson**, H. C. | Jul | La Guerra de Guerrillas II |
| **Peterson**, H. C. | Aug | La Guerra de Guerrillas III |
| **Peterson**, H. C. | Aug | Castro Critiques Invasion |
| **Pickett**, L. L. | Jan | Recon for Regiments |
| **Prickett**, W. F. | Jan | Duty Officers Are For Duty |
| **Reynolds**, J. A. C. | Nov | Terrorist Activity in Malaya |
| **Robertshaw**, L. B. | June | MARTCOM Report |
| **Rockey**, W. K. | Mar | Gift Giving Has Got To Go |
| **Runyan**, C. F. | May | Our Government |
| **Schimmenti**, J. A. | Sept | Eyes Aloft |
| **Sexton**, M. J. | Jun | Small Unit Training on Okinawa |
| **Shearer**, W. T. | May | Improve NCOs and You Improve USMC |
| **Shore**, H. E. | May | Modernization: Our Next Step |
| **Shoup**, D. M. | Feb | Commandant's Views for 1961 |
| **Slakosky** | Aug | Robots for 1965 |
| **Smith**, A. C. | Feb | Organic Artillery for the Infantry |
| **Smith**, F. H. | Apr | Nuclear Weapons and Limited War |
| **Smith**, C. J. | Apr | Red China's Military Revolution |
| **Smith**, A. C. | Jul | Eagle Eyes for the Division |
| **Snyder**, E. N. | May | How to Win at Poker |
| **Spark**, M. | Apr | Unlimited War: A Non-nuclear Strategy |
| **Spark**, M. | Apr | Operation Arbela 1962 |
| **Spring**, G. E. | Jan | Pass the Word and Keep Control |
| **Staar**, R. F. | Sept | Soviet Comments on Vertical Envelopment |
| **Staff** | Jan | The Symington Report |
| **Staff** | Mar | LAW Rocket Grenade Launcher XM72 |
| **Staff** | Mar | Troop Tests: Small Unit Ideas |
| **Staff** | Apr | What's Ahead for Marine Aviation? |
| **Staff** | May | SATS: A Bright Future |
| **Staff** | Jun | MarDiv Preview |
| **Staff** | Jul-Dec | FMF 1965 (Proposed Organization and Equipment) |
| **Steinkraus**, L. F. | Feb | Carrier CAS in AFSOUTH |
| **Stephens**, L. A. | Jan | Fast Amphibious Forces |
| **Stiffler**, L. E. | Oct | Seabees—1961 |
| **Strandberg**, C. H. | Jan | Problem: Selecting a Bivouac Area |
| **Strandberg**, C. H. | Apr | Problem: Crossing the River |
| **Strandberg**, C. H. | Jun | Problem: Trafficability |
| **Strandberg**, C. H. | Oct | Royal Marines UK |
| **Strandberg**, C. H. | Nov | Philippine Marines |
| **Strandberg**, C. H. | Dec | Netherlands Marines |
| **Sullivan**, W. E. | Sept | Report from the Ready Forces: 1MAW |
| **Szuch**, A. W. | Nov | Tradition: Curse or Blessing |
| **Tanham**, G. K. | Sept | Something to Fight For |
| **Taylor**, M. L. | Apr | Misdirectives |
| **Thompson**, T. W. | Oct | Force MT |
| **Trainor**, B. E. | May | Let's Transfer Ontos to Barstow |
| **Utley**, E. H. | Nov | New Approach to Leadership Training |
| **Utter**, L. N. | Feb | Soviet Mine Warfare |
| **Verdi**, J. M. | Jun | The Case For Jet CAS |
| **Vick**, W. L. | May | Recovering a Nuclear Fumble |
| **Walters**, R. E. | Nov | Interview with Capt B. H. Liddell Hart |
| **Wlaters**, R. E. | Dec | Interview with Gen Fuller |
| **Warren**, G. F. | Jul | Out of the Foggy Night |
| **Weller**, J. | Aug | Area Fire |
| **Weller**, J. | Sept | Combined Fire |
| **Weller**, J. | Oct | Aimed Fire |
| **Wilkinson**, J. B. | Feb | New Syllabus at 1st ITR |
| **Wright**, R. D. | Apr | Saving Time, Words, and Tempers |

## SUMMARY OF TOP NEWS STORIES OF 1961 PUBLISHED IN MCA NEWSLETTER

### JANUARY

**GMST & Promotion**—Advance word on new enlisted promotion policy.
**Regimented Battalions**—Rotation schedule of Transplacement Bns.
**Air Delivery**—New air delivery bomb capsule dropped from A4D
**The Symington Report**—Recommendations on reorganizing DoD
**Carrying a Load**—Multiple bomb racks handle three ton loads

### FEBRUARY

**Special Report**—Guidance for you in 1961 from the Commandant
**Staff NCO Promotions**—How FY '61 1stSgts/MSgts got picked
**Bolte Committee**—Changes in basic law on officer careers

### MARCH

**National Defense**—Eisenhower budget requests for the Marine Corps
**TempO Reshuffle**—Why MarCor is phasing out temporary officers
**M14**—MarCor adopts Manual of Arms without magazine
**CMC Asks Action**—Putting CMC Guidance to work
**Officer Retirement**—More liberal under-30-year retirement policy
**A New Picture**—What's ahead for 30,000 Reserve officers
**New Reserve Units**—Progress and growth of Organized Reserve

### APRIL

**Corps Standing Tall**—What CMC told House Armed Services Committee
**Homes for Marines**—Work resumes on Camp Lejeune Capeharts
**Officer Promotion**—Chances for promotion this year
**Golden Wings**—Shortage of candidates for flight school
**Testing and Promotion**—GMST test dates, how to prepare for them
**PR&PEB**—Commandt's board; what it does
**Special Report**—4th MEB reports on LANTPHIBX 1-61
**Operation Rajata**—Marines hold key billets in West Pac CPX

### MAY

**In War and Peace**—Laos flareup, how MarCor met the challenge
**Mobility and Marines**—A look at our Amphibious Fleet
**Guidance from SecNav**
**Your Military Education**—Re MCS. Who can go and why
**Too Little, Not Enough**—Specific MOS training asked for Reservists
**Congress and the Corps**—Increased budget for Marines
**Are You General Officer Material?** A simple test to find out
**Well Dressed Marines**—Blue uniform reduced in price

### JUNE

**MarDiv Preview**—A look at proposed Marine Division—1965
**HQMC Reorganization**—What's being done about it
**Homes for Marines**—A look at housing around MarCor
**Tactical Fire Power**—SecDev views CAS at Camlej
**Shooting Fronts**—Division Rifle and Pistol winners
**Stay in Shape**—IG tests Marines for physical fitness
**Division Reunions**—When and where in 1961

### JULY

**More Marines Sooner**—190,000 Marines okayed by President
**New Reserve Careers**—Advantages of a SWAG
**Stealth vs Force**—Report on Phase II of Troop Tests
**The Little Board**—Figuring the cost of a BLT
**Shooting Fronts**—Marines Corps Matches winners

### AUGUST

**Your Service Career**—What Congress is doing about it.
**Space Age Marines**—Report on Marines assigned to Project Mercury
**Organized Reserve**—OMCR increased by 500
**Reserve Summer School**—Report on Junior/Senior School for Reserves

### SEPTEMBER

**The Berlin Crisis**—What's in it for Marines?
**More Marines, More Readiness**—Report on planned 4th MarDiv
**General Officers Slate**—Where they are going and when
**Decisions, Decisions**—Machine help for selection boards
**Staff NCO Promotion Pattern**—New pattern to SNCO promotions

### OCTOBER

**How do You Spend More Money?**—1962 shopping list
**Shooting the M14**—Basic School tries it, gives stamp of approval
**Sad, Sad Story**—Capt Putteroffer loses his shirt through neglect
**Shooting Fronts**—How Marines did at Camp Perry

### NOVEMBER

**Crisis in Berlin**—A special news report by a former Marine, includes order of battle of Communist forces in East Germany
**The Joint Account**—How MarCor spends Navy money
**Weapons Fronts**—XM-70 survives hard look from DoD

### DECEMBER

**Grim Determination, No Hate**—CMC reports on Far East trip
**Service and Support**—Report on Phase II of Troop Test
**Air-Ground Reserve**—Guidance from CMC on 1962 Reserve Exercises
**Target: Shooting**—More Marines encouraged to shoot

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


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


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